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Abstract 
 
By now, the conventional wisdom of globalisation is well-known.  It tells the story of a 
radical circumscription of policy-making autonomy.  A heightened incidence of 
international capital mobility has been sufficient to place all governments in an effective 
political straitjacket.  Internatonal financial markets are assumed to tolerate only the most 
strictly orthodox monetary policies; governments which ignore these new structural 
economic realities face ‘punishment beatings’ administered by the markets in the form of 
mass capital flight.  This story is now so familiar that we are often told that it needs no 
repetition. 
 
In this thesis, I distance myself from such a conclusion.  I suggest that its very familiarity 
is itself a source of analytical interest.  Such is the frequency with which public policy-
makers appeal to these new ‘structural realities’ as an automatic guide for policy that it is 
possible that the conventional wisdom of globalisation has itself become a conditioning 
influence on policy.  I illustrate this argument with respect to the British case in general 
and, in particular, with respect to New Labour’s constant invocation of the ‘demands’ of a 
global economy to rationalise its distinctive policy choice. 
 
I begin with a critical deconstruction of the conventional wisdom of globalisation.  If the 
world does indeed resemble that depicted in the conventional wisdom, the claim that 
policy change is structurally determined at the economic level could well be sustainable.  
However, I show that globalisation rhetoric corresponds poorly with globalisation reality, 
suggesting that other causal influences on policy change must also be explored.  I argue 
that in addition to examining the international economic conditions of domestic political 
change, a more comprehensive understanding of the globalisation experience emerges if 
we also examine the domestic political conditions of international economic change.  
Viewed through such a perspective, New Labour’s appropriation of the conventional 
wisdom of globalisation appears to be strategic.  The repeated appeal to ‘globalising 
necessities’ has been used to displace the need for active consent to the political status 
quo in Britain.  So long as the conventional wisdom continues to resonate within public 
discourse, the continued reproduction of the political status quo seems secure; even 
though I demonstrate that the management of the economy within the parameters of that 
status quo has become increasingly contradictory.  Moreover, so long as the government 
acts in a manner consistent with the globalisation hypothesis, I show that path-dependent 
effects threaten to lock-in precisely those structural constraints which its globalisation 
rhetoric at present purportedly merely describes.  As a consequence, this process of lock-
in would then also inscribe the current contradictions within the government’s economic 
policy as a structural feature of the macroeconomic regime. 
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INTRODUCTION: 
 
CONSTRUCTING A RESEARCH AGENDA 
FOR THE STUDY OF ‘GLOBALISING OUTCOMES’ 
 
 
 
  2 
 
 
 
 
“‘Globalisation’ is the most over-used and under-specified concept of 
the post-Cold War era.”    (Higgott 1999: 2) 
 
 
 
Richard Higgott is surely right: ‘globalisation’ is the most over-used and under-specified 
concept relating to the structure of the world in which we live.  Indeed, this claim has 
now been accepted within the academic community to such an extent that the simple 
statement that ‘globalisation’ is an over-used and under-specified concept has itself 
become over-used and remains under-specified.  The aim of this thesis is to attempt to 
render explicit the precise ways in which the concept of globalisation remains under-
theorised both in the existing academic literature and in wider public policy-making 
discourse. 
 
 
  3 
‘Exemplary Questions’ in the Globalisation Literature 
 
The academic debate on globalisation has passed through a number of distinct phases (see 
Kofman & Youngs 1996; Hay & Marsh 1999 for possible typologies).  A particular 
exemplary question has tended to animate the prevailing research agenda relating to the 
study of globalisation during each of these phases.  Indeed, the move from one phase to 
another has typically been activated by the move from the dominance of one exemplary 
question to another.  Hence, the exemplary questions themselves become a useful means 
of classifying the development in the literature. 
 
The majority of the early debate on globalisation revolved around the perceived 
‘consequences’ of globalising tendencies, tendencies which were themselves treated as 
unproblematic independent variables.  In other words, the most frequently asked 
questions took the form of what globalisation ‘does’.  Attention consequently focused on 
the kinds of political interventions which globalisation either ‘forced’ governments to 
make, or ‘prevented’ them from making. 
 
Interestingly, much of the public discourse on globalisation, and therefore much of the 
policy-making debate set within the context of globalisation, continues to be couched in 
these terms.  The initial academic construction of the significance of globalising 
tendencies continues to exert a disproportionate influence on the policy-making process.  
This is surely significant, if for no other reason than that the academic debate itself has 
moved on from its initial construction of ‘globalising necessities’.  Indeed, whilst still 
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framed in terms of the exemplary question of what globalisation ‘does’, the academic 
literature took a decisive turn towards deconstructing the very notion that globalisation 
came complete with any ‘necessities’ at all.  Put simply, the general orientation of the 
literature oscillated wildly from one extreme to another.  Initially, it tended to be assumed 
that globalisation ‘did’ all manner of things, effectively providing a political blueprint 
from which no government had the luxury of opting out.  Subsequently, however, it 
tended to be assumed that globalisation ‘did’ little, or maybe even nothing at all.  The 
paradigm-shift which much of the early literature had attributed to the emergence of 
globalising tendencies (see, for instance, Levitt 1983; Ohmae 1990; Greider 1996; 
Thomas 1997) was latterly recast as being largely mythical (see, for instance, Hirst & 
Thompson 1996; Wade 1996; Rodrik 1997; Doremus et al 1998).  At this point, the 
academic debate on globalisation reached something of an impasse, with an increasingly 
sophisticated range of mutually-contradictory empirical ‘evidence’ being presented by 
first one side and then the other. 
 
The debate made little headway until a rather different research agenda emerged under the 
influence of a new exemplary question.  The general orientation of the literature has 
moved from asking questions about what globalisation ‘does’ to questions about what 
globalisation ‘is’ (early examples of such work being, for instance, Kofman & Youngs 
1996; Mittelman 1996).  This change has been significant.  For, it has moved the debate 
from a concern with the material extent of globalisation, to a concern with how the world 
has come to be globalised to the extent that it has in the first place.  Globalisation has 
therefore ceased to be an unproblematic independent variable, and has increasingly 
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become a dependent variable which it is necessary to render problematic in the search for 
analytical clarity.  That search has been animated by a desire to transcend conventional 
understandings of globalisation, from which consciously acting subjects have tended to 
be conspicuous by their absence.  As soon as globalisation is understood as a process, and 
globalising outcomes as effects which are actively formed, it is clear that accounts of 
globalisation must include references to consciously acting subjects. 
 
By asking questions about what globalisation ‘is’, political subjects have been 
increasingly inserted into accounts of globalising processes.  This has allowed the 
academic debate on the current restructuring of the international economy to be released 
from the impasse of an ever more sterile discussion of what, in strict empirical terms, 
would count as being evidence of a world consistent with the globalisation hypothesis.  In 
particular, such developments have been the cue for the analysis of globalising tendencies 
to be situated within a more explicitly theoretical perspective.  Where once the debate 
centred on how much market interdependency was required for us to sustain plausible 
narratives about the international economy having been globalised, now its focus tends to 
be on who is driving the tendency towards market interdependence, and why they should 
be doing so.1 
 
                                                          
1 Of course, there is also a burgeoning literature on cultural aspects of globalisation (see, for instance, 
Featherstone 1990; Giddens 1990; Robertson 1992; Lash & Urry 1994; Axford 1995; Waters 1995; Albrow 
1996; Appadurai 1996; Wilson & Dissanayake 1996; Sassen 1998).  However, my concerns centre 
specifically on the political economy of globalisation.  As a consequence, the focus of the chapters which 
follow will be restricted to this latter area. 
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It is within the context of this latter literature that this thesis should be read.  My aim is 
two-fold: to deepen existing knowledge derived from asking the question of what 
globalisation ‘is’, whilst simultaneously extending the analysis in altogether new 
directions.  In particular, I intend to depart from the parameters of the existing literature 
by asking not only about the processes which constitute evidence of globalisation, but 
also about the processes which the reflex political appeal to the image of ‘globalising 
necessities’ is used to obscure. 
 
Put simply, the thesis focuses on the causal tendencies which are currently driving 
economic restructuring at both the national and the international level.  However, I 
suggest that the relationship between structural economic change and globalisation is 
more complex than a simple line of causation running from the latter to the former would 
imply.  This may well be the notion of causality which dominates much of the academic 
literature as well as almost all public policy debates, but it will not feature in the chapters 
which follow here.  The very word ‘globalisation’ now tends to be used in both academic 
and public discourse as a unifying signifier capable of describing and explaining every 
aspect of current economic restructuring.  Yet, there are no grounds on which to construct 
this simple conflation between ‘globalisation’ and ‘change’. 
 
If there is a single assumption on which this thesis is founded, it is that conceptual clarity 
is sacrificed whenever ‘globalisation’ and ‘change’ are treated as synonyms.  It may be 
true that some aspects of recent international economic restructuring have involved an 
increase in market interdependencies across space, much as the globalisation hypothesis 
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would predict.  In other instances, however, whilst structural change has certainly 
occurred, the defining feature of that change has not necessarily been that it is global in 
nature.  Hence, globalisation is not always even a good description of the restructuring 
tendencies which are currently visible within the international economy.  To then ascribe 
causal status to globalising processes in such circumstances must surely, then, be a 
mistake. 
 
I argue that it is an open empirical question as to which aspects of recent international 
economic restructuring can be described, let alone explained, through reference to 
globalisation.  All-too-often in the existing literature, however, the causal status of 
globalisation is unchallenged.  This has resulted in globalisation being introduced as an 
explanatory variable even in circumstances in which we have other explanatory variables 
at our disposal which may make our analytical accounts of international economic events 
more precise.  For instance, the significance which is currently attached to constructing 
academic debates on economic policy through the perspective of globalisation runs the 
very real risk of ‘crowding out’ from the intellectual market-place, amongst others, 
debates concerning financial liberalisation, tariff reform and regional economic 
integration. 
 
This is my major source of contention with the academic literature on globalisation as it 
is currently constituted.  Of course, this is not to imply that every account of international 
economic restructuring should be adversely labelled in this way.  Yet, so long as this is 
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read as a statement about the general orientation of the literature rather than every piece 
ever written about globalisation, it would seem to hold. 
 
My appeal to others working on the political economy of globalisation is four-fold: 
 
i) to distinguish clearly and unambiguously between those instances in which 
globalisation is being used solely as a descriptive term, to describe the current 
state of the world; and those instances in which it is being used as an 
explanatory term, to explain the way in which that state of the world was 
created; 
ii) to treat the difference between the descriptive and explanatory uses of 
globalisation as an empirical question, and to note that the answer to that 
empirical question is likely to be specific to the market, factor of production, 
commodity, country etc under review; 
iii) to resist the temptation to follow public discourse by labelling all processes 
of contemporary economic change as ‘evidence’ of globalisation, even in 
circumstances in which more accurate descriptive or explanatory terms are 
available; and 
iv) to analyse the way in which the misattribution of causal status to 
globalisation can itself have subsequent political effects; and to hold open the 
possibility that a desire to produce such effects may even lead to the strategic 
misuse of the concept of globalisation within public policy debates. 
 
  9 
These are the conceptual concerns which animate this thesis.  I turn now to the way in 
which these concerns are applied in the chapters which follow. 
 
 
 
 
The Case for an Ideational Turn in the Study of ‘Globalising Outcomes’: The Discourse 
of Globalisation as Independent Causal Influence 
 
There are a number of claims to novelty to be found in the chapters which follow.  All, 
however, are based on a single break with the general orientation of the political economy 
literature on globalisation.  It is usual for globalisation to be viewed as a material 
economic process, and for ‘globalising necessities’ to be read off as a political 
epiphenomenon of that process.  Here, by contrast, I suggest that the existence of the 
material economic process is by no means a prerequisite for the existence of the 
‘globalising necessities’ which tend to be attributed to it.  It may appear somewhat 
paradoxical at first glance, but I argue that globalisation per se is not automatically a 
prerequisite for the institutionalisation of ‘globalising necessities’.  In other words, it is 
possible that governments are undertaking political reform, aided and abetted by appeal to 
the ‘conditioning effects’ of an external economic structure which is far less pervasive in 
reality than it is in rhetoric.  I suggest that the very appeal to the image of a determining 
external context has a more significant political impact than the actual nature of that 
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context would justify.  As such, I conclude that ideas about globalisation can have an 
independent causal influence on subsequent political outcomes. 
 
Little has thus far been written from such a perspective (although, for rare exceptions, see 
Piven 1995; Douglas 1996; Schmidt 1997; Hay & Watson 1998; Watson 1999b; Hay, 
Watson & Wincott 1999; Rosamond 1999).  Given the exponential growth in the political 
economy literature on globalisation in recent years, this perhaps might seem surprising.2  
Furthermore, given the potentially fruitful lines of investigation which such a perspective 
opens up, it is perhaps also to be lamented. 
 
My aim in what follows is to identify the outline of a future research programme in this 
area.  As such, I am aware that the empirical content of the thesis is somewhat limited.  I 
have only a single case study, for instance, and the lack of a comparative perspective 
within the empirical material reduces the status of the case study from the potentially 
explanatory to the merely illustrative.  In addition, for an analysis which concentrates on 
the significance of the way in which ideas are first formed and then articulated, there is a 
noticeable absence of primary interview data.  Rather, I rely on speeches and public 
interviews given by senior party officials, as well as on a whole host of supporting party 
policy documents.  As such, it is to be hoped that the thesis will be read as part of a wider 
research programme.  It remains work in progress insofar as it represents stage one of a 
two-stage process.  Stage two will entail the collection of more extensive primary data 
                                                          
2 However, given the rather isolated nature of analytical accounts which do no more than pay lip-service to 
the independent causal influence of economic ideas in general, this may not actually be that surprising.  For 
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across a range of different countries.  The aim in the chapters which follow is to provide a 
conceptual framework suited to the task of organising that data as and when it is 
processed. 
 
The analytical content of stage one of this wider research programme revolves around the 
claim that the impact of globalisation on domestic economic policy may be rhetorical as 
well as substantive.  This is not to suggest that the experience of ‘globalising necessities’ 
within society is any less real in circumstances in which their origins are rhetorical.  It is 
merely to suggest that the economistic notion of causality which dominates much of the 
debate about globalisation is more problematic than is often argued.  I suggest that 
governments act on perceptions of reality rather than on any unmediated objective reality.  
In a contingent world of incomplete information, it is extremely rare for us to experience 
a moment in which there is an absolute correspondence between perceptions of reality 
and actual reality. 
 
Two observations should be made at this stage: 
 
i) Firstly, if it is to be assumed that governments act on perceptions of reality 
rather than directly upon reality per se, the existence of a determining 
economic structure is by no means a necessary condition for governments to 
act in a manner consistent with the existence of such a structure.  In other 
words, the mere perception that we now live in a world of ‘globalising 
                                                                                                                                                                             
examples of work which seeks to overturn this orientation within the political economy literature, see Hall 
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necessities’ may be all that is required for governments to implement the 
policy prescriptions of those ‘necessities’. 
ii) Secondly, it is clear that the government’s control of the educative 
functions of the state means that it is highly influential in the process through 
which a dominant perception of reality first forms and then becomes accepted 
as part of ‘common-sense’ within society.  Therefore, it is necessary to explore 
not only the way in which governments act on perceptions of reality rather 
than reality per se, but also the way in which governments are actively 
involved in the creation of those perceptions in the first place.  This suggests 
that, contrary to the claims of the conventional wisdom of globalisation, 
governments are not necessarily the innocent victims of exogenous economic 
forces.  We must also hold open the possibility that some governments may 
have strategically appropriated the image of ‘innocent victim’ in order to 
facilitate their domestic political goals.  Such a possibility remains even more 
unexplored in the existing literature. 
 
Viewed through such a perspective, the lines of causation which dominate the existing 
literature on globalisation immediately begin to look more blurred.  One of the more 
intriguing lines of investigation which this perspective opens up is the possibility that a 
dominant discourse of globalisation becomes some form of self-fulfilling prophecy.  At 
the very least, acting in a manner consistent with the assumption of globalisation is likely 
to summon the consequences that such an assumption would predict.  Ideas about 
                                                                                                                                                                             
1989; MacNamara 1997; Carrier & Miller 1998; Blyth 2000. 
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globalisation may therefore have to be treated as a political trigger which serves to create 
the institutional realities which they are simply meant to reflect (on which point, see also 
Piven 1995; Panitch 1996; Rose 1996; Hay, Watson & Wincott 1999).  In other words, 
governments which enlist the image of an exogenous economic straitjacket may, through 
the consequences of their own actions, serve to produce institutional arrangements which 
actually do act as some sort of straitjacket on the realm of the politically possible (this is 
an issue which I explore in depth in chapters 6-8; see also Watson 1997, 1999a, 1999b). 
 
The tendency towards central bank independence offers the clearest example of such a 
process.  The appeal to ‘globalising necessities’ in order to rationalise such a tendency 
has become a standard feature of public policy discourse.3  ‘The markets’, it is said, will 
not tolerate anything other than the strictest macroeconomic orthodoxy.  The threat of 
capital flight consequently conditions the search for a new institutional bargain which 
mitigates against the pursuit of more heterodox monetary policies.  Typically, that search 
has ended with the move to delegate monetary policy-making responsibility away from 
institutional arrangements which have shown themselves to be permeable to democratic 
demands, and towards institutional arrangements which are dominated by purely 
technical concerns. 
                                                          
3 This is true both at the national level (witness the rhetoric and the actions of a whole range of domestic 
governments) and at the international level (witness the rhetoric and the actions of a whole range of 
international financial institutions). 
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Moreover, this is not all.  In purely technical terms, the ability to demonstrate an 
inflation-sensitive macroeconomic policy can be approached from a number of different 
directions.  This is not only a theoretical possibility, but an empirical fact as well.  In 
previous time periods, ‘the markets’ would appear to have been placated by government 
policies crafted from a range of often mutually incompatible macroeconomic stances.  In 
other words, the actual history of capital flows suggests that financial markets operate 
along rather more complex lines than the uni-dimensional logic which dominates the 
image of ‘globalising necessities’.  However, it has been precisely this image of a single 
systemic logic to market action which has been used to justify not only the transfer of 
policy-making initiative to central banks, but also the specific appointment of 
conservative central bankers to oversee the policy-making role. 
 
This distinctive pattern of appointments has had two effects.  Firstly, and most obviously, 
it has confirmed that the move to new institutional arrangements for the conduct of 
monetary policy would be followed by the introduction of a strictly orthodox monetary 
policy.  Furthermore, the ‘behind closed doors’ element to the decision-making process 
within the new institutional arrangements means that popular political mobilisation to the 
demands of monetary orthodoxy is no longer necessary for the reproduction of such a 
stance. 
 
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the move to new institutional arrangements for 
the conduct of monetary policy (both domestically and internationally) threatens to create 
precisely the uni-dimensional logic to market action to which it is supposed to be a 
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response.  To the extent that it makes sense at all to view capital flows as the markets 
passing judgement on domestic economic policy, the markets tend to judge government 
behaviour on the basis of what governments say they are going to do.  In previous time 
periods, then, when different governments announced that they intended to pursue their 
economic goals in a range of different ways, the markets judged their relative success or 
failure accordingly.  This is what accounts for the apparently multi-dimensional logic to 
market action at that time.  However, with the appeal to ‘globalising necessities’ acting as 
a trigger for convergence around new international institutional norms, the pursuit of 
domestic economic policy goals has also tended to undergo a process of convergence.  As 
a consequence, governments are increasingly asking the markets to judge them on the 
same basis, and capital flows have been reconstituted accordingly. 
 
What we have seen emerging, then, may well be the appearance of a uni-dimensional 
logic to market action.  However, irrespective of attempts to rationalise such a logic in 
terms of being simply ‘the way things are’ in an era of globalisation, it is important to 
note that this logic did not pre-exist the institutional arrangements which make its 
appearance possible.  It may well be that the pattern of contemporary capital flows 
increasingly suggests a market preference for only the strictest of macroeconomic 
policies, but this is because governments have constructed new institutional arrangements 
for the conduct of policy which accept the claims of macroeconomic orthodoxy.  As such, 
capital flows which circumscribe the parameters of the politically possible are every bit as 
much the consequence of externalising monetary policy-making responsibility as they are 
its cause.  Indeed, if we are looking for the cause of such a tendency, then we perhaps 
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need to look no further than the process through which the mis-specification of 
‘globalising necessities’ has led to the assumption of an absolute imperative to delegate 
policy-making responsibility away from democratic decision-making structures.  Whether 
that mis-specification has been unintended or strategic must remain an open empirical 
question at this stage, but this is an issue to which I return in later chapters. 
 
For now, it is sufficient that this illustration demonstrates that ideas about globalisation 
are a significant independent causal influence on the production of ‘globalising 
outcomes’.4  This, of course, should not be confused with a rather more extreme 
ontological claim that there is no extra-discursive realm.  That is most definitely not my 
position.  I do suggest that changes in the way in which the extra-discursive realm is 
perceived can have an important conditioning effect on the way in which that realm is 
subsequently experienced.  But this is clearly not to claim that there are no material 
structures underpinning the international economy.  Nor is it to claim that those structures 
have not been subjected to crucial dynamics of change in recent years.  However, it is to 
insist that the mechanisms of change are treated as an endogenous process, and that ideas 
about globalisation are treated as an integral element of that endogenous process. 
 
Nowhere is it more clear that the structures of the international economy are being 
forceably reconstituted than in the recent deregulatory blitz within the international 
financial markets (see, for instance, Eichengreen 1996; Helleiner 1996).  Every attempt 
has been made to ensure that those markets operate in a manner consistent with a global 
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equilibrium in asset prices.  Yet, there is no sense in which this should be seen as a 
‘natural’ tendency, and certainly no sense in which it is an ‘inevitable’ outcome of a 
globalisation process which itself is seen as a ‘natural’ tendency. 
 
Throughout the thesis, I challenge the idea that the word ‘globalisation’ serves either as a 
useful description or a useful explanation of the changes which have recently been 
imposed on the financial markets.  The very term obscures more causal relationships than 
it reveals.  The important context-shaping changes experienced within the markets in 
recent years are more precisely captured by the concept of liberalisation than by that of 
globalisation.  The importance of the difference between the two concepts can be easily 
stated.  Whilst the image of globalisation implies invisible hand dynamics effecting 
economic change at one stage removed from political control, that of liberalisation 
implies a much more visible political hand conditioning the context for future economic 
change. 
 
This is significant.  For, as soon as we accept that current processes of international 
economic restructuring are inherently political processes, we successfully transcend any 
assumption that there is anything at all ‘natural’ about them.  Of course, this is different 
to saying that these processes have not become in any sense ‘normalised’.  To the extent 
that financial liberalisation has become accepted merely as part of the way that things 
now are, it can be argued that such a tendency has indeed become normalised.  Certainly, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
4 Moreover, this influence is magnified when we add to the analysis the interactive effects of ideas about 
globalisation and the institutions which such ideas have helped to propagate. 
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the reproduction of liberal norms now takes place within a discursive context in which 
the irreversibility of recent financial market deregulation is increasingly taken for granted. 
 
This is most definitely not to argue that financial market deregulation is irreversible.  
Western governments already have the technology at their disposal to tag international 
capital flows as a means of enforcing economic sanctions against non-western 
governments (see Bienefeld 1996).  The same technology could therefore be used by an 
international regulator in order to tag speculative cross-border flows of hot money as a 
means of exposing short-term speculation to tax liability.  To repeat, then, there are no 
technical grounds for supposing that financial market deregulation is irreversible.  
However, the very idea that the irreversibility constraint still applies has been used to 
prevent a discussion of the technicalities of reregulation from entering mainstream public 
policy debates.5  Western public discourse has tended to define financial market 
reregulation effectively as a non-issue.  As a consequence, political influence in the 
process of global market formation can be seen quite clearly as an agenda-setting 
influence.  International financial markets continue to be restructured along the lines of a 
global equilibrium in asset prices, primarily because the discussion of any other form of 
financial regulation has been dismissed as irrelevant within a discursive context 
dominated by assumptions of the unquestionability of the drive towards liberalisation. 
 
Once again, we return to the claim that ideas about international economic restructuring 
can have a causal effect on subsequent political choices independent of the material 
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conditions of the restructuring process.  At the very least, it would seem that ideas about 
international economic restructuring can serve to reinforce the policy implications of that 
structural reform.  Indeed, in the chapters which follow, I make a somewhat bolder claim.  
I suggest that ideas about globalisation are used, often strategically, in order to enforce 
rather more exacting public policy constraints than the actual material extent of 
globalisation would appear to impose. 
 
 
 
 
Structure of the Thesis 
 
In Chapter One, I introduce and then challenge the validity of the conventional wisdom of 
globalisation.  Given that my overall aim is to demonstrate that ideas about globalisation 
can have a causal effect on political outcomes independent of material economic 
processes,6 it is important for me to show that there is a gap between the rhetoric and the 
reality of globalisation.  Quite clearly, were the empirical evidence to reveal that the 
international economy had indeed been globalised in the manner predicted by the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
5 Such an idea has clearly been politically-sponsored, and has proved to be highly convenient for its 
sponsors. 
6 In practice, causality may be more complex than implied by an ‘either/or’ condition suggesting that 
globalising outcomes are produced either by the material reality of globalisation or by ideas about 
globalisation.  For, we might also expect causal tendencies to be established by the interactive effect of 
ideas and material circumstances.  Whilst it is particularly difficult to distinguish unambiguously between 
the causal and the constitutive roles of ideas, I would argue that both roles are evident in the production of 
globalising outcomes.  To keep the analysis as simple as possible at this stage, however, and to highlight the 
major distinction between this thesis and the conventional wisdom of globalisation which pays no attention 
to the independent impact of the ideational realm, I focus for now on the causal role of ideas. 
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globalisation hypothesis, then we could plausibly dismiss the possibility that ideas about 
globalisation have a causal impact on domestic political processes.  For, in such 
circumstances, ideas about globalisation would be nothing more than a reflection of an 
actually existing material reality, and causal status could therefore be attributed simply to 
that actually existing material reality. 
 
On the basis of a review of the empirical literature, however, this is a claim which I find 
both possible and necessary to reject.  Market-clearing metaphors dominate the 
conventional wisdom of globalisation, and I organise my review of the literature around 
the existence of evidence that real-world markets operate in the manner predicted by such 
metaphors.  I find that the assumption of supraterritoriality which makes the conventional 
wisdom’s market-clearing metaphors resonate so strongly in political discourse is 
contradicted by the vast majority of the empirical data.  As such, I conclude that 
contemporary capitalist practices remain embedded in distinct territorial locations. 
 
This conclusion is significant for the arguments advanced in Chapter Two.  Having 
demonstrated in the opening chapter that a significant gap does indeed exist between the 
rhetoric and the reality of globalisation, I turn more specifically in the second chapter to 
an examination of that rhetoric.  In particular, I look at the way in which arguments about 
economic globalisation are linked to arguments about a political crisis of the state.  Two 
distinct narrative strategies can be identified within this dominant political discourse of 
state crisis.  The first relates directly to the market-clearing metaphors which I render 
problematic in Chapter One.  Implicit within the conventional wisdom in this respect is 
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the suggestion that conditions of globalisation force the state into a permanent ‘crisis of 
territoriality’.  The sweeping nature of this claim should not be downplayed.  For, it 
implies that globalisation disturbs the continued reproduction of the very being of the 
state. 
 
The second narrative of state crisis contained within the existing literature is less heroic in 
scope.  In this reading, globalisation is not assumed to prevent the reproduction of the 
state per se, only certain functions which individual states may be called upon to perform 
if popular political mobilisation so dictates.  The retreat of the state in an era of 
globalisation, then, is not necessarily a retreat into obsolescence.  At most, it is assumed 
to be an asymmetric retreat, whereby external economic constraints have left some state 
functions unchanged, whilst others have been completely transformed.  As a 
consequence, I suggest that this crisis narrative corresponds most closely to a ‘crisis of 
rationality’ (on which general point, see Habermas 1976).  Insofar as it is possible to 
argue that the modern state is suffering from a ‘territorial crisis’ at all, this may be little 
more than the geographic expression of a wider ‘rationality crisis’.  It is within this sense 
of rationality crisis that we first encounter globalisation’s political logic of no alternative.  
For, in circumstances in which a link is drawn between globalisation and a state 
‘rationality crisis’, globalisation would seem to be confirming certain political 
interventions as a priori ‘correct’ and others as a priori ‘incorrect’.  Of course, this is 
exactly what the dominant discourse of globalisation does.  It defines as rational all 
interventions of a market-liberalising nature, and it defines as irrational all interventions 
of a market-regulating nature. 
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In Chapter Three, I take issue with the implicit theoretical position on which the 
conventional wisdom of globalisation is based.  Both of the crisis narratives contained 
within the dominant discourse assume a world in which states are increasingly losing 
power to markets.  To sustain such an argument, however, first requires that states and 
markets are theorised as isolated aspects of social reality.  Only in the absence of 
arguments that they are part of an integrated whole does it make sense to talk of a power 
transfer from one to another. 
 
If this is indeed the claim on which the conventional wisdom of globalisation is 
grounded, then it is clear that the conceptual roots of the conventional wisdom are far 
from adequate.  I show that the mainstream political economy perspective of ‘states and 
markets’ represents an obvious advance upon the conventional wisdom’s ‘states versus 
markets’ in the attempt to theorise globalisation.  However, I also argue that this 
mainstream political economy perspective is itself far from convincing, despite its utility 
in undermining the conceptual basis of the conventional wisdom.  The perspective of 
‘states and markets’ is clearly an advance on that of ‘states versus markets’.  Yet, it still 
leaves fundamentally unasked a whole series of prior ontological questions about the very 
essence of ‘the state’ and the very essence of ‘the market’.  I conclude this chapter by 
arguing that neither has a trans-historical or trans-geographical essence.  Rather, the 
experience of both is that they are contextually-specific, depending on the dominant form 
of political mobilisation within society at a given point in time and space.  Having 
identified the prevailing balance of social forces as an important political influence on the 
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way in which globalising tendencies are experienced, I re-work the conventional wisdom 
for a second time, this time through a contextually-specific perspective of ‘states, markets 
and society’.  Finally in this chapter, I review the impact that this new perspective has on 
the globalisation debate more generally. 
 
In Chapter Four, I begin to explore more fully the range of effects which the prevailing 
balance of social forces can have on the everyday experience of globalising tendencies in 
a particular setting.  I suggest that these effects are carried into the rest of society through 
two quite distinct sets of processes; one which operates through the reconstruction of 
material realities, the other through the reconstruction of discursive ‘common-senses’. 
 
At the material level, the precise manifestation of the prevailing balance of social forces 
is likely to have a major impact on the general orientation of the government’s response 
to globalising pressures.  Put somewhat crudely, all governments are faced with choices 
regarding the extent to which they seek actively to encourage globalising tendencies, and 
the extent to which they seek actively to resist them.7  The nature of the government 
response will be conditioned by the dominant form of political mobilisation within 
society at the time that the decision of whether to encourage or resist globalisation is 
taken.  Indeed, the nature of the government charged with taking that decision will itself 
be a reflection of the dominant form of political mobilisation within society at that time. 
 
                                                          
7 Of course, due to the different capacities at the disposal of governments, some play a greater role in 
encouraging globalising tendencies than others, and some would seem to play no conscious role at all.  In 
this, as in many other aspects of political economy, a putative North/South divide is in evidence. 
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At the discursive level, the precise manifestation of the prevailing balance of social forces 
is also likely to have a major impact on the general orientation of the government’s 
response to globalising pressures.  In particular, it is likely to shape the knowledge that 
society holds about the range of possible policy responses which are available to the 
government.  Quite clearly, an altogether different set of political interests will be served 
in circumstances in which the overall character of the government’s response to 
globalisation is facilitative than in circumstances in which the overall character of that 
response is resistant.  One or other of these responses can be effectively ruled out should 
a dominant discursive practice which casts doubt against the very viability of that option 
become routinely accepted as a societal ‘common-sense’.  Here, then, I make the firmest 
claim to date that ideas about globalisation can have causal effects in their own right, 
independent of the material reality of increasing market interdependencies. 
 
This is a claim which I pursue in greater depth in Chapter Five.  In this chapter, I turn for 
the first time in any detail to the specific experience of globalising outcomes in Britain, 
my chosen country case.  I argue that ideas about globalisation have had an important 
independent causal influence on the nature of public policy debate in contemporary 
Britain.  At the very least, they have provided a context for distinguishing which types of 
intervention are to be deemed politically possible in current circumstances, and which are 
to be deemed politically impossible.  In particular, the image of an unbreakable 
exogenous economic constraint has been used to construct a political logic of ‘no 
alternative’ to the continued reproduction of the macroeconomic status quo.  The 
dominant form of political mobilisation within modern Britain is to a macroeconomic 
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regime which has been handed down virtually intact from the time of the Thatcherite 
reforms of the 1980s.  I show that a dominant discursive construction of a globalising 
logic of ‘neo-liberal necessity’ has been instrumental to this reproduction. 
 
The dominant discourse of globalisation has impacted most obviously in Britain through 
the way in which it has successfully displaced the need for active consent to further neo-
liberal restructuring.  Given the combination of the increasing use of the international 
financial markets as an external enforcement mechanism for domestic economic policy, 
and the increasing dissemination of the idea that globalisation in any case disqualifies the 
government from adopting a significantly different stance, it is far from clear that the 
political capacity still exists for translating popular demands for resistance to neo-liberal 
orthodoxy into actual resistance.  In such circumstances, the very need for consent to the 
reproduction of the neo-liberal status quo has been replaced by resignation that such 
reproduction has become increasingly ‘inevitable’ in the absence of political leaders 
willing to take seriously the possibility of alternative modes of economic development.  
The question of whether globalisation is a material reality would therefore seem to be 
superfluous in this instance; ideas about globalisation can themselves create the 
conditions which globalisation is argued to bring about. 
 
In Chapter Six, I turn more explicitly to the debate about public policy-making in an era 
of globalisation.  The image of globalisation which appears in much of the existing 
literature centres on the notion of insurmountable structural constraints imposed through 
exogenous economic forces.  The increased range of options which globalising tendencies 
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are assumed to have provided for capital is believed to be especially important in this 
respect.  Indeed, if the literature identifies one process more than any other as being 
symptomatic of globalisation’s structural constraints, then it is surely the ease with which 
capital can now exercise its mobility. 
 
However, in this chapter I suggest that the whole public policy debate on capital mobility 
is based on a series of misplaced assumptions.  In virtually every intervention into the 
literature on this subject, capital mobility is conceptualised in spatial terms.  It is within 
this context that globalisation’s pervasive logic of no alternative is conjured.  Capital can 
simply evade institutionally-regulated restrictions on private property rights by moving 
elsewhere.  Hence, governments are structurally required to endorse a lowest common 
denominator neo-liberalism.  Any government seeking to operate outside the parameters 
of such a logic is believed to be pressing the self-destruct button; triggering processes of 
capital flight and leading eventually to capacity shortfalls in productive sectors.  Here, 
however, I develop a rather different explanation of capacity shortfalls.  I suggest that 
they are the result, not of capital’s increased spatial mobility, but of its increased 
functional immobility.  Capacity shortfalls are currently evident within the productive 
economy, I argue, due to the increasing amount of capital which is concentrated within 
the international financial markets.  For an ever greater number of potential investors, the 
circuit of capital both begins and ends within the financial markets.  This, I suggest, is the 
most significant element of current processes of international economic restructuring.  
Certainly, it has more far-reaching public policy implications than those that result from 
mis-specified assumptions about capital’s new-found spacelessness.  I conclude this 
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chapter by re-visiting the public policy-making debate about the shadow cast by 
globalisation once that shadow has been re-specified in terms of capital’s increased 
functional immobility. 
 
This is a theme which I continue to explore in Chapter Seven.  In this chapter, I 
concentrate on the way in which the mis-specification of capital mobility constraints leads 
to a series of self-reinforcing public policy mistakes.  With capital mobility viewed in 
purely spatial terms, the aim of economic policy has increasingly become preventing 
national and/or transnational capitals from leaving the domestic production circuit for 
more profitable production circuits overseas.  However, the specific means which have 
been chosen to prevent this form of capital exit has actually been a trigger for another.  In 
Britain at least, the public policy response to the ‘pressures’ of globalisation has been to 
increasingly externalise the responsibility for economic decision-making.  The use of 
external enforcement mechanisms for economic policy has had the effect of pre-
committing the future trajectory of that policy.  But the increased level of certainty in 
future financial prices resulting from pre-commitment in turn has had the effect of 
providing investors with yet more incentives for concentrating their assets in financial 
portfolios only.  As a consequence, an increasing proportion of capital funds has exited 
the production circuit altogether. 
 
The British government has responded to the subsequent capital shortage in productive 
sectors by chasing potential inward investors ever more vigorously.  In this instance, too, 
I show that the government’s short-term policy ‘solutions’ lead to long-term 
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contradictions within the policy regime as a whole.  The Blair Government has emulated 
its Conservative predecessors by attempting to source comparative advantage in the 
market for inward investment on the basis of a competitive subsidisation strategy backed 
by a strictly orthodox macroeconomic policy.  Only orthodox policies are assumed to be 
credible in the eyes of footloose firms.  Yet, it is precisely such a stance which is 
responsible for the capacity shortfalls which have animated the chase for inward investors 
in the first place.  I conclude by demonstrating that these contradictory forms of economic 
policy-making are tightening future structural binds on the policy-making process.  Note, 
however, that the assumption of globalisation is not necessary in order to describe the 
nature of these structural constraints.  In fact, through responding to these constraints in a 
manner consistent with the globalisation hypothesis, contemporary economic policy-
making dilemmas have been made more, rather than less, intense. 
 
In Chapter Eight, I turn to the question of why the Blair Government should persist in 
using the full rhetorical repertoire of the dominant discourse of globalisation, not only in 
circumstances in which that rhetoric can be shown to be an exaggeration of a much less 
global reality, but also in circumstances in which policy responses to ‘globalising 
necessities’ can be shown to tighten the constraints that they are supposed to relax.  I 
dismiss the possibility that the answer to this question is simple cognitive dissonance.  
Rather, I suggest that New Labour has adopted the idea of globalisation for strategic 
reasons.  In other words, whilst the notion of globalisation may be inadequate for 
performing all of the analytical tasks which are attributed to it, the Blair Government has 
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used that same notion to enable it to perform certain political tasks that may otherwise 
have provoked popular political dissent. 
 
In this respect, it becomes crucial to examine how the Labour Party has attempted to de-
politicise contemporary economic outcomes, and how it has attempted to use the idea of 
globalisation as a means of developing a conscious political strategy of de-politicisation.  
Globalising ‘pressures’ have been cited as the reason why it has been necessary to enact 
‘sound money’ policies.  Yet, it has been ‘sound money’ policies themselves which have 
presented the most important material constraint to the possible re-definition of the 
prevailing balance of social forces in Britain.  I chart the way in which the Blair 
Government is attempting, at a variety of spatial scales, to make it structurally more 
difficult for any of its successors to pursue anything other than a ‘sound money’ strategy 
at any time in the future.  Most obviously, at the domestic level, it has ceded operational 
responsibility for the conduct of monetary policy to an unelected committee of technical 
‘experts’ at the Bank of England.  Less obviously perhaps, at the international level, it has 
backed calls for the creation of a ‘new financial architecture’ designed specifically to 
subordinate domestic governments still further to international financial markets, by 
providing additional momentum for deepening the degree of financial market 
interdependence.  This latter development is particularly interesting.  For, it shows that 
the government is indeed aware that its globalisation rhetoric is an exaggeration of a 
much less global reality,8 and that the possibility must be left open that ideas about 
globalisation play an independent causal role in the production of outcomes consistent 
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with the globalisation hypothesis.  Were New Labour actually to believe what it says in 
relation to globalisation, then there would be no need for it to be concerned with making 
financial market relations yet more global. 
 
Chapter Nine explores the way in which the Labour Party has constructed a particular 
definition of ‘globalising necessities’ specifically to serve its wider electoral goals.  I 
suggest more generally that the party’s economic modernisation, of which its decision to 
accept the ‘realities’ of globalisation should be seen as a major symbolic moment, must 
be set within the context of its attempts to restore a sense of electoral credibility to the 
party’s image.  New Labour’s appropriation of a globalising logic of ‘neo-liberal 
necessity’ has been instrumental not merely in appeasing the fears of the market that the 
party may have been tempted to turn its back on a strictly orthodox macroeconomic 
policy once in government.  It has also been instrumental in appeasing the fears of 
Britain’s middle-classes that a future Labour government may have reversed the dramatic 
shift in the balance of power in favour of the rich which accompanied the Thatcherite 
reforms of the 1980s. 
 
I conclude with an appeal to others working on the political economy of globalisation to 
be more sensitive to the significance of the domestic political conditions which facilitate 
international economic change.  Political economists tend to be sensitive to the possibility 
that there are international economic conditions to domestic political change.  Equally, 
however, they tend not to be so sensitive to the possibility that the reverse line of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
8 This was a line taken also by The Economist in its report of the WTO talks in Seattle in December 1999 
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causation also holds.  Yet, globalisation would seem to have the greatest impact on the 
domestic political agenda in circumstances in which a globalising logic of no alternative 
can be constructed that reinforces the dominant form of political mobilisation already 
existing within that society.  As such, I argue that it is necessary simultaneously to 
acknowledge the way in which international economic forces shape domestic political 
dynamics, and also the way in which domestic political forces shape the potential 
institutionalisation of international economic dynamics. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
(see The Economist 1999c). 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER ONE: 
 
BEYOND MARKET-CLEARING METAPHORS: 
DECONSTRUCTING THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM 
OF GLOBALISATION 
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The conventional wisdom of globalisation is now an established part of public discourse 
in Britain (as elsewhere, see for example Taylor-Gooby 1996; Schmidt 1997; Rosamond 
1999).  At its heart lies the claim that convergent pressures of economic globalisation are 
forcing governments into political conformity.  Unaccountable and unstoppable global 
economic dynamics are therefore assumed to be having causal effects within the political 
domain. 
 
As outlined in the introductory chapter, however, I intend to adopt a somewhat different 
perspective to that implied by the conventional wisdom.  Indeed, this thesis can be 
viewed as a fundamental challenge to the wisdom of such conventions.  The dominant 
discourse currently demands that the strict parameters which have been placed around the 
politically possible be seen only in the context of inexorable economic processes.  I 
suggest that the dominant discourse of inexorable economic processes itself has causal 
effects producing similar political outcomes.  As such, we should be looking not only at 
global economic restructuring, but also the conventional wisdom of the ‘inevitability’ of 
that restructuring, in trying to make causal statements in relation to contemporary 
economic policy-making. 
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Of course, before this argument can be laid out at any great length, it is first necessary to 
introduce the key assumptions, hypotheses and conclusions on which the conventional 
wisdom of globalisation is grounded.  This is the aim of this chapter. 
 
 
 
 
The Conventional Wisdom and Competitiveness Concerns 
 
One question which is frequently asked in relation to the dominant discourse of 
globalisation is, ‘Whose discourse is this exactly?’.  Is this fundamentally a practitioner or 
an academic discourse?  My answer to such a question, in a word, is ‘both’.  At face 
value, the non-committal nature of that response may appear to be somewhat 
unsatisfactory.  At the same time, however, it also serves notice of the complexities of the 
issues at stake here.  In addition, it introduces the possibility that there may be much to 
gain from analysing the overlap between the way in which the conventional wisdom is 
used simultaneously by both practitioners and academics. 
 
There is a well-developed tendency for practitioners and academics to employ the same 
concepts but to attribute rather different meanings to them.  Not only do practitioners and 
academics appeal to the notion of two quite distinct communities to justify the way in 
which they talk in different technical languages about an identical subject.  Often, they do 
so deliberately to talk past one another as a means of preserving their distinct identities.  
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That said, however, it would be wrong to over-emphasise the difference between the 
ideas which are enlisted by practitioners and academics as a basis of their understanding 
of globalisation.  Such differences are not fundamental.  Rather, there are a shared set of 
implications which flow from the initial assumption of globalisation.  Indeed, the very 
fact that practitioners and academics appear to be singing from a similar song-sheet is an 
important part of the process through which the conventional wisdom of globalisation has 
been increasingly institutionalised as a conventional wisdom. 
 
That conventional wisdom contains a series of claims relating to the circumscription of 
the politically possible in an era of global economic relations.  All such claims can be 
usefully bracketed together under the umbrella term ‘convergence’.  Given the emergence 
of globalising dynamics, all economies are increasingly assumed to have been subjected 
to common economic pressures.  Moreover, such pressures are further assumed to have 
led, if not yet strictly-speaking to common political outcomes, then nonetheless to a 
common trajectory of political outcomes (cf Berger & Dore 1996; Weiss 1998). 
 
The one major division between practitioner and academic understandings of the 
pressures of globalisation lies in the identification of different ‘bearers’ of those structural 
pressures.  In the terms of practitioner discourse, globalising pressures are made manifest 
in a heightened awareness of competitiveness concerns.  By contrast, in the terms of 
academic discourse, both globalising pressures and competitiveness concerns are more 
typically linked to assumptions that international economic markets now clear in a 
manner consistent with equilibrium dynamics of global supply and demand. 
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Let us first consider the competitiveness concerns which feature most prominently in 
practitioner discourse.  Interestingly, notions of competitiveness actually predate those of 
globalisation in public policy-making debates (see Hay, Watson & Wincott 1999: 8).  Set 
in such a context, the major impact of notions of globalisation has to be seen as having 
reinforced already dominant assumptions about the competitive imperative. 
 
It is not just the fact that we have witnessed an increase in the use of the notion of 
competitiveness which is important here.  Rather, it is the fact that the notion of 
competitiveness has increasingly been used specifically in conjunction with appeals to 
capital flight which has had the most significant impact on contemporary practitioner 
discourse.  In particular, it has allowed the notion of competitiveness to be applied in a 
new way in public policy-making debates.  Historically, arguments about the competitive 
imperative were assumed to be applicable only at the level of the firm.  Only firms could 
be seen as being either competitive or uncompetitive.  More recently, however, it has 
been assumed that the burden of the competitive imperative has been displaced upwards 
from the level of the firm to the level of the national economy (see Krugman 1994).  
Thus, the firm itself is no longer required to be competitive per se.  By contrast, it is the 
environment in which firms may choose to locate which is expected to be able to source 
competitiveness concerns. 
 
The political force of such a conclusion emerges only when it is viewed through the 
perspective of wider debates about contemporary economic restructuring.  In particular, 
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assumptions of capital flight are necessary in order to ensure that this new discourse of 
‘country competitiveness’ is politically resonant. 
 
The perceived consequence of heightened capital mobility is the threat of exit.  Guided by 
such assumptions, governments are effectively mandated to provide conditions for 
expanded profit opportunities.  Otherwise, firms can simply be expected to relocate into 
an environment in which such conditions are present.  Set within the context of the 
conventional wisdom of globalisation, it is assumed that no institutional barriers exist to 
prevent businesses from relocating wherever in the world that comparative advantage 
dictates.  Footloose firms are now assumed to be able to engage in a process of ‘regime-
shopping’ in an attempt to seek out the lowest common denominator production costs.  
Governments are consequently thought to have become locked-in to competitive relations 
of their own, in which the winner is whoever can bid down the costs of relocation to the 
greatest extent.  The more that governments are able to undercut one another, the more 
incentives that they are able to offer to firms which choose to locate in their country (on 
which point, see Swank 1998). 
 
This, then, is the application of the notion of competitiveness which tends to dominate 
practitioner discourse.  Of course, this discourse of ‘country competitiveness’ has also 
required the assumption of globalisation for it to have exercised such a grip on the 
imagination of contemporary public policy-makers.  In the absence of assumptions about 
globalising dynamics which break down the barriers between distinct national economies, 
the appeal to the politically conditioning effects of ‘country competitiveness’ immediately 
  38 
begin to look more problematic.  It is the idea that globalising tendencies produce de-
spatialising outcomes which is responsible for carrying further ideas that countries 
themselves now have a more important role to play in providing the conditions for profit 
maximisation.  This is clearly paradoxical.  On the one hand, globalisation is believed to 
have decreased the significance of the different geographies of individual nation states.  
On the other hand, the competitiveness concerns which globalisation is assumed to have 
sharpened are believed to have increased the significance of the way in which individual 
nation states can express whatever differences between them which still remain.  In an era 
which is typically presented as one of convergence, then, we are also being told that we 
are experiencing an increased sensitivity to difference.  Of course, there is no hard and 
fast rule which says that discourses which are built on paradoxical assumptions cannot 
become politically resonant.  So it is here.  Without doubt, the idea that globalising 
tendencies come complete with radical de-spatialising effects has served to condition the 
way in which the limits of feasible economic policy are currently conceived. 
 
Reduced to its bare minimum, the conventional wisdom of globalisation is based on a 
single claim.  Where once the concept of a ‘national economy’ served to demarcate the 
world of domestic policy-making, now it is assumed that nothing could be further from 
the truth.  The ‘national’ is believed to have given way to the ‘transnational’. 
 
Assumptions about the changing nature of the capital relation are especially important in 
this respect.  The word ‘globalisation’ enters the vocabulary of policy-makers most 
frequently to describe the emergence of a new structure of disembedded capital flows.  
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Three aspects of the external economic environment have been emphasised in particular 
in order to sustain appeals to the notion of ‘globalisation’ (see Watson 1999b; Busch 
2000).  Firstly, it tends to be assumed that the on-going restructuring of international 
capitalist relations has delivered a truly global circuit of trade in goods and services.  
Secondly, such restructuring is also assumed to have made national investment structures 
so open to external penetration that capitalist production has been effectively globalised.  
Thirdly, and without doubt most significantly, flows of financial capital are now assumed 
to take place at a spatial scale which completely overrides national regulatory regimes.  
Finance is believed to have been globalised insofar as economic transactions denominated 
in purely monetary form now occur within an entirely disembedded space of ‘virtual’ 
reality (see, for instance, O’Brien 1992). 
 
Here, we can see a subtle shift in the conventional wisdom, depending on whether it is 
being articulated as part of a practitioner or an academic debate.  In order to make the 
conventional wisdom resonate in public policy terms, competitiveness concerns tend to 
provide the primary focus of practitioner discourse.  However, that discourse itself is 
grounded in a prior assumption.  It may well be that this assumption receives little 
attention in public policy debates; nonetheless, it is fundamental to wider discursive 
practices.  Remove the prior supposition that international markets now clear in a manner 
consistent with the existence of a global equilibrium, and the grip which the competitive 
imperative has placed on the public policy-making imagination is significantly relaxed.  
In other words, behind every public pronouncement of the need to enhance national 
competitiveness lies the prior assumption that international markets now respond to truly 
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global dynamics of supply and demand.  Whilst a full articulation of this prior assumption 
is conspicuous by its absence from practitioner debates about globalisation, it features 
much more prominently in academic debates.  As such, it is to these academic debates 
that I turn in the following section. 
 
 
 
 
Financial Market Restructuring and Market-Clearing Dynamics 
 
As Meric Gertler suggests, the most significant aspect of the globalisation debate may 
well be the fact that “it has been taken as an article of faith for some time that we 
[already] live in a global economy” (Gertler 1997: 45).  Market-clearing metaphors are 
consequently well established in public discourse.  Nowhere is the assumption of 
diminishing constraints on the activities of capital more pronounced than in relation to the 
circuit of financial capital.  In the ten years since David Harvey first rehearsed his 
argument about recent technological change forcing ‘time-space compression’, such an 
argument has become increasingly well known (see Harvey 1989a).  Moreover, it has 
been applied irrespective of sector, in order to explain how all economic transactions 
have been ‘speeded-up’.  However, such an argument holds most force when it is used to 
describe those transactions which take place specifically within the international financial 
markets.  Governments routinely refer to “instantaneous adjustment mechanisms” within 
those markets (see Blair 1996a) in order to stress the qualitative “limits of government” 
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(Brown 1995; see also Hutton & Corry 1996; Robinson 1997).  Quite clearly, 
‘instantaneous adjustment’ is a bold claim.  Yet, it is one which is made with increasing 
regularity, primarily because the process of ‘time-space compression’ is now assumed to 
be complete within the financial markets.  Not merely are we directed towards the way in 
which temporal constraints on the relocation of capital are effectively compressing spatial 
difference.  Increasingly, we are faced by the assertion that space is being entirely 
annhilated through time (Swyngedouw 1989). 
 
Set within the context of the conventional wisdom, then, space has been removed as a 
potential impediment to market-clearing dynamics1.  As such, there would appear to be 
no economic barriers to prevent capital from becoming completely disembedded.  On the 
basis of this assumption, it would seem to be entirely reasonable to begin talking about 
the emergence of a truly ‘borderless world’ (Ohmae 1990). 
 
Moreover, at first glance there would appear to be sufficient statistical data to support two 
views: i) that the international economy has passed through a significant period of recent 
restructuring; and ii) that the direction of such restructuring has been towards the 
emergence of new global equilibria.  The stock of international bank lending, for 
instance, underwent quite spectacular growth in the 1980s, a decade widely identified as 
the ‘take-off’ stage to globalisation.  From a base of only 4% of OECD GDP in 1980, that 
figure had mushroomed to 44% by 1990 (Wade 1996: 64).  In addition, much of that 
increase bypassed the real economy altogether, such was the extent to which it was 
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channelled into the reproduction of an expanded circuit of financial capital (see Watson 
1999a).  That circuit currently offers the prospect of such quick returns on speculative 
positions that the liquidity ratios which dominate contemporary financial markets now 
bear little relation to the much lower ratios which were typical only twenty-five years ago 
(Hübner 1991: 59).  Driven by expectations of heightened liquidity, the transacted volume 
in foreign exchange alone now exceeds that in world trade by a factor of forty (Busch 
2000: 48).  Furthermore, over this period of market restructuring, such transactions have 
come to reflect the state of underlying economic fundamentals less and less (see, for 
instance, Underhill 1997).  As a consequence, it is now increasingly accepted within 
public discourse that government discretion over the conduct of monetary policy has been 
progressively curtailed.  Certainly, there is no sense in which national policy-makers have 
the same degree of latitude as they did in the era of exchange controls and the effective 
‘nationalisation’ of bank lending. 
 
Moreover, it is not only the increase in financial market activity which has served to 
constrain government behaviour.  At the same time as traded volumes have undergone 
almost exponential growth, there has also been a period of unparalleled market 
innovation.  This has been perhaps the most significant aspect in delimiting the 
parameters of the politically possible in terms of domestic monetary policy.  More than 
anything, it is the integrated structure that now exists between primary and secondary 
trading in the same financial instrument which has massively increased the sensitivity of 
all markets to shifts in investor sentiment (see Watson 1999a). 
                                                                                                                                                                             
1 Somewhat ironically, perhaps, the link between globalisation and the decreasing significance of space has 
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There is a certain irony that derivatives markets were introduced into the financial 
environment in order to allow investors a means of hedging against future risk.2  For, the 
current levels of secondary trading in derivatives markets has actually been responsible 
for enhancing the systemic risk which reflects the increase in cross-national sensitivities.  
Derivatives trading now comprises such a large part of world finance (see, for instance, 
Fitzgerald 1993) that its mere existence would pose sufficient threats to the ability of 
governments to run an autonomous monetary policy.  Most derivatives contracts have 
only been established in the first place so as to provide a means of allowing investors to 
bypass existing structures of government regulation in order to expand the scope of 
feasible profit-making activities (see IMF 1989).  As Robert Wade suggests, “in terms of 
the ability of governments to manage finance, derivatives make the power of private 
financial property still more absolute” (Wade 1996: 65). 
 
Indeed, others are willing to go still further and follow the conventional wisdom of 
globalisation all the way to its logical conclusion.  The power of private financial 
property has not merely become more absolute, they argue, it now is absolute.  According 
to Stephen Kobrin, for instance, the simultaneous development of derivatives contracts 
                                                                                                                                                                             
often been drawn by geographers (see, in particular, O’Brien 1992). 
2 A wide range of markets in financial futures now exists.  A futures contract is entered into in an attempt to 
generate a high degree of certainty about the medium-term price of a given asset.  Indeed, the specified 
terms of the contract secure that price at a non-negotiable level for the length of the contract (for a further 
elaboration, see Watson 1999a).  It is usual for financial markets to form to co-ordinate trade in the current 
price of a financial asset.  The term ‘futures’ is used, however, to describe a market where trading takes 
place in the future price of that asset.  The term ‘derivative’ is used to describe the contracts which 
formalise the trading environment in such markets, because the market demand for the future price of a 
financial asset is derived from expectations formed in the present as to the likely trajectory of prices within 
the market. 
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and electronic money has disembedded the circuit of financial capital from the real 
economy to such an extent that “the basic problem” for government regulation of an 
increasingly footloose financial sector is no longer “one of overlapping or conflicting 
jurisdictions”.  Rather, he suggests, “it stems from the lack of meaning of the very 
concept of ‘jurisdiction’ in a digitalised global economy” (Kobrin 1997: 76, emphases 
added). 
 
The underlying assumption here is that contemporary processes of financial innovation 
have been directed intentionally at undermining the regulatory status of ostensibly 
sovereign territories.  The ‘new’ money which has been created as a result of financial 
innovation is believed to have the ability to escape the clutches of regulatory regimes 
insofar as it bears no physical form whatsoever.  Put simply, this money is no more than a 
series of computer bytes (Business Week, 12.06.95).  The use of virtual finance is thought 
to have increased the liquidity of capital assets denominated in this way to the point at 
which such assets are now almost perfectly liquid (see Marimon, Nicolini & Teles 1998).  
As Kobrin argues, the battle between state and capital for control of the economic context 
has now become a battle between those who operate in  “geographic space” and those 
who operate in “cyberspace” (Kobrin 1997: 74).  The degree to which this has become a 
structurally uneven battle is highlighted in Kobrin’s conclusion that the realities of these 
new circumstances have made the jurisdictional plane which the state inhabits so 
permeable that the national state is itself now “irrelevant” (ibid: 71; see also Ohmae 1990, 
1995). 
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Set in this context, then, it is not merely the case that increasing financial market activity 
has rendered governments less autonomous in their economic policy-making.  Recent 
periods of intense innovation within these markets would appear to have rendered 
governments no longer autonomous at all.  Thus, not only should governments be 
assumed to have a diminished capacity to use market-shaping interventions to distort the 
global equilibrium price in which the world’s financial markets would naturally settle.  
Given the way in which ‘cyberspatial’ markets are believed to bypass all government 
structures and, as such, clear perfectly, that capacity is assumed to have been completely 
eradicated. 
 
However, to draw such a conclusion on the basis of the available empirical data is to 
elevate assertion above evidence.  The conventional wisdom of globalisation may well be 
predicated on the assumption of the increasing powerlessness of the state in the face of 
the expanding power of a new rentier class of financial capitalists.  Moreover, the 
development of a range of markets in financial futures may well represent a further 
increase in the structural power of those who hold capital assets in the functional form of 
money.  Yet, these two inferences do not necessarily add up to qualitative support for the 
globalisation hypothesis.  Just because we can see signs of the sort of ‘power transfer’ 
predicted by the conventional wisdom of globalisation does not mean that the 
conventional wisdom is necessarily a true reflection of reality.  Without doubt, there is 
evidence for the conditioning effects on government behaviour which the mere existence 
of financial futures markets has had.  However, there is also a distinct lack of evidence 
that this amounts to the creation of a truly global circuit of financial capital. 
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Contemporary economic reality is anything but the world of ‘one-price’ which such a 
circuit would imply.  The real world continues to sustain a range of different prices for 
any number of financial instruments whose traded characteristics are identical from 
country to country.  Arbitrage effects are expected to bring the price of capital assets 
denominated in money ever closer as the markets on which they are traded become more 
integrated (see Frankel 1994).  Despite such effects, however, convergence tendencies 
remain far from complete (Rodrik 1997: 27).  Even at the most straightforward level of 
financing investment through interest-bearing loans, the existence of deep-seated real 
interest rate differentials effectively does away with the assumption of a ‘one-price’ world 
(see, for example, Frankel & Hardouvalis 1995; Mishkin 1995; Goodhart 1996; 
Houthakker & Williamson 1996; Kearney 1996). 
 
Many studies have been commissioned in recent years to test the ‘one-price’ hypothesis.  
Irrespective of the stage of the globalisation process at which the study was conducted, 
the available empirical evidence suggests that the conclusion of a necessary convergence 
in real interest rates is misplaced (see, for instance, Feldstein & Horioka 1980; Kasman & 
Pigott 1988; Zevin 1992; Obstfeld 1995).  This in itself would appear to provide 
sufficient grounds to argue that, whatever form current restructuring dynamics eventually 
take as they are embedded around the world, it seems unlikely that it will be as a truly 
global circuit of financial capital.  In other words, there is nothing a priori global about 
those tendencies which are so frequently labelled ‘globalisation’. 
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The process of capital market integration is significantly more pronounced in some 
contexts than it is in others.  As a consequence, financial globalisation has taken on a far 
more uneven complexion than is assumed in the conventional wisdom.  The image of 
‘cyberspatial’ markets which clear perfectly in all instances is almost certainly a 
misleading one.  Indeed, it may well be that the only thing which is truly global in relation 
to ‘globalisation’ is the way in which such tendencies have been institutionalised in a 
manner which reflects the specificities of the different contexts in which they have been 
set.  As such, what is truly remarkable about the experience of recent processes of 
capitalist restructuring is not the extent to which the separate logics of individual capital 
markets have been overwritten amidst the creation of an objective structure of global 
capital flows.  Rather, it is that national economies still remain as isolated as they are, 
despite at least twenty years of concerted political effort on the part of the majority of the 
most capital-rich governments the world has ever seen to create just such a structure. 
 
Arguably the most persuasive indicator of the persistent autonomy of national economies 
is the maintenance of a high correlation between the rates of domestic saving and 
domestic investment (for a review of the literature in this area, see Bayoumi 1997).  
Insofar as it is constructed on the presumption of a fully-integrated global capital market, 
the conventional wisdom of globalisation all but rules out the possibility that such a 
correlation should remain.  Amongst US states, for instance, the state-level saving rate 
accounted for a mere 2% of the variance in state-level investment rates fully forty years 
ago (Wade 1996: 74).  This is what evidence of a real-life integrated capital market 
should look like, and this evidence comes from long before governments chose to engage 
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actively with restructuring dynamics in order to deepen the integration trend.  As Stephan 
Sinn has shown, however, even after ten years of reconstituting OECD capital markets as 
a means of preparing a global circuit of financial capital, the correlation between the rates 
of domestic saving and domestic investment has remained stubbornly high.  If a figure of 
2% for the variance in investment rates accounted for by the saving rate represents the 
closest conceivable approximation of a perfectly integrated capital market, then the 
following figure illustrates the non-integration of OECD capital markets as a whole.  For, 
in 1990, fully 60% of the variance in domestic investment rates was accounted for by 
domestic savings rates (Sinn 1992). 
 
As a consequence, any new flow of investment at any point within the international 
economy is most likely to have its origin in the existing stock of domestic saving.  This 
has served to ensure that national stock markets have continued to operate as if in 
isolation from one another.  Portfolio diversification may well be a more developed 
tendency than it was twenty-five years ago (see Steil 1994; Epstein 1996).  However, the 
spatial limits of that diversification have typically been limited to the national economy.  
Whilst domestic consumption demands in general continue to be satisfied via the circuit 
of domestic capital, those domestic producers remain predominantly domestically owned.  
For instance, although Wall Street has the reputation of being the most ‘open’ stock 
exchange in the world, throughout the 1990s roughly 95% of investment by Americans on 
Wall Street remained in domestic stocks and bonds (Piven 1995: 111).  Moreover, this 
may not be all that surprising, given that less than one in twenty of the firms which are 
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cited on the New York Stock Exchange have origins anywhere other than in the United 
States (The Economist 1999a). 
 
Contrary to the globalisation hypothesis, then, there are significant elements of 
contemporary finance which have remained overwhelmingly within the borders of the 
national economy.  It may well be more common to hear public policy-makers and 
academics alike appeal to the extent of globalisation rather than its non-extent.  Yet, in 
this instance, rhetoric and reality are clearly mismatched.  Globalising tendencies are 
routinely assumed to have reprojected financial relations into a virtual economic space 
whose mere presence contradicts the continued reproduction of explicitly ‘national’ forms 
of economic management (see, for instance, O’Brien 1992; Scholte 1996; Kobrin 1997).  
However, when the analysis is moved beyond assumption to explore existing empirical 
detail, the physical barriers of national geographies would still appear to be of intrinsic 
importance to the location of financial investment.  Such is the continued significance of 
contextually-specific features of the international financial system. 
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The Spatial Embeddedness of Production: Capital as a Social Relation of Production 
 
In terms of relative mobility options, there can be no doubt that finance is the most 
mobile of all the parties to the capital relation (see, for example, Aglietta 1985; Cerny 
1994; Germain 1997; Palley 1999; Radice 1999).  Yet, as we can see from the above 
analysis, even here the conventional wisdom of globalisation consistently overstates the 
footloose properties of contemporary capital.  The simple assertion of boundless mobility 
options bears little comparison to the much more limited degree to which such options 
are actually exercised in practice. 
 
In a word, the conventional wisdom is wrong.  Moreover, insofar as the assumption of 
unlimited exit options tends to be applied across the board, with no reference at all to the 
very different mobility options available to different fractions of capital, it is more wrong 
in some cases than others.  In the previous section, I focused on the mismatch between 
globalisation rhetoric and a far from globalised reality in relation to the circuit of financial 
capital.  In this section, I show that a similar mismatch is much more pronounced when 
the analysis is recast in terms of the circuit of productive capital. 
 
A focus on the different mobility options open to different fractions of capital is necessary 
for two reasons: 
 i) the fact that liquidity ratios vary across different fractions of capital and, indeed, 
within them; and 
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 ii) the fact that government policy in a range of advanced capitalist economies has 
recently been reoriented towards guaranteeing enhanced liquidity ratios.  My analysis in 
chapters 7 and 8, for instance, highlights the way in which the Blair government in 
Britain has set about performing such a role. 
 
In general, the higher the liquidity ratio, the greater will be the potential mobility.  At no 
point do capital assets more closely approximate perfectly liquid assets than when they 
are held in the functional form of money.  Even in such circumstances, however, 
observed mobility effects currently do little to bear out the predictions of the conventional 
wisdom of globalisation.  Given this, it would appear to be most unlikely that similar 
predictions would be shown to be true in productive sectors, where capital assets are far 
less liquid than they are in financial sectors.  Empirical evidence in general cautions 
against accepting the conventional wisdom at face value.  This is never more the case 
than in relation to assumptions about the limitless mobility of productive assets. 
 
Despite such evidence, however, two of the three elements of the conventional wisdom of 
globalisation continue to draw on assertions about the increasingly disembedded nature of 
productive capitals.  In addition to assumptions about the globalisation of financial flows, 
the conventional wisdom also contains assumptions about the globalisation of trade and 
production flows.  As Kevin Cox suggests, however, such assumptions can only be made 
to appear plausible when set within the context of a concept of capital which treats the 
capital relation solely as an exchange relation (Cox 1997: 128).  It may well be that this is 
the image which guides both the dominant discourse and the political practice of 
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globalisation which currently operate across a range of advanced industrialised 
economies.  But it is also the case that such a context requires that the theoretical 
advances which have been made in political economy over the past hundred and fifty 
years be effectively ‘disinvented’.  Put simply, to theorise capital purely as an exchange 
relation is to return to the classical political economy which pre-dated the emergence of 
the Marxian critique of economic liberalism (see Watson 2000b for a further elaboration). 
 
Such a claim undoubtedly needs to be unpacked if it is to be explained more fully.  The 
Marxian critique of economic liberalism is based on conceptualising capital, not as an 
exchange relation, but as a social relation of production (see Marx 1973a, 1973b: for a 
discussion, see Eldred & Roth 1978).  Capital takes on its distinctive essence as capital in 
those moments in which financial assets are embedded within a wider set of social 
relations in order to make production possible in a distinctively capitalist form (on which, 
see, for instance Jessop 1990; Clarke 1991).  In other words, capital can only act as a 
productive force when it is embedded within a particular social context.  As such, 
whenever it acquires disembedded properties which release it from the social context in 
which it is grounded, the very process of de-socialisation acts as a structural impediment 
preventing financial assets from being deployed to initiate a full circuit of productive 
capital.  A clear contradiction is therefore evident within the conventional wisdom of 
globalisation.  On the one hand, the notion of globalisation is deployed to depict a 
qualitatively new phase of capitalist production.  On the other hand, it assumes the 
existence of a world of capital flows which are now so disembedded from their wider 
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social context that capital would seem to cease to be able to act as a force of distinctively 
capitalist production at all. 
 
Quite clearly, the advanced industrialised economies remain dominated by a distinctively 
capitalist mode of production.  As such, I suggest that it is necessary to argue against the 
logical coherence of the conventional wisdom of globalisation.  Throughout the thesis, I 
will make every attempt to distance the analysis from the conventional wisdom’s implicit 
assumption that capital should be conceived purely and simply as an exchange relation.  
Instead, the study will be grounded within a theoretical context in which capital is 
conceived as a social relation of production, and in which the everyday experience of the 
economy is conceived as a manifestation of the prevailing balance of social forces. 
 
As a consequence, the analysis will revolve around a very different conception of the 
relationship between productive capacity and its geographic location to that which 
dominates both the discourse and practice of globalisation.  Once again, it is necessary to 
argue that there is nothing automatically ‘global’ about those tendencies which are so 
readily attributed to globalisation in public discourse.  In viewing capital as an embedded 
social relation of production, there is no reason to assume that the economic gains which 
the capitalist classes have been able to make as a result of contemporary restructuring 
dynamics accrue simply from enhanced spatial mobility.  This is a far from insignificant 
claim.  For, if there is no necessary correlation between capital mobility and utility 
maximisation, then the incentive to explore exit options will be greatly diminished, 
whether firms are footloose or not.  In turn, the pattern of observed exit can be expected 
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to be a pale imitation of (or, indeed, just plain different from) that predicted by the 
dominant discourse. 
 
Thus, increased spatial mobility of capital cannot be theorised as a necessary effect of 
globalisation.  It remains an open empirical question as to whether it is an effect at all of 
those tendencies which are deemed to be evidence for globalisation.  As such, it is only 
ever likely to be an effect which is contingent upon a range of other causal factors.  The 
successful pursuit of certain capitalist strategies will be facilitated by exit in certain 
contexts only.  In others, it will not. 
 
The extent to which exit is a likely capitalist strategy is determined by the extent to which 
socially embedded relations of production are a condition of the continued extraction of 
surplus value.  If we lived within a truly global economy, it could well present corporate 
managers with the kind of limitless exit options that the conventional wisdom highlights.3  
However, actual exit depends on more than just the feasibility of exercising mobility.  
The mobility option needs to be desirable as well as feasible before it crystallises as a 
rational corporate strategy. 
                                                          
3 Indeed, we may be able to identify a ‘paradox of exit’ here.  If we did live within a truly global economy 
in which all markets cleared in a manner consistent with a one-price world, then presumably all sites of 
potential exit and entry would so closely resemble one another as to render exit a redundant strategy. 
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In particular, it is the significance of sunk costs within the production chain which 
typically ensures that firms retain a specific spatial identity over the course of the product 
life-cycle.  Given that it is capital-intensive production which dominates contemporary 
capitalism, the proportion of total costs accounted for by sunk costs tends to be 
sufficiently high for firms to resist adopting short-term ‘flags of convenience’.  
Competitive advantage can be sourced in more ways than merely through exploiting exit. 
 
As a consequence, the conventional wisdom is quite spectacularly inaccurate in its 
predictions for the spatial patterning of contemporary production (on which point, see 
Cooke & Noble 1998).  The flow of inward investment across national borders has made 
headline news in recent years (see Graham 1997: 99).  Insofar as such flows have tended 
to be read as ‘confirmation’ of the globalisation hypothesis, though, they have not 
necessarily made headlines for the right reasons.  Far from FDI being a symbol of the 
global dispersion of production structures as the conventional wisdom suggests, inward 
investment flows have displayed a high degree of sensitivity to the contextually-specific 
characteristics of their recipient markets (Mair 1997).  As Paul Krugman suggests, “if 
there is one single area of economics in which path dependence is unmistakable, it is in ... 
the location of production in space” (Krugman 1991: 80).  In other words, flows of FDI 
tend to be channelled into those geographical areas of the market in which production 
competencies are already well established.  Cumulative causation processes thus ensue 
effectively to ‘lock-in’ certain spatial patterns of production in a self-reinforcing manner.  
The path dependent trajectory of investment flows can consequently be seen as some kind 
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of institutionalised market rigidity.  Certainly, it prevents the global market for 
investment clearing in the instantaneous manner implied in the conventional wisdom. 
 
There is ample reason, then, to question the utility, relevance and even the validity of the 
discourse which dominates contemporary policy-making processes.  There is no sense in 
which we live in a world of ‘stateless production’ taking place in ‘de-territorialised 
spaces’.  The simplicities of the conventional wisdom must at all times be set alongside 
the complexities of actual capitalist production.  For, it is the specificities of the social 
contexts in which the development of individual production technologies is set which 
ensures that capital assets which are invested in fixed form productive outlets tend to 
remain in that form.  As a result, it is likely that successful technology transfer will 
depend every bit as much on the adaptability of the social relations of production in the 
new location as they do on the portability of the physical relations of production from the 
old location (Gertler 1997: 58).  As Kevin Cox suggests, “what this points to is the 
importance of spatial organisation as a productive force rather than as a geography of 
input costs” (Cox 1997: 129).  The significance of tacit knowledge and accepted practices 
within the production chain leads to productivity-enhancing externalities, and it is these 
which in turn lead to the sort of path-dependent effects which mitigate against capital 
mobility.  In particular, firms have habitually engaged with developing ‘internal labour 
markets’ so that they may be able to facilitate social learning within the production outlet 
(see, for instance, Soskice 1991; Streeck 1991).  Social ‘lock-in’ effects then tend to be 
activated, to the point at which the costs of exit are raised considerably in relation to the 
costs of staying put.  The typical cost-benefit matrix which faces a firm that is embedded 
  57 
within a given social context is therefore nothing like that which is implied in the 
conventional wisdom of globalisation. 
 
The conventional wisdom paints such an inaccurate picture of contemporary capitalist 
production, primarily because it refuses to view capital as a social relation of production.  
Instead, it tends to be treated purely as an exchange relation.  It is only in this respect that 
the nature of the production process can be considered to be secondary to the cost of what 
is being produced: an ordering of priorities which is so evident in contemporary public 
policy-making discourse.  When viewed through this perspective, although this 
perspective only, competitive advantage can appear to be determined solely by price 
relativities.  In theorising capital purely as an exchange relation, enhanced surplus value 
extraction depends on the ability to find and make use of cheaper labour sources and 
cheaper production techniques.  The world of boundless mobility options to which the 
conventional wisdom refers would obviously facilitate such a search.  For, this would be 
a world in which successful search allowed for all input costs to be reduced to a 
minimum.  Operating within perfectly integrated international market structures is 
assumed to be conducive to minimising variable costs of production, and the ability to 
minimise variable costs of production is further assumed to be conducive to profit-
maximisation strategies. 
 
However, it bears repetition that not all costs associated with the capitalist mode of 
production are variable costs.  This means that there is nothing necessary about exit being 
the optimal capitalist strategy in all instances.  As Robert Wade suggests, “National 
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boundaries ... are proxies for physical, cultural, linguistic and educational nearness” 
(Wade 1996: 85).  These factors represent those parts of the wider social environment 
which may lead to productivity-enhancing externalities activated through social learning 
within the production chain.  The decision to leave one domestic context for another is 
therefore likely to incur additional sunk costs, proportionate to the time that it takes to 
develop new productivity-enhancing externalities to the level of those that were sacrificed 
to make exit possible in the first place.  As such, overplaying the exit card - or even the 
threat to exit card - could well inhibit profit maximisation strategies.  If exit dissolves 
important social relations of production, then it acts not to enable potential profit 
maximisation but to undermine it.  In circumstances in which this proves to be the case, it 
is simply stating the obvious to suggest that mobility options are likely to be ignored.  It 
may well be true that the ubiquitous nature of arguments about globalisation has 
introduced an awareness of an increased range of feasible exit options into the corporate 
mindset.  But it is equally true that exercising such options is only a rational strategy in 
those instances in which writing off sunk costs in the present location and taking on more 
sunk costs in the new location aids the process of surplus value extraction.  Moreover, no 
amount of globalisation will enhance the degree to which mobility options are exercised 
unless that process is aided in this way. 
 
Given the significance of sunk costs to decisions not to exit, mobility options are likely to 
be structurally impaired in those sectors which are capital-intensive in nature.  Moreover, 
when capital-intensive sectors are dominated by production techniques which are 
distinctively high-tech, these structural impediments are likely to be even more 
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pronounced (Gertler 1997: 58).  The limits on the spatial mobility of capital are therefore 
very real (see Watson 1999a), and in fact become more real as the mode of production 
moves away from labour-intensive industries.  It should therefore come as little surprise 
that the most mobile of productive investments - indeed, the only ones which come 
anywhere near approximating the image of the footloose firm to be found in the 
conventional wisdom - are those which rely on labour as the primary productive input.  
Elsewhere, the continuing geographic specificity of social relations of production has 
ensured that globalising tendencies are not automatically made manifest as global flows 
of productive capital. 
 
 
 
 
The Non-Globalisation of Production in Advanced Capitalism 
 
Ample evidence exists to dismiss the assumption that contemporary production networks 
have been effectively globalised.  The dominant economic geography of research and 
development, for instance, remains overwhelmingly bounded by the physical parameters 
of national production space.  Contrary to the globalisation hypothesis, the share of the 
world’s larget firms’ technology activity which is done anywhere other than in those 
firms’ home countries is minimal (see Archibugi & Pianta 1992).  Around 90% of the 
total R&D expenditure of the world’s advanced industrialised economies is spent at 
‘home’.  There is absolutely no sense in which such a figure can sustain assumptions of 
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perfectly clearing global markets.  Parimal Patel and Keith Pavitt must surely be closer to 
the mark when they suggest that this is “an important case of non-globalisation” (Patel & 
Pavitt 1991: 1; see also Patel & Pavitt 1994). 
 
Moreover, the persistence of distinctively national innovation systems is not merely an 
interesting empirical anecdote.  It is also responsible for conditioning the rest of the 
production chain with a continuing bias towards the persistence of national economic 
structures and national competitiveness regimes.  Consider, for instance, production 
which has been restructured so that it may begin to approximate a model of flexible 
specialisation based on ‘just-in-time’ delivery of goods to the market (on which, see 
Jessop et al 1991; Amin 1994).  Successful flexible specialisation strategies are 
dependent on developing highly localised economic niches in order to take advantage of 
pre-existing market specificities.  However, the ability to derive that sort of competitive 
advantage in turn is dependent on the prior ability to align contingent local consumption 
geographies with specialised local production geographies (Watson 1997).  As such, the 
flexible specialisation process highlights the importance of the unique aspects of local 
geography in a way which stands in complete contradiction to the conventional wisdom’s 
assumption that globalising dynamics come complete with homogenising tendencies 
which erode all sense of geographic difference.  Whereas the globalisation hypothesis 
predicts the emergence of a truly global circuit of production, the flexible specialisation 
process draws attention to the actual existence of a highly localised circuit of production.  
In most respects, the globe is a much less feasible space for the realisation of 
accumulation strategies than are localities anchored within discrete national capitalist 
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structures.  It is the location of the final market which provides the most reliable guide as 
to the likely location of the specialised production outlet.  Insofar as contemporary 
consumption patterns tend to be contextually-specific, final markets tend similarly to be 
locked-in to fixed spatial co-ordinates.  Such effects discount the possibility of mobility 
options being exercised by those firms which operate in well-defined local economic 
niches. 
 
Moreover, it is not that spatially embedded production in any way represents old and out-
moded production technologies.  ‘Just-in-time’ techniques are distinctively state of the 
art.  Indeed, many of the most up-to-date production technologies serve to mitigate 
against the dispersal of investment funds across and beyond the borders of national 
economies.  As soon as financial assets are made concrete as productive investments, 
there are a whole range of reasons to believe that the spatial mobility of capital is far 
more limited than the conventional wisdom of globalisation would suggest. 
 
Given this, it is perhaps to be expected that the available empirical evidence will 
contradict the assumption of a truly global circuit of productive capital.  Indeed, it would 
arguably be more surprising were there to be evidence for such a circuit, despite the grip 
which the conventional wisdom of globalisation would appear to have on public 
discourse.  For, having scratched the surface of the market economy to begin to look at 
the actual essence of capitalist production, it is clear that there is nothing ‘natural’ or 
‘inevitable’ about the creation of a global market.  At the very least, the actions of those 
who hold themselves up as being at the cutting-edge of the globalisation process would 
  62 
seem to suggest that this is the case (see Hildyard et al 1996: 125).  A significant amount 
of time and money has been devoted by both state and capital, on the one hand, to 
suppressing resistance to globalisation and, on the other, to systematically re-defining the 
domestic political agenda in an attempt to facilitate ‘evidence’ of a global circuit of 
production.  Quite clearly, this rests uneasily with the dominant discursive construction of 
globalisation as an exogenous process. 
 
The fact that such interventions are considered necessary to ensure the successful 
embedding of globalising norms carries a number of important implications: 
 i) It suggests that globalisation is as much a political project as it is an economic 
one; moreover, a contingent political project at that. 
 ii) It suggests that, so long as the political context which determines the form 
which globalising tendencies will take in any given instant continues to be a site of 
struggle, the globalisation process will remain fundamentally incomplete. 
 
Moreover, as the following figures show, the only ever partial process of globalisation is 
more than just a theoretical possibility.  It is also an empirical fact.  Not only, then, are 
there theoretical reasons to doubt that there is a necessary connection between an 
increased exposure to global markets and an increase in the spatial mobility of productive 
capital.  The available statistical data demonstrates that the spatial patterning of 
contemporary capitalist production sites remains much more closely linked to national 
economic structures than the conventional wisdom allows. 
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The figures for the distribution of FDI flows are perhaps most instructive in this respect.  
For, a sudden surge in the quantity of FDI stocks in the 1980s forms a significant part of 
the casual empiricism which is taken to be ‘confirmation’ of globalisation in the 
conventional wisdom.  There is no reason to deny that such an increase took place; the 
statistical measures are quite unequivocal in this instance.  During that decade, the growth 
in FDI as a proportion of GDP far outstripped the growth in exports as a proportion of 
GDP, which in turn was substantially higher than GDP growth itself (Busch 2000).  As 
such, like trade patterns, production patterns are becoming more integrated, but at a 
quicker pace.  Whilst percentage growth in exports and FDI had moved closely in parallel 
in the preceding decade, the late 1980s saw a clear divergence between nominal growth in 
the two as investors increasingly diversified into FDI (Hirst & Thompson 1996: 55).  
Inward flows of foreign direct investment per head of population for the G7 countries in 
aggregate rose from a 1981-1986 average of US$35.9 to a 1991 figure of US$148.0 
(calculated from UNCTAD 1993).  Adjusting for the impact of inflation on the 
underlying price level, inward investment flows more than trebled in that single five-year 
period.  This much would seem to be impossible to dispute. 
 
What we must dispute, though, is the use of such figures as ‘confirming evidence’ for 
trends with which they are no more than coincidental.  It may well be that the 1980s saw a 
dramatic increase in the rate at which FDI flowed around the international economy.  It 
may also be the case that increases in inward investment flows are commonly assumed to 
be indicative of the deepening of globalising dynamics within the international economy.  
However, there are no grounds on which these two assertions should be run together in 
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the conclusion that the 1980s therefore witnessed the emergence of a qualitatively new 
economic state called ‘globalisation’. 
 
The available empirical evidence indicates that two objections should be raised against 
such a conclusion.  The first concentrates on the suggestion that there is something 
distinct and novel about increased FDI penetration; the second on the suggestion that the 
spatial distribution of contemporary FDI flows are representative of a truly global circuit 
of productive capital.  Firstly, to the extent that heightened flows of inward investment 
are assumed to be a sign of what lies ahead for the international economy, this then is a 
future which has been seen before.  When expressed as a proportion of GDP, FDI flows 
are no more marked today in the globalisation era than they were in the Gold Standard era 
(Bairoch 1996: 188).  Despite all the advances in transportation and information 
technology networks, and despite all the subsequent talk of ‘time/space compression’ (on 
which point, see Harvey 1989a), proportionate FDI flows are now no higher than they 
were in 1913.  In this respect, it is the period in between, especially that of the Bretton 
Woods era in which capital flows were policed quite rigorously through exchange 
controls, that looks to be the period of qualitative novelty (Watson 2000c).  Certainly, it 
would appear to be difficult to sustain the impression that it is contemporary restructuring 
processes which have produced a stage of capitalist development unlike any seen before.  
The growth of inward investment flows in the 1980s, for instance, despite this being a 
decade of intense capital liberalisation, was less than it was in the 1970s, which was a 
decade widely condemned for its protectionist mindset and anti-liberal practices. 
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Secondly, and more importantly, the spatial distribution of FDI flows fails to simulate a 
truly global circuit of production.  The more extreme accounts of the globalisation 
process point to the emergence of an ‘inevitable’ job displacement effect.  As before, the 
capital relation has to be treated purely as an exchange relation in order to reach such a 
conclusion.  Viewed through such a perspective, corporate managers are assumed to be 
sufficiently rational to exploit any opportunity they may possess to exit high-wage, high-
cost, advanced industrialised economies so that they may relocate in lower-wage, lower-
cost, newly industrialising economies.  However, the observed spatial patterning of actual 
capital flows does virtually nothing to bear out such a narrative (Wieczorek 1995). 
 
Recent increases in FDI have not been directed at exploiting absolute inter-country wage 
differentials.  Germany, for instance, despite its relatively high wages, continues to 
receive more inward FDI than it exports.  Investments do not necessarily flow down wage 
gradients from those whose pay is high to those whose pay is low.  Indeed, what is 
remarkable about recent increases in FDI flows is not the extent to which they have been 
concentrated in the low-wage periphery of the international economy.  Rather, it is the 
extent to which they have bypassed such regions altogether.  Foreign direct investment is 
just as likely to flow up wage gradients as it is to flow down them (see, in particular, 
Cooke & Noble).  Overwhelmingly, inward investment is a phenomenon which occurs 
within and between the world’s most advanced industrialised economies.  British 
governments may well have been successful in capturing a disproportionate amount of 
recent FDI activity through marketing Britain’s cost-competitiveness relative to the rest of 
the EU.  However, the process of allowing footloose firms to chase the cheapest labour 
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has taken place within distinct spatial limits.  Insofar as FDI has been channelled towards 
low-wage countries at all, this has only been in terms of the relatively low-wage 
economies of the Triad regions of North America, Western Europe and South-East Asia.  
Certainly, it is not in terms of absolute low-wage economies. 
 
In this respect, it may even be possible to argue that market-clearing dynamics are 
becoming less rather than more ‘global’.  Talk of perfectly integrated production markets 
appears somewhat hollow when set within the context of the following figures: 
 i) The South’s share of the world FDI stock fell by a third between the late 1960s 
and the late 1980s (Griffin & Khan 1992). 
 ii) Over the same time-frame, Latin America’s share of that stock fell by around 
60% (Busch 2000), despite its close links with the American economy. 
 iii) Similarly, it required the Asian ‘miracle’ and the rapid integration of the 
‘tiger’ economies into international capitalist structures to allow East Asia’s share of 
world FDI to hold constant in this period (Wade 1996). 
 iv) Africa and the Middle-East continue to remain effectively excluded from the 
inward investment game altogether. 
 
In sum, the sudden surge of FDI in the 1980s provided a stimulus for the re-concentration 
of the dominant circuit of productive capital within the North.  By the end of that decade, 
around 85% of all foreign direct investments were both sourced and received by advanced 
industrialised countries (Bairoch 1996: 183).  Moreover, of that total, well over half 
ended up in the United States alone (Hirst 1997: 21). 
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The conventional wisdom therefore picks up on tendencies that are at work (the number 
of FDI flows has increased in recent years), and redescribes them as processes which are 
not (such flows in no way represent a truly global circuit of productive capital).  National 
economies are much less porous at the level of production than in the image of perfectly-
clearing global markets summoned by the conventional wisdom.  It may well be the case 
that an increased incidence of corporate takeovers in the 1980s allowed most of the 
world’s largest companies to acquire subsidiary outlets outside of their home markets (see 
Cowling 1990).  It may also be true that firms which have restructured in this way control 
almost a third of private GNP within the German, French, Italian, British, Dutch, Belgian, 
Swiss, Canadian and Australian economies, and almost a quarter in the Japanese and 
American economies (Wade 1996: 63).  But simply to read off from this the assertion that 
here there is evidence of transnational corporations pushing back the frontiers of the 
global economy is once again to elevate inference above causal analysis. 
 
For a start, it is to mis-specify the essence of such firms.  Not only is it seriously to over-
estimate the footloose features of their corporate structures to label these firms ‘trans-
national’.  It is also often to stretch reality to think of them as truly ‘multi-national’.  The 
process which lies at the heart of the redefinition of the corporate landscape through the 
wave of takeovers in the 1980s is not globalisation per se.  Rather, it is evidence of a re-
concentration of capital as the liberalisation of the international economy allowed for 
surplus value to be derived through capital acquisition as well as capital accumulation.  
Given that much of the acquisition process was driven by asset-stripping strategies (see 
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Woolcock 1996), the subsequent spatial dispersion of production through corporate 
takeover was strictly limited.  In many ways, what resulted was not multi-national 
production at all.  Instead, foreign subsidiaries tended to be bought in order that they be 
used mainly as export platforms (Franks & Mayer 1990; Buckle & Thompson 1995).  Set 
within the context of external trade barriers operating at both national and regional level, 
such acquisitions provided a means of bypassing regulatory legislation (on which point, 
see Watson 1999b: 132-4).  In many cases, then, inward investments are triggered every 
bit as much by export strategies as they are by production strategies.  Serious questions 
must therefore be asked of any assumption that recent increases in FDI have necessarily 
led to the creation of a global production structure. 
 
This brings the study quite neatly to the third of the three strands of the dominant 
discourse of globalisation.  Although the analysis in the previous two paragraphs would 
suggest that there are difficulties associated with trying to separate out the effects of 
production strategies from the effects of export strategies, this is precisely what the 
conventional wisdom does.  As such, the focus of the study now turns away from 
assumptions about the globalisation of production to assumptions about the globalisation 
of trade. 
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Trading Relations and the Possibility of a Global Market in Goods and Services 
 
The Economist may well conclude that it is only in the last ten years that public discourse 
has shifted to treat free trade as an unequivocal ‘good’ (The Economist Survey 1999).  
However, the process through which the structures of the international economy have 
been re-constituted so as to facilitate a liberal trading regime reach much further into the 
post-war period than merely the last ten years.  As such, there should perhaps be little 
surprise at the frequency with which trade interdependencies are heralded as a sign of the 
increasingly anachronistic status of national economic structures.  Indeed, it is to the 
simple symmetries of their trade models that orthodox economists tend to point when 
explaining their understanding of globalisation. 
 
However, as with the other strands of the conventional wisdom, rhetoric and reality are 
not necessarily a good match in the case of trade.  There is certainly evidence that the 
growth in exports as a percentage of GDP has consistently been above GDP growth for 
almost all of the post-war period (Hirst & Thompson 1996: 54).  Indeed, the accelerating 
gap between exports and output is the most frequently cited ‘evidence’ for globalisation; 
output growth being less than three-quarters of export growth in the period from 1980 to 
the present day (United Nations 1997: 1).  A definite trend of heightened sensitivities to 
international market conditions can therefore be identified from the raw economic data.  
Yet, once that data is unpacked, the assumption of trade globalisation rapidly dissipates. 
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The globalisation hypothesis in itself represents a bolder claim than the mere 
identification of increased trade penetration.  It relies on suppositions, not just about the 
changing volume of trade flows, but also about their changing nature.  Confirmation of 
an increase in traded volumes is not automatically confirmation of their changing nature.  
Moreover, insofar as currently increasing volumes have had only a marginal impact on 
the spatial distribution of trade flows, and insofar as that impact is far from 
unambiguously in the direction of a wider dispersion, they should in no way be read as 
confirmation of the creation of a global circuit of trade. 
 
Two qualifications to the globalisation hypothesis should perhaps be made.  Both refer to 
the spatial limits of the current dispersion of trade flows: the first directly; the second 
indirectly. 
 
First, once we control for the effects of the development of regional trading blocs, recent 
patterns of trade have pointed to a re-concentration of capital, and most definitely not its 
reprojection into a realm of truly global economic relations.  Given that it is the most 
institutionally embedded of the three Triad regions, Western Europe is arguably the 
paradigm test of such dynamics.  On a range of different statistical measures, the small 
open economies of Western Europe, in particular the Benelux countries, are the most 
open in the world.  Taken together, these three economies’ exports as a percentage of 
GDP stood at well over 50% as early in the capital liberalisation process as 1980 (Rodrik 
1997: 26).  This figure is striking in its own right; but becomes even more so when set 
alongside that for the last hundred years’ average of the United States’ exports as a 
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percentage of GDP: which is roughly 5% (Chisholm 1995: 15).  However, after 
controlling for the ‘single market effects’ of intra-regional trade, the discrepancy between 
these two figures all but disappears.  Put simply, then, it is regional markets which 
dominate current trading patterns, not global markets.  Indeed, the imposition of regional 
tariff barriers currently presents one of the most important institutional impediments to 
the emergence of a perfectly-clearing global market in trade. 
 
The extent to which even the most open economies in the world are integrated into a 
global circuit of trade flows is much more limited than is the extent to which less open 
economies are integrated into regional circuits of trade flows.  When taken as three 
single-unit blocs of North America, Western Europe and South-East Asia, exports 
account for only around 10% of GDP (Hirst 1997: 8); a figure which the national 
economies of the world have exceeded in more years of the twentieth-century than they 
have not (calculated from Chisholm 1995: 15).  The lack of integration of trade regimes 
has ensured that around 90% of consumption within the Triad is sourced by production 
which is ‘domestically’ based (Wade 1996: 66). 
 
Second, much of the recent growth in trade is accounted for by the increasing significance 
of intra-firm trade.  It has already been noted that an increasing proportion of FDI flows 
now take the form of capital acquisitions.  Such dynamics have been triggered by 
attempts to lessen larger firms’ exposure to external tariff barriers imposed on final 
products.  Trading between different parts of the same firm has subsequently risen quite 
substantially in order to complete the means through which which such barriers are 
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avoided.  Unfinished products are exported from one part of a firm to another, so that the 
final stage of the production process takes place in the country that the product is to be 
sold. 
 
As Robert Wade reports, for instance, intra-firm trade involving US-based multi-nationals 
represents the equivalent of about one third of all American exports (ibid: 64).  This, 
though, is more of an accounting fix than it is a proper export strategy.  When data sets 
are adjusted for the existence of such accounting fixes, trade openness figures look even 
less like those which the globalisation hypothesis predicts than they do when taken purely 
at face value.  Indeed, the figure for American exports, which stands at around 9% of 
GDP in nominal terms, is reduced to around 6% of GDP after controlling for intra-firm 
trade effects. 
 
The persistence of national economic structures is very real, then, with companies 
remaining rooted in home bases and governed by domestic regulatory regimes (see Cox: 
1997: 116-18).  The institutional specificities of distinctive national capitalisms are not 
being overwritten in some homogenising blitz.  Despite the fact that trade currently takes 
place within a highly liberalised international environment, the price of ostensibly 
identical goods can still vary widely across countries for a range of reasons which have 
nothing to do with systemic economic logics.  For instance, and with respect to the 
specific case of Britain, the Monopolies and Mergers Commission is currently 
undertaking an extensive investigation at the behest of the Secretary of State for Trade 
and Industry as to why consumer prices in that country should appear to be structurally 
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higher than they are anywhere else in the G7.  The world of ‘one-price’ may well be 
familiar to orthodox economic trade models, but it is not a world which is currently being 
experienced in reality (on which point, see Krugman & Lawrence 1994). 
 
International trade may indeed be capable of creating arbitrage effects in a manner 
consistent with orthodox economic theory.  Yet, such effects have not led to price 
convergence as the globalisation hypothesis predicts.  Given the strictly limited nature of 
global trade, however, price convergence should probably not be expected - irrespective 
of the degree to which the rules of international trade have been liberalised.  The 
following empirical anecdote provides suitable illustrative evidence of the way in which 
price convergence is more advanced within national economic borders than it is across 
them.  The calculations are John McCallum’s, and the focus of his study is typical trading 
patterns between the United States and Canada.  Even before the NAFTA treaty was 
signed, trade between the two countries took place within the context of the most lightly 
regulated bilateral agreement in the world.  Effective barriers to trade were no greater 
between the two countries than they were within them.  Still, however, McCallum has 
been able to show that trade between a US state and a Canadian province is dwarfed by 
trade between two Canadian provinces by a factor of twenty (cited in Rodrik 1997: 21-2).  
That is, international trade in this instance represents the equivalent of only 5% of intra-
national trade.  As such, the external linkages which could conceivably bring 
international prices into line in the same way as intra-national prices just do not exist. 
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Despite the emergence of many data sets of this nature, both the dominant discourse and 
the political practice of globalisation continue to revolve around the assumption of a 
world of ‘one-price’.  Of particular importance to that practice has been the way in which 
price arbitrage has been argued to lead to similar arbitrage effects in terms of social 
standards.  Put simply, the co-existence of countries with very different economic norms 
and social institutions within a shared and highly liberalised trade environment is 
believed to undermine those domestic social bargains which historically have sought the 
highest level of labour de-commodification (see, for instance, Huber & Stephens 1999).  
Put more simply still, globalisation is believed to rule out all socially-progressive 
economic options, normalising previously discrete social contexts around a lowest 
common denominator liberalism.  Most significantly for the analysis which is to follow in 
this thesis, globalising tendencies are thought to make necessary the forced extraction of 
the state from the economic policy-making process.  Increased trade interdependencies 
are not only argued to be incompatible with an increasingly interventionist role for the 
state.  Amidst populist references to a generic ‘crisis’ of state management, they are also 
argued to be incompatible merely with reproducing the state in its current form. 
 
Once again, however, the available statistical evidence does little to explain the 
talismanic grip which the conventional wisdom is able to exert over current 
understandings of socio-economic reality.  Historically, growth in trade and growth in the 
state have not been the kind of contradictory process which the conventional wisdom 
suggests that they have now become as a result of globalising tendencies.  As David 
Cameron was the first to point out, there has been a surprisingly strong, and statistically 
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significant, association across cases between the extent to which domestic economies 
have been penetrated by international trade flows and the importance of the government 
in regulating those economies (Cameron 1978).  Following Cameron’s methodology and 
up-dating his study with the inclusion of more contemporary data-points, Dani Rodrik has 
shown that both the strong association and the statistical significance have persisted long 
into the era of globalisation (Rodrik 1996, 1997).  Lined up along a distribution matrix, at 
one extreme are the Benelux countries with their remarkably open economies and their 
high levels of government-regulated social protection.  At the other end are the United 
States and Japan, whose low levels of government spending and welfare state coverage 
are matched by their low levels of trade openness. 
 
On the basis of such figures, Rodrik concludes that “the social welfare state has been the 
flipside of the open economy” (Rodrik 1997: 25).  Far from high levels of social 
protection being incompatible with high degrees of export penetration as the conventional 
wisdom of globalisation suggests, it would in fact seem as if increased liberalisation is 
incompatible with welfare state retrenchment.  The demands which the dominant policy-
making discourse currently makes are therefore built on contradictory premises.  So long 
as restructuring tendencies continue to take a distinctively liberal form, the history of 
post-war state-building appears to suggest that they will increase the scope of necessary 
social insurance.  However, globalisation is typically constructed as denying the 
institutional space for the macroeconomic autonomy which would be required to make 
expanded social protection feasible.  As such, contemporary public policy-makers would 
seem to be faced with something of a dilemma.  In continuing to ensure that globalisation 
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remains a fundamentally liberal project, governments may simultaneously be in the 
process of creating domestic conditions that serve to undermine the social consensus for 
keeping national markets open to international trade. 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Accepting Rodrik’s conclusion, then, it is perhaps unsurprising that the creation of a 
domestic political context which could facilitate further international economic 
integration has been linked to suggestions of ‘state crisis’.  A concerted attempt is being 
made to produce globalising tendencies in a distinctively liberal form.  This in turn seems 
likely to lead to the erosion of domestic social compromises and, as such, a crisis of 
legitimacy for the state. 
 
That said, crisis narratives of this nature provide only a marginal voice in the public 
discourse of globalisation.  Indeed, the dominant voice in this particular debate adopts the 
exact opposite position.  The most common assumption is not that the need for preserving 
a social consensus is making the current process of globalisation increasingly 
contradictory.  Rather, it is that globalising tendencies are making the reproduction of 
existing social norms increasingly contradictory.  As such, it is the restrictively liberal 
parameters of economic globalisation which tend to be treated as a given; whilst it is the 
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social settlements embodied in extensive welfare state provision which tend to be treated 
as expendable.  The defence of a distinctively liberal globalisation is assumed to require 
that existing levels of welfare be sacrificed.  Almost entirely absent from public discourse 
is the contrary assumption that the defence of existing levels of welfare requires that a 
distinctively liberal globalisation be sacrificed. 
 
In the chapters which follow, I turn first to this dominant crisis narrative which is to be 
found in the conventional wisdom.  Given that the link between globalisation and 
‘inevitable’ state restructuring forms such an important feature of public discourse, it is 
almost certainly a surprise that this dominant crisis narrative is rarely rendered explicit in 
the existing academic literature.  However, there can be little doubt that such a narrative 
is important to the political practice of globalisation.  Consequently, it is to the task of 
analysing the putative relationship between globalisation and state crisis that the 
following chapter is dedicated. 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO: 
 
GLOBALISATION AND NARRATIVES OF STATE CRISIS 
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The market-clearing metaphors which play such a large part in the conventional wisdom 
of globalisation are precisely that: metaphors which relate to an ideal-typical world, rather 
than statements about the world in which we actually live.  Narratives of state crisis 
which are implicit in the conventional wisdom follow the same pattern.  They also relate 
to an idealised end-state of some future globalisation process rather than to the actuality 
of the process which we are currently living. 
 
The aim of this chapter is to render such narratives explicit.  In general, they are made 
manifest as two distinct types of claim.  One dominant crisis narrative contained within 
the conventional wisdom of globalisation relates to state functions as a whole, and 
suggests that we are passing through a critical moment in the history of the state per se.  I 
label such suggestions the narrative of ‘territorial crisis’.  The other relates to the 
functions of a certain form of the state, and suggests that critical tendencies are apparent 
only within that state form.  I label these latter suggestions the narrative of ‘rationality 
crisis’. 
 
 
 
 
Globalisation and the Narrative of ‘Territorial Crisis’ 
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Despite widespread perceptions that the state is indeed at a critical juncture in its history, 
it is tempting to begin this part of the analysis with the usual retort to accusations of 
impending crisis.  Given that the political activities of state actors continue to shape the 
contours of everyday experience, there would appear to be some justification for asking, 
‘Crisis ... what crisis?’.  The conventional wisdom of globalisation may well point to the 
radical statelessness of contemporary social and economic relations (see, for instance, 
Ohmae 1990: 172).  Yet, it is nevertheless true that the state remains a pervasive 
influence within modern societies. 
 
A clear difference exists between the assumption that the state is now invisible because it 
has been abstracted from everyday life, and the assumption that the dominant pattern of 
state visibility is changing because the role which the state is being forced to discharge 
has changed (Lindblom 1979; Underhill 1995; Strange 1996; May 1998).  Even in times 
of state reconstruction, we continue to experience the interventions of those who operate 
in its name.  Indeed, such experiences are perhaps more apparent in these circumstances 
than they are in times of normal politics.  It would therefore be a mistake to characterise 
the current process of state reconstruction as the state having simply disappeared.  It may 
now be called upon to perform rather different tasks to the state of the immediate post-
war period.  This latter state may well be in terminal decline.  Yet, it is clear that the 
perceived crisis is anything but universal, in the sense that it fails to encapsulate all 
spheres of potential state activity (see Cerny 1990; Albo 1994; Wiseman 1996).  In fact, 
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at the same time as state actors are relinquishing competencies in some policy areas, they 
are claiming new competencies in others. 
 
Nevertheless, the use of more populist forms of the language of crisis within public 
discourse implies that there are universalising effects in operation here.  Perceptions of a 
mass of contradictions within the existing structures of the state tend to be made manifest 
in the first instance in geographic terms: as a ‘crisis of territoriality’ (Poggi 1990: 177; see 
also Ohmae 1995; Reich 1992; Levitt 1983; Sachs & Warner 1995; Greider 1997).  
Doubts have been raised about the continued relevance of the national state in a world in 
which the constraints of territorial space seem to be ever more permeable.  It is suggested 
that the national state has been ‘hollowed-out’ from both above and below by the 
increasingly footloose character of the capital relation.  As this process has unfolded, it 
has been further assumed that the ‘substantive institutional coherence’ of the state has 
been progressively dissolved (see Jessop 1990: 345). 
 
Globalisation is assumed to be changing the nature of the spatial relationships which 
underpin the state’s successful reproduction.  Indeed, such has been the adverse nature of 
this change that it is assumed that the state no longer enjoys sufficient competencies to 
ensure “the coherent expression [of its] institutional mission” (Poggi 1990: 173).  As 
Kenichi Ohmae puts it in less abstract terms, “national borders have effectively 
disappeared and, along with them, [so has] the economic logic that made them useful 
lines of demarcation in the first place” (Ohmae 1990: 172). 
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In contrast to the ever more fluid spatial relationships of globalising capital, the national 
state remains constrained by its fixed territorial configuration (see Smith 1992).  As such, 
the state is seen to be increasingly ineffective in its attempts to defend the ‘national’ 
interest when governance problems emerge at a spatial scale which exceeds its 
jurisdictional remit.  As the processes of globalisation have re-projected social, political 
and economic relations onto a truly international stage, the conventional wisdom of 
globalisation implies that the state in its national form has become simply too ‘small’ to 
be able to regulate such relations (Waters 1995: 96).  Furthermore, this trend has been 
lived out within a discursive context which effectively negates any possibility of 
corrective action.  The dominant political discourse of the perils of ‘big government’ has 
prevented state actors from acquiring additional competencies in order to offset the 
increasing spatial mismatch between state and capital. 
 
So long as globalisation persists in re-defining the capital relation as essentially 
‘footloose’, it is assumed that the state will continue to appear anachronistic in its 
national form.  The conventional wisdom highlights the contradiction inherent whenever 
a national state attempts to regulate a domestic economy which has been increasingly 
stripped of its essentially ‘national’ character.  The ‘reality’ of globalisation is constructed 
as the radical ‘territorial non-correspondence’ which is now thought to exist between 
economic relations and state relations (Cox 1997: 116).  The assumption that capital now 
enjoys abundant mobility options suggests that such relations now reside, not only on 
altogether different territorial planes, but also on altogether different jurisdictional planes.  
The conventional wisdom asserts that capital is free to take advantage of an effectively 
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borderless world to escape the clutches of state regulation by re-defining its geographical 
identity.  Globalising dynamics are assumed to have significantly heightened the range of 
possibilities for adopting short-term ‘flags of convenience’ in this manner.  The ‘crisis of 
territoriality’ associated with globalisation is therefore announced most graphically by the 
emergence of a range of economic structures and processes which “have a radius of 
action that ignores, or denies relevance to, any given state’s territory” (Poggi 1990: 177). 
 
The national specificity of capital is thought to have been undermined in particular by the 
integration of the world’s financial markets into a single trading entity (for differing 
interpretations of such a trend, see for instance Helleiner 1994; Thrift 1995; Drucker 
1997; Schaberg 1998).  Spurred on by the normalising effects of speculative flows of 
capital which have shown themselves able to override government policy at will, talk has 
been rife about the potential for economic and political homogenisation.  Prior to the 
onset of globalisation, the international economy had been a space of difference.  This 
was both a cause and a consequence of the different mediating roles played by individual 
states in guaranteeing temporally-specific compromises between the competing parties to 
the national production relation.  However, the public discourse of ‘territorial crisis’ 
assumes that this expression of national difference within international economic space is 
no longer possible.  For, the primary agent responsible for authoring such difference, the 
state, increasingly appears to be by-passed by global financial relations.  At best, national 
states are now thought to ‘operate downstream’ from the international financial markets.  
As such, the conventional wisdom is that they are effectively powerless to do anything 
other than go with the flow of speculative movements of financial capital: swimming 
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with the apparently irresistible tide of homogenising economic forces for fear of sinking 
without a trace should they attempt to assert their difference too vigorously.  A new, 
compelling ‘reality’ is being constructed within public discourse, and this has had 
significant effects on the way in which the world is being experienced.  It is now routinely 
presented as an unquestionable fact that homogenising tendencies will become ever more 
deeply embedded as globalisation eradicates national institutional specificities and re-
projects social relations onto a “supra-territorial plane” (Scholte 1996: 49). 
 
However, the underlying aim of this thesis is, of course, to challenge such a claim.  That 
challenge revolves around my counter-claim that the future remains less closed to 
political contestation than the homogenisation hypothesis allows.  The narrative of 
‘territorial crisis’ may well reveal the major rhetorical position of the conventional 
wisdom of globalisation.  But it is much less clear whether such a position can be 
substantiated at an empirical level.  Indeed, the empirical data which was introduced in 
the previous chapter can only be read in one way.  Market-clearing metaphors may well 
form a crucial part of the conventional wisdom of globalisation.  Yet, any suggestion that 
such metaphors represent an accurate reflection of the social reality of everyday 
experience can be decisively rejected.  Insofar as assumptions of a generic ‘territorial 
crisis’ of the state are constructed using exactly the same metaphors, then a similar 
standard clearly applies in this instance as well.  The homogenisation hypothesis and its 
associated inflection of generic state crisis are such a selective reading of contemporary 
events that, when exposed to the rigours of empirical scrutiny, it proves to be a 
fundamental mis-reading of a significantly more complex social reality. 
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Such complexities can be summarised in two points:  i) There is no evidence for the 
existence of a global equilibrium of supply and demand.  As the previous chapter 
demonstrated, the economic conditions which lie at the heart of the narrative of 
‘territorial crisis’ speak of an imagined world rather than the world of actual practice.  ii) 
Even if the reverse was true, there would still be no basis on which to simply read off the 
‘inevitability’ of state crisis from the underlying economic conditions.  There is much 
more to the reproduction of the state than can be discovered merely by talking about its 
economic base. 
 
The homogenisation hypothesis is grounded on assumptions about the way in which 
footloose flows of global economic forces are likely to erode, indeed have eroded, the 
specificity of national political structures.  Such a view is predicated on observations of 
the increasingly porous nature of the boundaries of formerly closed national economies 
(see Perraton et al 1998).  However, to argue that the processes of globalisation entail the 
systematic by-passing of the state and, eventually, its necessary obsolescence, requires a 
prior theoretical assumption that the manner in which the state is reproduced can be 
reduced purely to its economic determinants.  This assumption would be analytically 
dubious at the best of times: that is to say, were there to be unambiguous evidence that 
the processes of globalisation took the same form in practice as they do in the 
conventional wisdom.  Quite clearly, given the absence of such evidence, this assumption 
looks even more of a hostage to fortune.  Moreover, this is not to claim that there is just 
an empirical problem here.  Irrespective of the evidence of the empirical data, there would 
  86 
be no acceptable analytical grounds on which to make the assumption of economically-
determined state reproduction. 
 
The state, as a concrete historical phenomenon located in a specific spatial and temporal 
context, is a product of the interaction between a range of contingent social, political and 
economic factors.  As such, it remains fundamentally under-determined at the level of the 
economic (Jessop 1982, 1990).  Consequently, the implicit economism of much of the 
existing globalisation literature prevents the present debate from capturing fully the 
complexities of both the state and state power.  Notwithstanding arguments about 
globalisation, the state continues to derive two resources which are essential to its 
reproduction from distinctively political processes.  Both its identity (that is, the means 
through which the state is reproduced as a state) and its legitimacy (that is, the means 
through which the power of the state is reproduced) emerge through such processes.  
Thus, the state remains the primary focus of political socialisation, mobilisation, 
identification and representation. 
 
In none of these cases has the ‘supra-territorial’ managed to supplant the ‘territorial’, or 
has the ‘supra-national’ managed to supplant the ‘national’, as the dominant space of 
politicisation.  As a result, and independent of the extent to which the changing 
spatialities of the capital relation can be assumed to have hollowed-out the state, its 
distinctively national character has yet to be superceded.  It is therefore necessary to 
investigate the counter-claim to the conventional wisdom that the homogenisation 
hypothesis describes a new social reality in which national institutional specificities have 
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been dissolved in the face of global economic forces.  National differences of state 
formation have proved to be far more enduring than is allowed by the assumption that 
common pressures will always result in common outcomes. 
 
The national character of political socialisation, mobilisation, identification and 
representation suggests that national responses to globalising pressures will not all be the 
same.  Such pressures, as and when they exist, will pose different challenges to different 
forms of political activity.  Therefore, it is to be expected that they will also elicit 
different responses.  In short, globalisation should only ever be viewed as a tendency.  To 
this, there may or may not be counter-tendencies, depending on the dominant form of 
political mobilisation existing in the country under review (see Hay, Watson & Wincott 
1999).  Even, then, if the dominant tendency inscribed into globalising dynamics was to 
be towards a generic crisis of the state, there can be no guarantee that there would not be 
successful counter-tendencies mobilised to prevent such a tendency being made manifest 
in all circumstances.  Far from globalisation and homogenisation being interchangeable 
concepts, should we reach some future point in which the economic conditions for 
globalisation are very much more apparent than they are at the present time, globalisation 
is still unlikely to lead to homogenisation.  A range of diverse social structures of 
accumulation currently flourish under the influence of globalising tendencies which are at 
best embryonic, and at worst non-existent.  Moreover, a range of diverse social structures 
of accumulation are likely to continue to flourish even under the influence of some 
idealised end-state of full globalisation. 
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Indeed, the reproduction of national political and institutional differences appears to have 
been a pre-condition for facilitating the strictly limited globalisation process which is 
currently visible.  Globalisation embodies a deliberate attempt to release the capital 
relation from the jurisdictional remit of the state in order that the balance of competitive 
advantage within the international economy be shifted towards those national economies 
already organised along liberal market lines (see, for instance, Taylor 1997).  A clear 
paradox can therefore be identified in terms of the way in which the conventional wisdom 
constructs this re-drawing of the parameters of competitive engagement.  According to 
the conventional wisdom, a process has been unleashed which will now sweep all before 
it in the wake of irresistible economic pressures, ‘forcing’ a convergence of all capitalist 
models on the ideal-type liberal market economy.  Thus, it is argued that globalisation is 
creating a world in its own image, consequently eroding those essential political 
differences from which it emerged in the first place.  Unless it is to be believed that a 
process has been initiated which, like Frankenstein’s monster, subsequently turns on its 
creator, it is necessary to search for more subtle explanations of both the causes and the 
consequences of globalisation.  That search leads us neatly into the next section. 
 
 
 
 
From the Homogenisation Hypothesis to ‘Refracted Divergence’ and Back Again 
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It has been state-sponsored reforms to the dominant circuit of capital which have led to 
the emergence of arguments, most of which have been exaggerated, about the economic 
conditions of globalisation now being in place.  Subsequently, such arguments have been 
turned into assumptions of a generic crisis of the state.  We should maybe not be too 
surprised that a distinctively economistic causality has been appealed to in order that the 
assumption of a generic state crisis be made to resonate.  For, it is only when the debate is 
set in these terms that it can be suggested that the state has run its course.  On closer 
inspection, the present phase of capitalist restructuring is linked more to a reconstitution 
of the role of the state than it is to the state’s necessary obsolescence.  Indeed, the 
restructuring process would be stripped of much of its dynamic content were it not for the 
facilitative role of state actors.  Far from the state being stuck in some Fukuyamian 
vacuum having reached the end of its own history, those features of the external 
environment which are thought to have rendered the state increasingly problematic are 
themselves only ever produced in the first place via the exercise of state power. 
 
The conclusion of state crisis implicit in the homogenisation hypothesis would therefore 
appear to be groundless.  Yet, still it continues to be advanced, not only in practitioner 
discourse but also in much of the existing academic literature.  It may well be that 
practitioner and academic discourses contain slightly different inflections.  However, such 
differences typically are more a matter of degree than they are a question of absolutes.  
Practitioner debates tend to be structured in rather cruder language, suggesting the future 
possibility of a total annhilation of national spatial and institutional differences.  
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Academic debates tend to be less crude, although they too are most often conducted 
through strictly reductionist language. 
 
Taking the academic debates at face value, divergent modes of organising the economy 
are forecast to persist, at least in the short-term.  The idea of path-dependency is enlisted 
in order to argue that cognitive, political and institutional factors will impede the road to 
full homogenisation for a number of time periods.  Whilst the market-clearing world of 
the conventional wisdom is one of instantaneous adjustment, the real world of path-
dependent economic institutions is assumed to be one of significant time lags. 
 
In what is perhaps the most comprehensive analysis of such a position, Herbert Kitschelt, 
Peter Lange, Gary Marks and John Stephens express a desire to remove any implication 
that the political change associated with globalisation is merely functional to a governing 
economic essence.  This they do by introducing the notion of change as “refracted 
divergence” (Kitschelt et al 1999: 427-60).  More than anything, such a conception is 
intended to capture the politicised nature of the capital relation.  Divergent modes of 
political mobilisation are assumed to have led to divergent economic practices, and the 
difference in these practices is further assumed to have led to different counter-tendencies 
being mobilised to globalising pressures (cf Berger & Dore 1996; Weiss 1998). 
 
Note, however, that the use of path-dependent assumptions does not prevent globalising 
pressures themselves from being conceived in homogenised form.  It may well be that 
national modes of political mobilisation are seen as having produced national path-
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dependent trajectories of capitalist evolution.  Yet, these different evolutionary processes 
are assumed to have been punctuated by an unfolding conjunctural moment associated 
with contemporary capitalist restructuring.  Hence, all path-dependent trajectories have 
been subjected to refractory dynamics, which have in turn disturbed the systemic 
direction of the different paths being followed by injecting a critical moment of 
discontinuity into their development. 
 
It is therefore clear what is being meant by ‘path-dependence’ in this instance.  The 
introduction of the concept serves merely as a short-hand for some sort of appreciation 
that history matters.  Yet, that appreciation does not appear to be the same as saying that 
small differences in initial starting conditions can, through a process of cumulative 
causation, lead to magnified differences which will ensure that historical specificities will 
be reproduced indefinitely.  Rather, history is assumed to be an effect which has a 
diminishing impact over time.  Set within the context of ‘refracted divergence’ 
arguments, path-dependence does not seem to imply continued divergence per se.  It 
implies divergent tendencies which have strict temporal limits, and which are susceptible 
to being overwritten by the emergence of a new systemic logic. 
 
To point to two different understandings of the notion of path-dependence is not merely 
to engage in semantics.  It is an important point which deserves further exploration.  By 
focusing on the path-dependent characteristics of various models of contemporary 
capitalism, Kitschelt and colleagues express a concern to emphasise the diverse dynamics 
of change induced by globalisation.  The notion of ‘refracted divergence’ is introduced 
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with precisely that goal in mind: to do away with assumptions of a systemic logic of 
change associated with globalising pressures.  Yet, they do this by replacing assumptions 
of a systemic logic of change with assumptions of a series of sub-systemic logics of 
change.  Here, each of the various real-world ‘models’ of capitalist accumulation adapt to 
the pressures of globalisation in a manner which is internally consistent with their 
different principles of organisation.  Kitschelt and colleagues’ definition of ‘refracted 
divergence’ is a situation in which “some of the past patterns of diversity disappear ... [to 
be] replaced by new ones”.  Clusters of capitalism display different evolutionary 
dynamics, reflecting the specificity of “institutionally-mediated responses to the 
challenges posed by the new environment” (Kitschelt, Lange, Marks & Stephens 1999: 
437). 
 
Both aspects of this last quotation must be unpacked.  Firstly, the emphasis on 
‘institutionally-mediated responses’ show the potential gains to be made from following 
Kitschelt et al’s insistence on re-thinking the political logic of no alternative which lies at 
the heart of the homogenisation hypothesis, and which suggests that globalisation 
effectively mandates certain policy responses.  Secondly, however, that emphasis is set 
within the context of unquestioning assumptions about the ‘challenges posed by the new 
environment’.  The institutionalist ‘re-think’ is therefore directly solely at the different 
institutionally-mediated responses to a common set of pressures.  No account is taken of 
the possibility that the processes of institutional mediation will not create a common set 
of pressures at all, but rather a disparate set of pressures.  We are being advised to re-
think the responses to globalisation, then.  Yet, set within the context of unasked 
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questions about the possibilty that the ‘challenges posed by the new environment’ are 
themselves experienced differently across both space and time, we are not being advised 
to re-think globalisation itself. 
 
Whenever attempts are made to describe exactly what it is that has caused this ‘new 
environment’, and hence what it is that has ushered in political change, the analysis of 
‘refracted divergence’ essentialises economic explanations in a manner reminiscent of the 
homogenisation hypothesis.  The refractory dynamic is seen to be triggered almost 
entirely by the internal restructuring of capital.  Subsequent changes in the non-economic 
environment are thus read off from their underlying economic determinants.  The 
conjunctural moment which is an implicit assumption of the notion of ‘refracted 
divergence’ remains fundamentally an economic moment. 
 
Yet, herein lies something of a contradiction.  On the one hand, it is existing path-
dependent factors which are heralded as those rigidities within the system which prevent 
the total de-politicisation of national economic space in the face of globalisation.  
However, on the other, these same factors are seen to be in the process of being 
overwritten by a new logic of path-dependency driven by exogenous economic change.  
Given that globalising tendencies are thought to negate the original institutional 
specificity of national accumulation regimes, ‘post-refracted’ divergences are likely to 
look very different to ‘pre-refracted’ divergences.  Indeed, the assumption is that 
globalisation highlights a ‘best-practice’ method of organising the capitalist economy 
along liberal market lines.  As such, the ‘pre-refracted’ divergences are likely to be 
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compressed, consistent with perceptions of such a systemic logic.  Thus, the internal 
restructuring of capital is assumed to have been the cue for a period of convergence in 
both the form and the function of the national state.  Once again, reductionist assumptions 
are being drawn about the ability of exogenous economic forces to generate endogenous 
political change.  In short, the ‘crisis of territoriality’ of the national state re-emerges as 
the moment of refraction crystallises into a challenge, both to the specificity of ‘pre-
refracted’ divergences, and also to the autonomy of national economic space. 
 
Contrary to its authors’ claims, then, the notion of ‘refracted divergence’ does not 
represent a wholesale challenge to the homogenisation hypothesis.  On closer inspection, 
the only appreciable difference between the two positions would appear to be one of 
timing.  Until the time that original path-dependent trajectories are overwritten by 
globalising tendencies, the crisis of territoriality associated with globalisation is thought 
likely to be ‘lived out’ nationally.  In other words, distinct national responses to 
transnational pressures are predicted to be the norm.  Once that time has come, however, 
assumptions of a multi-speed globalisation tendency exhibiting ‘variable geometries’ are 
thought to be increasingly less likely. 
 
As is clear, then, homogenising tendencies remain an integral, if implicit, feature of the 
‘refracted divergence’ hypothesis.  It is assumed that the timing of the moment of 
refraction has been experienced differently across the range of capitalist economies 
depending on the precise manner in which globalisation has exposed the contradictions in 
the existing accumulation regime.  Yet, no such parallel assumption is made about the 
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potential for the way in which the moment of refraction will be experienced to differ 
between countries.  ‘Multi-speed’ globalisation processes may well be forecast to persist 
in the short-term.  Beyond the short-term, however, the dominant image of determining 
exogenous economic forces effectively rules out the possibility that globalisation bears a 
‘multi-directional’ logic.  As such, whatever national differences currently remain in 
terms of organising the capitalist economy are thought to be in the process of being 
undermined by globalisation’s normalising effects. 
 
Thus, what at first glance appear to be competing understandings of globalisation 
subsequently collapse into a single analytical framework with a single set of political 
implications.  The ‘refracted divergence hypothesis’ and the ‘homogenisation hypothesis’ 
should be seen as descriptions of two related aspects of the same tendency.  However, this 
may not be all that unexpected.  For, as Peter Taylor observes, the word ‘globalisation’ 
has “a peculiar double meaning” (Taylor 1997: 3).  It simultaneously facilitates both a 
synchronic and a diachronic understanding.  The word ‘globalisation’ can be interpreted 
as either a reference to a normalised condition of stasis, the end-state of being 
‘globalised’; or, alternatively, to a contextually differentiated moment of progress towards 
the condition of stasis, the process of becoming ‘globalised’.  This latter formulation 
creates a conceptual space for theorising the “multiple causes” of the processes of 
globalisation and the “likelihood of multiple equilibria” of the end-state of such processes 
(on which point, see Perraton et al 1997: 258).  Yet, this space is all-too-frequently closed 
off in the existing literature by the failure to acknowledge explicitly that globalisation 
remains fundamentally under-determined at the level of the economic.  At no stage does 
  96 
the internal restructuring of the capital relation create a context which becomes 
determining over subsequent political action.  Contemporary economic transformations 
will clearly have a conditioning effect on those social relations which are embedded 
within an economic framework; the opening up of new circuits of capital will make some 
changes in the political environment more likely than others.  However, the precise 
configuration of that change remains essentially contingent, primarily because the precise 
character of the experience of globalisation is itself dependent upon prior political 
dynamics. 
 
Globalising tendencies are likely to be interpreted in different ways depending upon the 
exact nature of their perceived impact on highly differentiated domestic institutions.  In 
turn, these diverse perceptions are likely to be reflected in a variety of different 
mediations of the ‘real’ economic processes which are at work and, ultimately therefore, 
in a range of different globalising outcomes.  Thus, the globalisation process itself 
appears to be limited in time and space; such parameters being variously constructed 
according to the dominant cognitive and political traditions which have been successfully 
institutionalised in distinct national settings.  Therefore, there would appear to be no 
generic logic of globalisation in a world which continues to be territorially-bounded by a 
system of national capitalisms.  Indeed, within such a system, globalised outcomes may 
themselves be produced via very different, and possibly even mutually independent, 
causal mechanisms.  As a consequence, an adequate understanding of globalising 
tendencies will almost certainly be impeded by appeal to a generic logic. 
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This will be the case in those instances in which economic markets clear in a manner 
consistent with the existence of a global equilibrium.  Moreover, in those instances in 
which market-clearing dynamics of this nature are not apparent, the appeal to a generic 
logic of globalisation would seem to be even more misplaced.  Given that this latter 
situation more closely approximates the majority of instances, any insistence on 
explanations which highlight a generic logic of globalisation is extremely dubious. 
 
Indeed, not only are they analytically dubious, they also threaten to sustain those 
dynamics which they purport merely to be describing.  An important process of mutual 
constitution is in operation here between, on the one hand, those supposedly 
homogenising tendencies which academic discourse sets out to explain and, on the other, 
homogenising models which academics fall back on in order to explain those tendencies.  
As we delve further into the academic literature of globalisation, it becomes apparent that 
it is replete with analyses which contribute further to the evidence enlisted in support of 
the view that globalisation equals homogenisation.  But it does so precisely because the 
starting point for such analyses is typically to accept a priori some variant of the 
homogenisation hypothesis. 
 
The homogenisation hypothesis does not necessarily have to be true for us to see the 
emergence of homogenising dynamics within the political environment (see Hay & 
Watson 1998; Hay, Watson & Wincott 1999).  All that would seem to be required to 
summon the consequences which that hypothesis would predict if it were true is that 
governments act in a manner consistent with the hypothesis.  The question of whether the 
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hypothesis is an accurate reflection of real-life dynamics is in many ways besides the 
point.  Similarly, should the academic literature converge on explanatory models which 
take globalisation’s homogenising instincts as a given, then the production of knowledge 
about globalisation will also serve to confirm the homogenisation hypothesis whether it is 
true or not. 
 
Moreover, the context in which we currently operate is one in which both practitioner and 
academic discourse appear to accept as true the assumption of globalisation and its 
homogenising effects.  As a result, both communities currently act in a way which renders 
talk of a generic logic of globalisation mere ‘common-sense’.  Significantly, such 
‘common-sense’ has required little in terms of underlying basis in fact for it to have 
become politically resonant.  For example, the resonance of narratives of state crisis 
clearly continues to abound in public policy-making debates; this at the same time as the 
weight of empirical evidence contradicts claims about the very existence of the material 
conditions which are identified as the source of the ‘crisis’.  This is a paradox which 
exists at the core of both the public discourse and the political practice of globalisation.  It 
is also a paradox on which I attempt to shed more light in the following section. 
 
 
 
 
Globalisation and the Narrative of ‘Rationality Crisis’ 
 
  99 
Perceptions of a generic logic of globalisation are brought to life in the assumption that 
we have passed through a critical juncture in which the capitalist system has been locked-
in to a new logic of ‘progress’.  It is taken as read that some national capitalisms have 
been better placed than others to respond to globalisation’s perceived necessities.  These 
economies have therefore been quicker to make ‘progress’ towards internalising the 
functional imperatives for facilitating the political demands which globalisation dictates.  
However, all the advanced capitalist economies are assumed to be making some such 
progress, albeit at their own pace (see, for instance Thrift 1996; Greider 1997; Perraton et 
al 1997; Borrego 1999; Stephens, Huber & Ray 1999). 
 
Globalisation’s ‘logic of progress’ is assumed to expose as vulnerable certain forms of 
national capitalism and, as such, also certain forms of political intervention within the 
national economy.  In particular, it is thought to have solved the tension between 
regulating the capitalist economy in line with organised or liberal market norms.  A 
decisive victory is typically announced in favour of the latter.  The image of ‘progress’ 
associated with the de-spatialising effects of globalisation, then, is one of political 
conformity.  The perceived crisis of the state, whilst still remaining largely implicit, has 
consequently experienced a subtle shift.  In the narrative of territorial crisis, globalisation 
tends to be equated with a crisis of national economic space.  Here, however, the 
contemporary crisis of the state takes the form of a crisis of national political space. 
 
It is not difficult to find commentaries on these perceptions of ‘enforced’ political 
conformity within the existing literature.  As Peter Hall argues, for instance, in an attempt 
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to capture this sense of a political logic of no alternative: “An old spectre is haunting 
Europe: the spectre of liberal orthodoxy” (Hall 1998: 1).  David Coates identifies a 
similar dynamic developing within public discourse when he suggests that: “The answer 
both to the diminished competitiveness of Western European welfare capitalism and to 
the unexpected emergence of Japanese financial instability” is now assumed to lie in 
restoring to prominence the traditional “‘Anglo-Saxon’ way of running capitalism” 
(Coates 1999a: 644). 
 
The rhetorical position which dominates public knowledge of globalisation, and which 
the authors cited above attempt to critique, is highly economistic in nature.  The likely 
political landscape through which the state could reasonably be expected to travel is 
assumed to have been narrowed by an apparent inability to think outside the confines of a 
future in which the internal restructuring of capital promotes market over non-market 
solutions (see Teeple 1995: especially 145-6).  The analysis which forms the grounding 
for such a conclusion is the same as that which is to be found in the narrative of territorial 
crisis.  As before, the analysis starts with the assumption that capital is sufficiently 
rational to take advantage of the enhanced exit options from the national economy which 
globalisation offers.  It is assumed that the only condition which needs to be present for 
exit to become a reality is that capital considers it to be in its interests to move off-shore 
to escape non-market regulation.  Increases in the spatial mobility of capital are thought 
to have opened up new geographic circuits for the realisation of profit.  Driven by its 
instinct to maximise surplus value, capital can be expected to disembed itself from 
existing production relations in countries which are pursuing “policies unfavourable to 
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global markets”, before subsequently re-emerging in countries which favour “‘market-
friendly’ policies” (Perraton et al 1997: 257). 
 
Thus, a subtle move is apparent which takes the argument away from the narrative of 
‘territorial crisis’.  Under the terms of that narrative, the disembedded nature of capital is 
argued to have rendered the national state universally anachronistic.  Inherent in such a 
claim is a wholesale ‘death of the state’ hypothesis.  Re-inflected with these more subtle 
tones, however, the state would not appear to be ‘dead’ per se.  Indeed, it is being 
provided with a route to its own salvation.  Any state which can become an effective 
market-leader in the race to introduce ‘market-friendly’ policies is assumed to be well-
placed to attract new capital investments; thereby providing itself with an economic base 
of sufficient vitality to safeguard its own future reproduction. 
 
If we are to take this re-inflected crisis narrative at face value, then, it could be that we are 
not talking about a systemic crisis at all.  Economic globalisation does not appear to have 
rendered ‘the state’ an obsolete abstraction.  Rather, it is being argued to have changed 
the structure of the underlying environment in which capitalist social relations are 
embedded.  As the state is itself a part of that structure, its role in the reproduction of 
capitalist norms is thought to be changing in line with these changes in the norms 
themselves.  The new economic ‘reality’ of heightened capital mobility may well be 
assumed to be stripping states of a range of policy competencies, whilst at the same time 
transferring those competencies to the market (see, for instance, Boyer 1996; Brodie 
1996).  Yet, this is not the end of the road for the state per se.  It is only those 
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governments who have tried to resist this state-market power transfer which are thought 
to be vulnerable to market retribution in the form of capital flight.  Arguments about 
globalisation may well point to the tendential dissolution of spatial heterogeneity.  But, as 
Michel Aglietta noted long before the notion of globalisation came to dominate 
government rhetoric, assumptions about dissolving spatial heterogeneity themselves tend 
to act as ‘cover’ for arguments advocating the creation of a “homogeneous space of ‘pure’ 
market relations” (Aglietta 1982: 5). 
 
At all times, then, assumptions of ‘territorial crisis’ also contain an in-built solution.  In 
fact, the in-built solution is more important to the analysis than is the identification of the 
‘crisis’ which requires that solution.  The state’s ‘crisis of territoriality’ may be only the 
geographic moment of a rather different tendency.  Perceptions of a ‘crisis of 
territoriality’ point to the possibility that globalising tendencies make problematic the 
specific spatial realm of action associated with the state in its national form.  However, 
the dominant rhetoric of globalisation moves beyond such a claim to cast doubt on the 
plausibility of certain forms of state action per se.  A perceived ‘crisis of territoriality’ 
serves merely as the geographic expression of a perceived ‘crisis of rationality’ (on the 
theory of which, see Habermas 1976, 1996; Offe 1985). 
 
The ‘crisis of rationality’ of the national state form emerges through the construction of a 
binary opposition between ‘state’ and ‘market’.  Such an opposition has subsequently 
been set within the context of a dominant discourse of globalisation which views the 
replacement of states with markets as a functional imperative of the increasing de-
  103 
territorialisation of the circuit of capital.  Unsurprisingly given such a series of 
equivalences, the discursive space within which the state is considered a legitimate actor 
in economic relations is significantly narrowed.  The dominant discourse of globalisation 
therefore constitutes a very definite limit on the range of possible practices open to state 
actors.  Such limits are legitimised within the terms of the discourse by the underlying 
rhetorical context of state crisis. 
 
However, the theory of ‘rationality crisis’ associated with the heightened incidence of 
capital mobility is based on a tautological understanding of the effects of globalisation.  
Globalising tendencies problematise state activity only to the extent that the dominant 
rhetoric of globalisation confirms as correct a prior ideological shift in favour of market 
solutions by hegemonising ‘the market’ at the expense of ‘the state’.  Perceptions of 
‘rationality crisis’ are therefore constructed on a ‘proof’ which is little more than an a 
priori ideological assumption which sets up the state as the market’s ‘other’. 
 
Of course, as I have been at pains to show in this chapter, the fact that discourses may 
have no grounding outside of a series of self-referencing and self-perpetuating hypotheses 
need not rule out the possibility that they will become politically resonant.  If they can be 
made to speak directly to the way in which everyday experience is ‘lived out’, they can 
have subsequent real effects irrespective of their logical consistency.  Such is the claim 
that I am attempting to make in relation to the dominant discourse of globalisation.  
Within the confines of globalisation rhetoric, the perception that active economic 
management is now impossible is articulated as a matter of course.  The onset of 
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globalising pressures is assumed to have exposed the “qualitative limits” of progressive 
modes of social regulation associated with extensive welfare state provision and 
encompassing labour markets (Ryner 1997: 5).  Set in such a context, the parameters of 
the politically possible have been narrowed to such an extent that the welfare state is 
assumed to have “grown to limits”, and even beyond (Stephens, Huber & Ray 1999: 166).  
‘Rationality deficits’ are argued to have emerged because the functional demands which 
the continued reproduction of the welfare state places on the national economy are 
themselves thought to be contradictory to the continued reproduction of that economy in 
an increasingly global environment.  According to the conventional wisdom of 
globalisation, these deficits are now at a critical level, as the on-going processes of 
capitalist restructuring continue to relieve domestic economies of their ‘national’ 
identities. 
 
In Habermas’ original formulation, the theory of ‘rationality crisis’ is fundamentally 
linked to a theory of economic crisis.  As he goes on to suggest, however, rationality 
deficits appear to have their point of origin in overtly political dynamics.  In particular, 
they are associated with the political system’s inability to ‘cope’ with the latent 
contradictions of the economic system.  Crisis tendencies within the economy emerge as 
rationality deficits within the political realm at those moments in which the state fails to 
successfully reconcile the competing, and often contradictory, functional imperatives 
received from the economic system (see Habermas 1976: 45-7). 
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The conceptual framework which Habermas establishes to explain such a process is that 
of a ‘logic of crisis displacement’.  Economic crisis tendencies have shown themselves to 
be a persistent feature of the history of advanced capitalism, and yet such tendencies 
consistently fail to be made manifest as a political threat to the continued existence of the 
capitalist system per se.  The reason for this displacement effect is that the state has 
increasingly been charged with responsibility for alleviating the immanent contradictions 
of the capitalist realisation process.  The competitive imperative is fundamental to the 
expanded reproduction of capital, as it acts as the motive force underpinning the 
continuous restructuring of capitalist production.  At the same time, however, within a 
system of ‘pure’ market relations, increases in competitiveness can only be bought at the 
cost of diminishing profit and the consequent liquidation of a range of capitalist assets.  
Hence, unchecked, the capitalist system threatens to self-destruct as the arrival at 
successive points of systemic equilibrium entails the erosion of the system’s productive 
base. 
 
Consequently, the capitalist system of ‘pure’ market relations is never allowed to operate 
unchecked.  Instead, the state is increasingly introduced into capitalist production 
relations in an attempt to provide an economic context within which the trend rate of 
private profit can remain relatively robust.  It is the state’s necessary mediating role, 
preventing the capitalist economy from destroying its own means of expanded 
reproduction, which explains why fundamental contradictions emanating from within the 
economic system tend to assert themselves as political crises of rationality.  Political 
interventions undertaken in the name of the state have failed to move beyond a ‘structural 
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subordination’ to the perceived needs of the market economy (Offe 1985: 119-29); thus, 
enabling the latter to retain its essential identity and associated developmental logic, 
whilst making those of the former susceptible to periodic change.  As a result, if the state 
as currently constituted is found to have insufficient or inadequate structural resources to 
offset the emergence of crisis tendencies within the economy, then the state’s structural 
subordination to capital tends not to be called into question, and certainly not the very 
existence of the capitalist mode of production per se.  By contrast, in a classic case of 
‘shooting the messenger’, it is the specific form of the state which is most often viewed as 
problematic, and hence ripe for change. 
 
As a consequence, the state appears to lack the structural capacity to ensure a once-and-
for-all reversal of the tendential fall in the private rate of profit under the influence of 
ever more aggressive capitalist competition (Habermas 1976: 45).  The state, however, 
remains central to the realisation process.  Yet, the form which the state takes, and the 
functions which it fulfils, are likely to be subjected to dynamics of change over time.  
Critical junctures emerge when a process of restructuring is constituted in popular 
political discourse as both ‘inevitable’ and ‘necessary’.  These decisive discursive 
interventions are typically grounded within an underlying material context in which the 
state is shown to be unable to guarantee profitable circuits of capital.  It is in conjunctural 
moments such as these that the state, in its current form, is thought to have transgressed 
the bounds of its own rationality. 
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A clear paradox is visible in such a conclusion.  On the one hand, it is the state which has 
to act as the motor of legitimation for capitalist production.  It does this by maintaining 
the perceived rationality of market relations; ironically, through institutionalising a series 
of checks on the operation of a ‘pure’ market order.  As such, it is state actors who 
prevent the ‘progressive development’ of the capitalist system from eroding the very 
foundations of the productive base on which it is built.  Yet, as soon as the state is found 
to be no longer able to provide the capitalist system with sufficient resources of 
legitimation - resources which the system is unable to generate for itself - it is the state 
and not the system which is thought to be suffering from a rationality deficit. 
 
The history of the development of the modern state shows that it has indeed been 
susceptible to periodic political restructuring.  Decisive moments in this development 
have occurred whenever the state has been unable to absorb the displaced effects of 
contradictions emerging from an economic system prone to temporary disturbances.  The 
fact that it is the economic system which has proved immune from the process of 
reconstruction, even though it has been the source of the crisis tendencies which have 
resulted in reconstruction elsewhere, leads me to affirm Habermas’ claim that there is a 
logical inconsistency in the way in which ‘rationality crises’ tend to be experienced. 
 
Moreover, if ‘rationality crises’ are paradoxical in general, the specific ‘rationality crisis’ 
associated with globalisation contains a double paradox.  According to the dominant 
narrative of state crisis, the restructuring process which globalisation is assumed to 
necessitate attempts to restore to primacy something approaching a ‘pure’ market order.  
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However, it is precisely such an order which historically provided the trigger for the self-
destructive tendencies which required the introduction of government regulation in the 
first place.  Hence, arguments for increasingly disembedding the state from the economy 
are based upon a commitment to the very same order which in previous times had 
necessitated the embedding of the state within the economy. 
 
If the conventional wisdom of state crisis is to be believed, then, the evolution of modern 
capitalism appears to have come full circle.  It seems to have returned with the onset of 
globalising tendencies to the point at which its contradictory impulses were first set free.  
Perhaps unsurprisingly given the circularity of the arguments, missing entirely from the 
dominant crisis narratives outlined in this chapter is any appreciation of the means 
through which globalising tendencies have become institutionalised within the 
international economy.  Missing also is any appreciation of whether such tendencies have 
been institutionalised in the way in which the dominant narrative contends.  The national 
state is merely assumed to have lost power to a new network of global markets.  No 
account is offered of how such a network has been created; whether it has indeed been 
created; who it is that is responsible for authoring its creation; and who it is that is 
responsible for popularising the idea that such a network exists before adequate empirical 
analysis of that existence has been undertaken.  These are issues which will, of course, be 
addressed in later chapters as the analysis proceeds beyond the terms of the conventional 
wisdom. 
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Conclusion 
 
As concepts capable of performing serious academic tasks, the dominant narratives of 
state crisis to be found in the conventional wisdom of globalisation are clearly found 
wanting.  Neither the narrative of ‘territorial crisis’ nor that of ‘rationality crisis’ stand up 
outside their own circular terms of reference.  The reason for this is relatively 
straightforward. 
 
As any cursory re-reading of the preceding analysis is sufficient to reveal, globalisation is 
most often conceptualised as a process without a subject (see Hay & Watson 1998; Hay 
& Marsh 1999).  The ‘consequences’ of globalisation are assumed to be there for all to 
see; but its ‘causes’ remain tantalisingly out of sight.  They are effectively hidden from 
view by the implicit theoretical position contained within the dominant crisis narrative.  
This suggests that states and markets are isolated aspects of social reality and, if they are 
linked in any way at all, then this is a purely external link.  Assumptions of state crisis in 
this context therefore need a prior conceptual dichotomy of ‘states versus markets’. 
 
In the chapters which follow, I attempt to explain in more depth why such a dichotomy is 
untenable.  It may well facilitate crisis narratives which promote the popular image that 
states are in the process of losing power to markets.  However, it does so in a way which 
fails to capture the essence of either.  The Hayekian notion of the market’s ‘spontaneous 
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order’ is implicit in the dominant rhetoric of globalisation, conjuring as it does the idea of 
an autonomous sphere of economic activity independent of political effects.  Yet, the 
idealism of such an image is quickly exposed when subjected to the rigour of empirical 
testing. 
 
In reality, markets are ‘made’.  They require continued political interventions to secure 
their successful reproduction (for the classic statement of such a position, see Polanyi 
1957).  Far from the internationalisation of economic activity announcing the end of the 
state, then, where such internationalisation is visible in the form of newly-emergent 
global markets, it is in fact the creation of states.  In short, wherever we see evidence of a 
global circuit of capital, that circuit is, to a significant degree, being authored by state 
actors.  Similarly, in those instances in which evidence for the existence of global supply 
and demand dynamics is sparse yet governments still act in accordance with the 
predictions of the globalisation hypothesis, ‘globalising’ outcomes are once again the 
result of interventions by state actors. 
 
The terms of the globalisation debate are thus immediately changed by the recognition 
that state actors need to be inserted into any adequate understanding of globalising 
outcomes.  Moreover, they need to be so on the basis of the assumption that they are 
conscious political subjects.  Such is the task of the remainder of the thesis. 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE: 
 
THE SUBJECT OF POLITICAL ECONOMY RESEARCH: 
STATES VERSUS MARKETS; STATES AND MARKETS; 
OR STATES, MARKETS AND SOCIETY? 
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As the thesis unfolds, I attempt to establish an analytical framework which enables 
globalisation to be set within a markedly different context to that of the conventional 
wisdom.  The dominant political narrative of state crisis emerges as a result of the way in 
which globalisation tends to be conceived as a process without a subject (Hay & Watson 
1998; Hay & Marsh 1999).  In order to facilitate the move to an analytical position which 
starts from the assumption that globalising outcomes require consciously-acting subjects, 
this chapter focuses on the relationship between states and markets. 
 
The conventional wisdom contains an implicit assumption about this relationship which 
treats states and markets as conceptually distinct.  Both are believed to be independent 
aspects of a wider social reality; each being a setting for the potential exercise of ‘power’ 
over the other.  Set in this context, the emergence of global markets is argued to 
problematise the national state because this is thought to equate with an increase in the 
power of the market at the expense of that of the state. 
 
As soon as the conceptual dichotomy between states and markets is dissolved, however, 
this link between globalisation and state crisis immediately appears to be somewhat 
exaggerated.  Indeed, the logic of such a link would seem to be open to question, 
whenever states and markets are assumed to be locked into a relationship of mutual 
interdependence.  Viewed through this latter perspective, states are indispensible to the 
  113 
process through which markets are constituted.  If the word ‘globalisation’ is to be used 
to describe the tendency towards global market formation, then we would appear to be 
left with a conclusion which clearly contradicts the conventional wisdom.  Actors 
operating in the name of the state are similarly indispensible to both the initial 
production, and subsequent reproduction, of globalising tendencies. 
 
The chapter concludes by taking a rather different turn.  Whilst I suggest that the focus on 
states and markets is to be preferred to that of states versus markets, I also suggest that 
both leave the logically prior ontological question about the nature of states and markets 
fundamentally unasked.  In circumstances in which this persistent weakness within the 
political economy literature is addressed, I suggest that more can also be learnt about the 
nature of the changing international economic environment.  This I attempt to do by 
beginning to look not only at the relationship between states and markets.  In addition, I 
ask questions about the form that the state takes at any given moment, and about the form 
that the market takes at any given moment.  I attribute both to the underlying balance of 
political forces within society at that particular moment.  As such, the focus of the study 
begins to be shifted in order to produce the conceptual space for the arguments which 
appear in later chapters.  Subsequently, the analysis will be focused less on globalisation 
per se, and ever more on the domestic social conditions which make globalising outcomes 
possible in a particular context.  In short, globalising outcomes are anything but socially 
neutral; therefore, it is necessary to be working from an analytical position which refuses 
to abstract states and markets from their wider social settings. 
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The Political Construction of Markets; The Political Construction of Globalisation 
 
In orthodox economic theory, the market mechanism is assumed to operate in a way 
which ensures that any given set of societal resources will be designated between 
competing productive interests in the most suitable manner.  In public discourse, the idea 
of globalisation is usually appealed to in order to sustain arguments that we now live in 
an era of ‘invisible hand’ dynamics.  However, globalisation itself has not proved 
necessary for orthodox economists to work with models which predict exactly the same 
effects that globalising tendencies are believed to produce.  The ‘invisible hand’ has 
always been assumed to move with minimum delay, and maximum effect, to re-direct 
factor inputs towards a point of Pareto-optimality (see, for instance Vaughn 1996; for the 
counter-argument, see Kaldor 1972).  Once in this position, no more allocative-efficiency 
gains are available.  Therefore, a pure market order is considered to be the ideal. 
 
Meanwhile, the state is assumed to act in a way which militates against optimal solutions 
of this nature.  Driven by the particular interests of its political constituents, the state’s 
concerns tend to lie in the realm of wealth distribution rather than wealth creation (for a 
commentary on which, see Coates 1999).  As such, according to orthodox economic 
theory, state policy is more likely to be focused on distributive-efficiency and not 
allocative-efficiency.  It is perceptions of this insoluble divide between distributive-
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efficiency and allocative-efficiency which makes it possible to construct a binary 
opposition of states versus markets.  Moreover, with the enhanced mobility options which 
globalisation is assumed to have delivered, allocative-efficiency has been elevated above 
distributive-efficiency as the only understanding of efficiency which can now credibly 
underpin government economic policy-making.  It is from this assumption that we can see 
the emergence of the argument that globalisation involves a power transfer from state to 
market.  For, the functions which markets can provide are thought to go with the grain of 
globalising pressures; whilst the functions which states can provide are thought to be 
diametrically opposed to it. 
 
Set in such a context, then, it is possible to construct globalisation as a liberating force.  
The very existence of the state is conceived, a priori, as an implicit entry-barrier to the 
market arena.  Governments are assumed to prevent a range of potential market actors 
from pursuing productive activities by institutionalising a series of constraints on the 
operation of market mechanisms.  In this reading, states are able to effect power over 
markets whenever they successfully embed redistributive policies within the dominant 
mode of social regulations. 
 
Of course, the processes of globalisation are thought to have changed fundamentally all 
this.  To the extent that it may have been possible previously to experience a reality which 
saw markets as ‘subordinate’ to states, such a reality can no longer be accessed.  The 
emergence of global markets in trade, production and, especially, finance has been 
sufficient to create a qualitatively new reality. 
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It is states which are now routinely assumed to ‘lose out’ to markets, as the increased 
number of exit options from the domestic economy which globalisation permits has 
limited the effectiveness of national state regulation.  Given the previously ‘landlocked’ 
nature of national economies, the state used to be seen as a barrier to market entry per se.  
Now that globalisation has delivered an effectively borderless world, however, the state is 
no more than a political constraint in one national context only.  Enhanced capital 
mobility allows productive activities to be undertaken in any spatial setting.  Therefore, 
the state’s concerns for distributive-efficiency are considered to be increasingly 
incompatible with its inability to intervene in the production process.  In circumstances in 
which allocative-efficiency is not prioritised, domestic producers can be expected to 
undermine the fiscal base of redistributive policies simply by re-locating to complete the 
circuit of capital in another part of the global market. 
 
Yet, such a conclusion is distorted, as it is shaped, by the conceptual environment within 
which it is framed.  In the terms of the conventional wisdom, the ‘inevitable’ effects of 
globalisation are formulated within an analytical framework which assumes that states 
and markets are isolated aspects of social reality locked-in to a mutually antagonistic 
relationship.  Within these cognitive parameters, although only within these cognitive 
parameters, globalising tendencies can indeed be made to appear to have sharpened such 
antagonisms in a manner which is detrimental to state capacity.  However, there is no 
innate reason to suppose that the world of everyday experience will necessarily 
correspond to this conceptual world of ‘states versus markets’.  In fact, there are many 
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good reasons for asserting that it will not.  Suspend the initial assumption that states and 
markets are conceptually distinct, and the ‘inevitabilities’ of globalisation are 
immediately rendered problematic.  Indeed, move beyond mere assumption into the world 
of empirical evidence, and such ‘inevitabilities’ are shown to be entirely groundless.  
Contrary to the conventional wisdom, there is no evidence to suggest that markets have 
emerged spontaneously at any time during their history (for the classic intervention into 
the political economy debate along these lines, see Polanyi 1957).  As such, we should 
not even expect there to be evidence that, because markets emerge spontaneously, states 
are superfluous to an understanding of global market formation (amongst others, see 
Watson 1999b). 
 
National states, whether acting on their own or in concert, are essential to economic 
expansion and industrial transformation (see Weiss & Hobson 1995: 1-13).  This is as 
true today as it has ever been.  The processes of capitalist restructuring associated with 
globalisation acquire their dynamic tendencies only insofar as domestic actors are able to 
shape national social structures of accumulation in a manner which is conducive to their 
development.  Of course, the extent to which the creation of new ‘supraterritorial’ spatial 
circuits of capital has actually taken place is a matter of some conjecture.  Nonetheless, 
whatever the extent, it is clear that such circuits have been created, rather than having 
merely emerged.  Moreover, the process of global market formation has been 
predominantly state-authored.  Therefore, the continued reproduction of markets, 
irrespective of the degree to which they approximate global markets in practice, is 
conditional upon the continued reproduction of state power. 
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The terms of the globalisation debate must consequently be changed from the rather crude 
economism of the conventional wisdom.  Put slightly differently, they must be abstracted 
from analytical perspectives grounded in the assumption of states versus markets.  
Globalising tendencies are not the crystallisation of a new market logic but are, in fact, 
contingent upon political dynamics.  Globalisation has not ‘emerged’ through the natural 
workings of an autonomous sphere of pure market relations, but has been constructed as 
the result of an interactive relationship between states and markets.  Both the causes and 
consequences of globalisation are mediated through politics, with the state being the 
primary site in which globalising market outcomes are both formed and resisted.  As 
Christopher May suggests, the ‘and’ in states and markets is not “an either/or operator” 
(May 1998: 158), and little can be learnt about those effects which are commonly 
attributed to globalisation when it is treated as such. 
 
The form taken by the state, and the functions which it is expected to fulfil for the process 
of market formation, are shaped fundamentally by the actions of state personnel 
(Kesselman 1992: 649).  As previously argued, the rhetoric of state crisis which is so 
prominent in the public discourse of globalisation therefore should not point to any 
presumed generic obsolescence of the state.  Instead, it should serve merely to highlight a 
conjunctural moment in which the state’s internal mode of organisation is in the process 
of being overhauled from within. 
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This process can be characterised in one of two ways.  The first breaks with the 
conventional wisdom of globalisation only to a matter of degrees.  For, it suggests that the 
character of the state is being re-defined politically as state actors themselves seek to 
create an external economic environment suited to the task of fostering social relations of 
production appropriate to the latest phase of capitalist restructuring.  In this reading, 
whilst the state has not disappeared in the way it does in the crisis narrative of ‘state 
versus market’, nevertheless it is still perceived in merely reactive terms.  In particular, it 
is assumed to be reacting to the emergence of a new, equilibrating, exogenous economic 
force. 
 
Such a perspective is clearly limited.  It may help to explain one or two puzzles within the 
existing literature.  But, it can do no more than that.  At most, it provides a basis for 
arguing that although the creation of a supranational network of market relations appears 
to have produced a context within which national states have lost at least some of their 
autonomy vis-à-vis other states, this does not necessarily translate into any moderation of 
state power in relation to civil society.  Indeed, as Philip Cerny points out, the very fact 
that state officials have been able to act as the trigger for re-projecting the domestic 
capital relation onto an increasingly global scale is perhaps evidence of the continued 
accretion of state power (Cerny 1990: 201). 
 
Whatever the merits of this counter-argument to the conventional wisdom, however, it 
remains wedded to the same initial assumption as the conventional wisdom: namely, that 
state actors are forced into a functional response to exogenous economic change.  
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Globalisation’s ‘variable geometries’ may well be thought to correspond to the range of 
different political contexts within which such tendencies are fostered.  Equally 
importantly, however, those tendencies are themselves treated fundamentally as given. 
 
Set in this context of ‘states and markets’, research tends to be focused on the fact that 
not all states enjoy the same degree of authority over civil society.  This is viewed as 
another way of saying that not all states can condition the experiences of everyday life to 
the same extent in accordance with globalising ‘norms’.  For any number of institutional, 
legal and cultural reasons, some states will be more favourably placed than others to 
actively re-shape existing social structures of accumulation in order to facilitate 
globalisation.  The general thrust of this element of the literature is to argue that 
globalising tendencies have become most deeply embedded in those countries in which 
the state derives a latent degree of power over national civil society due to its central 
autonomy.  Such circumstances are believed to allow state actors sufficient political room 
for manoeuvre to impose a policy structure which produces ‘globalising’ outcomes.  
Viewing globalisation through this perspective, it is perhaps no coincidence that, across 
otherwise comparable states, indices of trade openness have been shown to match closely 
indices of political centralisation (on which point, see Thompson 1997).  In a similar 
vein, the dynamics of welfare retrenchment have been shown to be most pronounced in 
those political contexts in which there are no constitutional veto points (Stephens, Huber 
& Ray 1999: 180). 
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Yet, still there is a sense in which outcomes consistent with the globalisation hypothesis 
are being ‘forced’, and that they are being forced by economic globalisation itself.  The 
state is still being treated as something of a passive recipient of globalising norms.  
Moreover, society is also being treated as a passive recipient of the state’s own passive 
acceptance of such norms.  It is apparent, then, that rethinking globalisation within the 
context of ‘states and markets’ does not necessarily lead to a more intrinsically politicised 
account of globalising processes than that which emerges from the context of ‘states 
versus markets’. 
 
An account of globalising tendencies which merely says that states matter is not, in itself, 
a political account.  As a consequence, the analytical focus of ‘states and markets’ needs 
to be transcended every bit as much as that of ‘states versus markets’.  The very concept 
of ‘the political’ must refer to much more than merely the formal public arena in which 
resistance is both mobilised and demobilised to globalising norms, and in which the 
outcome of such resistance is made manifest.  Hence, there are more questions to ask 
about the state’s role in the production of globalising effects than the degree to which the 
state enjoys autonomy from civil society, and therefore the degree to which the state is 
able to withstand the mobilisation of resistance to globalisation.  Rather, it is necessary 
that we view the concept of ‘the political’ as a process and not as an arena.  In this way, it 
becomes possible to look not only at the feasibility of institutionalising globalising effects 
in a given context, but also at the way in which such effects are constructed as desirable. 
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Quite clearly, in circumstances in which the dominant form of political mobilisation is to 
programmes which are consistent with those that globalisation is said to necessitate, 
‘globalising outcomes’ are likely to be apparent whether they are caused by actual 
globalising tendencies or not.  In other words, it may be possible to observe the ‘effects’ 
of globalisation’s political logic of no alternative without globalisation actually being the 
cause of those effects.1  This means that it is necessary to look at political mobilisation as 
more than just a means through which the state can be activated to dampen down 
otherwise inexorable globalising tendencies.  Indeed, it is necessary to make a complete 
break with the assumption that there is anything inexorable about globalisation at all.  
Even when we see superficial evidence that seems to confirm the globalisation 
hypothesis, it is possible that such evidence has been produced for reasons which have 
little to do with globalisation itself.  My position is therefore a simple one: to transcend 
the rush to attribute causal status to global market-clearing dynamics for which there are, 
in any case, a less than convincing empirical argument. 
 
‘Globalising outcomes’ may well currently be experienced in a manner which sustains the 
appearance of a ‘multi-speed’ globalisation process of ‘variable geometries’.  In addition, 
the state may well come into the explanation of why these ‘variable geometries’ are 
apparent.  Yet, behind the theoretical abstraction of ‘the state’ lies a complex process of 
political mobilisation.  The state adopts a certain trajectory at a given moment of time due 
to the dominant form of political mobilisation which defines the legitimate uses of state 
                                                          
1 To return to a theme first outlined in the introductory chapter, even if globalisation serves as an adequate 
description of the world in which we live, this does not also automatically mean that globalisation is an 
adequate explanation of the way in which the world came to be like this. 
  123 
power.  As such, globalising tendencies which are mediated through the state are also 
dependent on the dominant form of political mobilisation existing in the environment in 
which they are being introduced.  Indeed, as I have stressed before, ‘globalising 
outcomes’ can even be produced in the absence of actual globalising tendencies, so long 
as the dominant form of political mobilisation is to encourage outcomes similar to those 
which globalisation is argued to deliver.  If it is true, then, that globalisation cannot 
adequately be explained without an appreciation of the state, it is equally true that neither 
can adequately be explained without an appreciation of the dominant forms of political 
mobilisation which underpin both. 
 
In order to develop such a position at greater length, it is clearly important to explore the 
relationship between state power and political mobilisation in more detail.  It is to this 
task that I turn in the following section. 
 
 
 
 
Inserting the State into the Globalisation Debate 
 
In attempting to introduce the state as a more integral element of our understanding of 
globalising tendencies, one clarification needs to be outlined immediately.  The very idea 
of ‘the state’ implies a unified actor.  In practice, however, real states fail to perform in a 
manner consistent with such an image.  Indeed, ‘the state’ exists only as a theoretical 
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abstraction.  As such, there can never be a grand narrative of the state which is able to tell 
us how all states will act in all circumstances.  Put somewhat crudely, there is always too 
much politics going on at the level of state institutions for such a narrative to make any 
real sense. 
 
Thus, any assertion about the nature of the state which takes the form of a simple 
generalisation must be treated more as propositional than definitional.  As Bob Jessop 
argues, any overly parsimonious conceptual claims are better interpreted “metaphorically 
... than literally” (Jessop 1978: 56).  At the heart of such a claim lies the prior assumption 
that both the form and the functions of the state are conditioned by the prevailing balance 
of social forces.  This balance itself is produced in a non-deterministic manner.  For, it 
depends crucially upon the particular social setting in which the process of determination 
takes place.  As a result, the state is contextually-specific, both in historical and 
geographical terms (Smith & Moore 1981: 92).  Consequently, general theoretical 
understandings of the state need to be buttressed by empirical accounts which go beyond 
the merely abstract to capture their particular manifestations in concrete time and space. 
 
This is a highly significant claim for the arguments advanced in this thesis.  I argued in an 
earlier section that the perception of ‘rationality crisis’ built into the dominant discourse 
of globalisation is based on the assertion of a false dichotomy between state and market.  
Moreover, in light of this latter claim, this would not appear to be all.  In addition, it is 
also the case that ‘the state’ which appears in this false dichotomy tends itself to have a 
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false systemic logic attributed to it.  Thus, the conventional wisdom’s assumption of 
globalisation’s logic of no alternative would seem to be doubly untenable. 
 
It would therefore seem most unlikely that the state would ever act as if guided by the 
same inexorable inner logic in all instances.  However, if this suggests that a flat rejection 
of the conventional wisdom is in order on conceptual grounds, the real world of political 
practice is rather more complicated than a rejection of this nature would seem to allow.  
We can safely deny the possibility that the state is always directed towards the satisfaction 
of a universal interest in the way that it could be, were it to be a unified actor embodying 
a single systemic logic.  But this is not necessarily to say that we can discount a rather 
different possibility.  In particular, the state seems to exist within an environment whose 
political and discursive properties make it appear that the state is continually at the behest 
of a number of functional imperatives.  It is important to emphasise that these are not 
functional imperatives per se, irrespective of the extent to which they are constructed as 
such in public policy-making debates.  As a consequence, it is clear that, if the state can 
be said in any way to follow a general ‘law of motion’, then this is not determined 
exogenously.  If the appearance of a ‘natural’ and therefore immutable trajectory does 
exist, then this is generated internally, within the structures of state institutions, through 
decisive political interventions which serve to close off alternative paths of development. 
 
In this vein, for example, the reproduction of the capital relation has assumed the status of 
functional imperative for the modern state, rather than actually being one per se.  This has 
happened primarily through the way in which those working in and through the state have 
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defined it as such, and have led successful political mobilisation to such a definition.  
Therefore, capitalist reproduction appears to be more consciously directed than any 
argument about its ‘organic’ nature would be able to allow.  This applies not only to 
capitalist reproduction in general, but also to the specific reproduction of a globalising 
capitalism.  Politically motivated social subjects are integral to every stage of the process 
of reproduction.  Moreover, it is the conscious intervention of such actors which imbue 
this process with its specific qualities in any given context. 
 
The reproduction functions which the state is conditioned to mediate are therefore 
historically contingent.  This in turn suggests that systemic imperatives will be 
understood in a variety of different ways in a variety of different contexts, depending on 
the dominant ideological mediation of the ‘needs’ of the economic system at particular 
moments of time and space.  Thus, in the absence of the total de-politicisation of the 
state’s ideological terrain, it is to be expected that its ‘functional imperatives’ are not in 
fact functional at all, but remain open to political contestation.  The precise definition of 
the tasks which the state is adapted to perform is accordingly a product of the on-going, 
and always temporary, resolution of political struggle. 
 
As such, it is clear that a theoretical exposition of the state’s perceived functional 
imperatives can only ever provide a context for subsequent empirical analysis, rather than 
an explanation of the specific details of policy outcomes.  It is in this spirit that the 
following pages must be read.  The aim here is merely to demonstrate the theoretical 
possibility that ‘globalising outcomes’ have been created through the agency of the state, 
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whether they have been the result of actual processes of global market formation or not.  
This will be achieved by developing an abstract account of the manner in which the state 
pursues the social reproduction of capitalist economic relations in general.  I will focus in 
particular on the way in which a decisive shift in the dominant ideological articulation of 
the ‘needs’ of the capitalist economy can lead to a similarly decisively shift in the 
political practice of economic policy-making. 
 
Such a focus raises a potentially intriguing possibility.  For, it confirms the suggestion 
made in previous sections that there is no necessary correspondence between ‘globalising 
outcomes’ and the process of global market formation.  In other words, ‘globalising 
outcomes’ can be made manifest in the absence of truly global market relations.  All that 
would appear to be required is that governments respond to a dominant ideological 
mediation of ‘systemic imperatives’ which is consistent with that to be found in the 
conventional wisdom of globalisation for ‘globalising outcomes’ to be experienced as 
real.  Of course, there are many reasons why a government would choose to adopt such a 
position on the question of ‘systemic imperatives’.  Significantly, there are more reasons 
which have absolutely nothing to do with either globalisation or perceived globalisation 
than there are those which can be directly attributed to one of these influences. 
 
From this observation, it would seem clear that there is more to explain in terms of the 
link between globalisation and the state than merely how different forms of ‘state power’ 
produce different globalising outcomes.  Most significantly, it is necessary to transcend 
all assumptions that ‘state power’ is itself a given.  Rather, we have to ask questions 
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about how ‘state power’ is produced before we can begin to ask questions about the 
impact of ‘state power’ on the globalisation process. 
 
It is only then that it may become possible to view the economy - whether in local, 
national, international or global forms - as a site of political struggle (on which point see, 
for instance, Daly 1991: 100).  Thus, there is no sense in which the language of necessity 
which animates the reproduction of the capital relation - again, whether locally, 
nationally, internationally or globally - is anything other than a political construction.  
Any analysis of globalisation must therefore be an analysis of political dynamics. 
 
Let me pursue the implications of these three claims in more detail.  Perhaps most 
strikingly, they suggest that it would be a mistake to think in terms of any ‘inevitable’ 
equilibrium reproduction of capitalism.  At one level of abstraction, we may be able to 
point to the way in which the state is enlisted to offset the contradictory status of the 
capital relation within a ‘pure’ market economy.  Bringing the analysis down a number of 
levels of abstraction, however, it becomes clear that the exact way in which that latent 
contradiction is experienced is contextually specific.  As Peter Hall notes, “the success of 
an economic strategy depends as much on the organisation of society as on the 
organisation of the state” (Hall 1989: 380). 
 
Indeed, it may even be possible to stretch Hall’s argument one stage further, to suggest 
that the success of an economic strategy depends more on the organisation of society than 
on the organisation of the state.  For, the exercise of state power is itself a reflection of 
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the dominant form of political mobilisation within society.  In circumstances in which 
‘state power’ can be identified as the cause of governments acting in a manner consistent 
with the globalisation hypothesis, we also need to identify those forms of prior political 
mobilisation within society which have conditioned ‘state power’ to perform this task. 
 
In terms of economic policy, political mobilisation revolves crucially around the 
construction of a dominant notion of ‘economic necessity’.  At all times, of course, we 
must be careful to distinguish between policies which are actual necessities and policies 
which appear to be necessary only within the context of the end to which they are a 
means.  This is easily achieved.  For, there is no such thing as an actual necessity - that is, 
a necessity which can be abstracted from the social or economic context in which it is 
located (see Amariglio 1990).  No discursive representation of ‘economic necessity’ can 
ever exhaust the range of possible meanings within the economy.  Consequently, no 
economic discourse comes to dominate popular political debates because it describes a 
systemic imperative universal to economic development.  Rather, a dominant economic 
discourse serves to circumscribe the parameters of that considered politically possible due 
to the way in which it expresses the political interests of those who currently hold the 
balance of power within society.  The appeal to a systemic imperative may act as a source 
of legitimation for those determined to use the balance of power in their own interests; yet 
this is all it is.  ‘Systemic imperatives’ are never real categories per se. 
 
What does this mean in relation to globalisation and, in particular, in relation to the 
question of globalisation’s political logic of no alternative?  It may well be that the link 
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between globalisation and its political logic of no alternative is sustained through the 
appeal to ‘economic necessity’.  However, it is equally clear that such a link does not 
exist outside of the confines of that appeal.  To problematise the very notion of ‘economic 
necessity’ as in the manner above is, therefore, to destroy the basis on which the 
assumption of globalising ‘necessities’ is grounded. 
 
To put this much more simply, if economic policy-making in any one country can be seen 
to be increasingly driven by neo-liberal tendencies, then there is no reason to enlist 
globalisation as the cause of these developments, even though globalisation is commonly 
assumed to come complete with a logic of ‘neo-liberal necessity’.  Neo-liberal tendencies 
must instead be viewed through the perspective of a dominant ideological mediation of 
the ‘needs’ of that country’s economy which constructs neo-liberal policies as being in 
some sense correct.  The notion of globalisation may well be used in order to legitimate 
the image of neo-liberalism having been rendered ‘necessarily’ correct.  Yet, this only 
holds in those circumstances in which prior political mobilisation has taken place to 
enforce that understanding of ‘necessity’ and, more importantly, to establish as a societal 
end the sort of political goal to which that necessity becomes a means. 
 
In later chapters, I attempt to put some empirical flesh on these theoretical bones.  This I 
do by looking at the British case and, in particular, the way in which the Blair 
Government has come to define the ‘needs’ of the British economy.  It is the way in 
which that government has mobilised public opinion to the view that “the global market, 
in the end, is a good thing for us ...  [we should] not try to resist it or ward it off or say it 
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shouldn’t exist” (Tony Blair, interview with John Humphrys, cited in Held 1998: 26) 
which has been the most important reason that New Labour has acted in a manner 
consistent with the globalisation hypothesis, I argue, rather than the faceless forces of 
globalisation per se.  It is the Labour leadership’s insistence that “we want people to be 
able to move money very, very quickly” (ibid) which has created the image of ‘economic 
necessity’ to which government policy is a response, rather than any actual necessity 
associated with capital flight. 
 
The sense of ‘necessity’ to which the Labour Government responds is itself a reflection of 
Blairite concerns for where the balance of power currently resides within British society.  
This in turn is assumed to place qualitative limits on the scope of feasible political 
mobilisation (see Coates 2000).  Whilst the usual notion of causality in this debate links 
such limits solely to globalisation and its political logic of no alternative, in my reading of 
events this serves to hide more causal processes than it reveals.  Given that there is, in any 
case, no unambiguous evidence that globalisation is itself a reality, evidence for the 
reality of its political logic of no alternative must also be extremely questionable.  I 
suggest that both these categories - both globalisation and its political ‘necessities’ - must 
themselves be traced back one stage further to show how they relate to the existing 
balance of political forces within society.  In other words, there are quite clearly domestic 
political conditions underpinning the way in which international economic trends are 
experienced in a contextually-specific manner in practice.  It is for this reason that I place 
such emphasis on ‘state power’.  For, it is the exercise of ‘state power’ which shapes the 
domestic political conditions of international economic trends.  In addition, and perhaps 
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even more importantly, ‘state power’ itself is a manifestation of the uneven distribution of 
power within society. 
 
 
 
 
The State as a Factor of Cohesion in the Social Formation 
 
Just as it is clear that ‘the state’ exists only as a theoretical abstraction, so it is with 
‘society’.  The state has no fundamental unity; neither has society.  However, each can be 
made to look as if it is reacting to a unified logic under the influence of decisive political 
interventions.  Set within such a context, the exercise of state power tends to take place 
with a clearly articulated goal in mind.  As a consequence, state power appears to be 
applied in a coherent manner to inscribe a similar sense of coherency into the general 
orientation of society.  Through the exercise of state power, the state may be able to direct 
a diverse range of social groupings to act in a manner consistent with the image of a 
unified society.  Of course, this is an ideal-typical scenario which is likely to be 
approximated most infrequently in real life.  Moreover, in the absence of successful 
political mobilisation to the ‘necessity’ of the initial societal goal, no amount of state 
power would seem to be sufficient to orientate the whole of society to act as a unified 
whole. 
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Nevertheless, despite this likelihood of failure, it may still be useful to follow the 
Poulantzian tradition and view the state as a factor of social cohesion (see, in particular, 
Poulantzas 1978: 136).  In abstract terms, then, state power tends to be condensed at the 
level of social formation.  In periods of ‘normal politics’, it is typically used to direct the 
organisation of society towards the successful displacement of tendencies which are seen 
as contradictory, where the notion of contradiction is itself animated by the dominant 
discourse of ‘economic necessity’ to which social relations are oriented at that moment of 
time.  With reference to the British case at least, it is now possible to state with every 
justification that the political practice of globalisation is currently constituted very much 
as ‘normal politics’.  Thus, it is necessary to view the implicit appeal to ‘necessity’ 
contained within Tony Blair’s assertion that “we want people to be able to move money 
very, very quickly” (cited in Held 1998: 26) as a means of trying to displace potential 
political mobilisation aimed at resisting both globalisation and its political logic of no 
alternative. 
 
In Britain, economic practice consistent with the globalisation hypothesis now represents 
the status quo.  The social structure of accumulation confirmed as ‘correct’ by that 
hypothesis may prove, like all others before it, to have distinct temporal limits to its 
effectiveness (on which general point, see Block 1987: 178).  For, such limits befit any 
social relation in need of constant reproduction through the contingent processes of 
political struggle.  That said, there will always be groups whose political interests will be 
served through the maintenance of the status quo, even in circumstances in which it 
proves to be increasingly dysfunctional.  Status quos do not become status quos in the 
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first place should they fail to align the rest of society to the particular interests of those 
groups who hold the balance of political power within that society. 
 
It is here that the state tends to be called upon to act as a buffer zone to widen the 
parameters within which it is possible to reproduce the social relations of production in 
their current form, certainly when that form is showing signs of becoming increasingly 
dysfunctional.  This is the concept of the state which I will be appealing to in future 
chapters in an attempt to shed more light on the globalisation process as it is currently 
being played out in Britain.  My argument will take the following form: 
 
 1] I will continue to reject the dominant orientation in the existing literature which 
suggests that globalisation (even to the extremely limited extent to which we currently see 
global markets being formed in practice) represents the by-passing of the state and that, as 
such, all concepts of the state are superfluous to explanations of globalisation. 
 2] I will resist the temptation to replace one totalising explanation of globalisation 
with another by simply asserting that the state somehow ‘causes’ globalisation. 
 3] Instead, I will base my analysis on the assumptions: i) that ‘state power’ is 
appropriated by those groups that have put themselves in a position where they are able to 
shape the dominant modes of political mobilisation existing within society; ii) that the 
particular form which that power takes at any given instant is itself a reflection of the 
dominant mode of political mobilisation within society; iii) that ‘state power’ is used to 
create a buffer zone to enable the expanded reproduction of the pre-existing social 
structure of accumulation, even in circumstances in which new forms of political 
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mobilisation point to the erosion of consent to that expanded reproduction; and iv) that 
the current position in Britain is one in which a ‘buffer zone effect’ is in operation, where 
state power is being utilised in order to produce outcomes which may well be consistent 
with the globalisation hypothesis, but which actually reflect attempts to reproduce an 
established social structure of accumulation in a political environment of fragmenting 
consent. 
 
Thus, whilst the image of globalising ‘necessities’ may well be appealed to in public 
discourse to explain why state power is currently being used in the way it is, I suggest that 
this is nothing more than legitimating rhetoric.  Indeed, as the thesis unfolds, I go as far as 
to turn one of the most ingrained elements of the conventional wisdom almost completely 
on its head.  Rather than arguing that any concept of the state is superfluous to the 
explanation of globalisation, I suggest that most concepts of globalisation are actually 
superfluous to the explanation of the dominant use of state power in contemporary 
Britain.  Behind the façade of arguments about the radically disempowered nature of the 
state in an era of globalisation, what we see instead is the state being inserted into the 
terms on which the capital relation is experienced in Britain.  The use of state power in 
this instance is designed to act as some sort of substitute for continued consent to the 
further restructuring of British labour markets along ever more flexible, and therefore 
ever more coercive, lines. 
 
Built into this notion of ‘buffer zone effects’ is an appeal to a Habermasian ‘logic of crisis 
displacement’.  As we have seen in the previous chapter, in Habermas’ original 
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formulation, the state is assumed routinely to internalise rationality deficits emerging in 
the economic system as a means of sheltering that system from the political repercussions 
of a critical juncture in its development (Habermas 1976).  Here, Habermas would seem 
to be accepting the Poulantzian view that state power resides at the level of social 
formation.  In particular, he argues that it resides in the ability to organise social relations 
in moments of systemic contradiction in ways which pose least threat to the reproduction 
of the status quo. 
 
Whilst it is clearly possible to read highly functionalist notions of causality into this 
account, it is important not to throw the Habermasian baby out with the functionalist 
bathwater.  ‘Crisis displacement’ dynamics do represent the intended use of state power 
in many instances.  That said, it is still essential that we set such dynamics within a 
context in which we understand that state power is itself a reflection of prior political 
mobilisation.  There is no sense in which states automatically act to displace the potential 
for crisis tendencies to emerge.  Rather, if states can be seen to be acting in such a way, 
this is only because there has been successful prior political mobilisation to the idea that 
it is ‘necessary’ for contemporary crisis tendencies to be displaced into the state system.  
Remove the successful political mobilisation to the ‘necessity’ of preserving the status 
quo, and the very essence of a logic of crisis displacement is dissolved. 
 
What implications does such a discussion have for the analysis of globalisation?  Put 
simply, it would seem to have a complex set of implications which would appear to be 
difficult to reconcile into any straightforward answer.  Much of that complexity stems 
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from the fact that the very concept of globalisation has taken on a bewildering array of 
meanings within the existing academic literature (see Higgott 1999: 2).  Different 
specifications of globalisation - whether explicitly or, more likely, implicitly articulated - 
lead to different understandings of ‘crisis displacement’ dynamics. 
 
On the one hand, we can see within the existing literature a line of argument which 
suggests that the state is being called upon to act decisively because it is globalisation 
itself which is in crisis (for a range of rather different accounts of this argument, see, for 
instance, Gill 1992; Magdoff 1992; Albo 1994; Gordon 1994; Bryan 1995; Gough 1996; 
Greider 1997; Martin & Schumann 1997; Rodrik 1997).  In other words, this is a crisis of 
globalisation.  Globalising tendencies are here seen to be so detrimental to the social 
conditions for their own reproduction that a self-destructive system would be created 
were it left unregulated.  Hence, the state is enlisted to ensure that sufficient coercion is 
present within the system to direct society into providing the social conditions for the 
reproduction of society, whether there is consent for that reproduction or not. 
 
On the other hand, the dominant line of argument within the existing literature suggests 
that the state is being called upon to act decisively to correct critical tendencies which 
emerge in the wake of a globalisation process which itself is self-perpetuating (for a range 
of rather different accounts of this argument, see, for instance, Scharpf 1991; Laxer 1993; 
Ross 1995; Ruigrok & van Tulder 1995; Taylor, Watts & Johnston 1995; Mittelman 
1996; Stephens 1996; Thrift 1996; Wiseman 1996; Seyf 1997; Standing 1997; Streeck 
1997; Armstrong 1998; Garrett 1998; Hirst & Thompson 1999).  In other words, this is a 
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crisis caused by globalising dynamics which themselves display no outward signs of 
being in crisis.  Here, the production of new social conditions through globalisation is 
thought to be the most significant factor explaining the emergence of critical tendencies 
within society.  Certainly, this is thought to be more important than the ability to 
reproduce the social conditions which are necessary for globalising dynamics to become 
embedded in the first place.  As a result, the state is seen in this instance to be required to 
offset crises created by the consequences of globalisation rather than by its causes. 
 
However, I wish to take issue with both of these positions.  I wish to suggest that, to the 
extent that it is possible to view current state interventions through the perspective of 
‘crisis displacement’, the link between globalising tendencies and critical moments is not 
a direct causal link as both of these positions seem to imply.  Rather, I argue that any 
sense of criticality is located within the social structure of accumulation which was 
institutionalised in the aftermath of the collapse of the post-war regime of ‘embedded 
liberalism’ (on which, see Ruggie 1995; Garrett 1999).  Clearly, different countries 
experienced both the ‘embedded liberal compromise’ and its collapse in different ways.  
Equally clearly, this has served to sustain a range of different social structures of 
accumulation in the post-collapse phase, and has also created a range of different crisis 
tendencies within such a structure.  But what is also clear is that globalising dynamics 
have little by way of direct causal influence on any of these developments. 
 
Indeed, I wish to argue that the conscious assimilation of globalising tendencies has been 
directed at creating a ‘buffer zone’ capable of offsetting popular political pressure to 
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reconstitute the existing social structure of accumulation.  This is not to say that 
globalisation resolves the contradictions of the neo-liberal accumulation regime which 
succeeded the embedded liberal compromise.  It is merely to suggest that enabling 
globalisation in the present has been seen as one means of displacing the contradictions of 
neo-liberalism until some time in the future. 
 
In fact, my claim is even more modest.  In the absence of more extensive comparative 
data, I am only really able to argue that the attempted insertion of a globalising dynamic 
into the British economy is consistent with the account I have offered in the preceding 
paragraphs.  In Britain at least, we have witnessed successful political mobilisation to the 
use of state power to create a ‘buffer zone’ through globalisation for the continued 
reproduction of a neo-liberal social structure of accumulation. 
 
For example, it would appear that the Labour Party moved to accept the policy logic of 
neo-liberal economic discourse at the very moment that the ability of that discourse to 
generate active consent for its particular understanding of economic ‘necessity’ began to 
be openly disputed.  New Labour’s accounts of the party’s ‘modernisation’ may well 
highlight the influence of electoral constraints which were perceived to have become so 
strong that there was simply no political space remaining to argue for anything but a 
fundamentally neo-liberal conception of economic ‘necessity’.  To repeat, however, this 
seems to have occurred just as the link between neo-liberalism and a whole host of 
adverse social trends became increasingly articulated in public debates (for the most 
famous example of such an articulation, see Hutton 1996).  As such, New Labour’s 
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electoral strategy and the economic foundations of that strategy became increasingly 
contradictory.  Active consent for further institutionalising the existing balance of social 
forces failed to be matched by active consent for the further neo-liberal restructuring 
which would make such a process possible. 
 
Faced by an environment in which it had a diminishing means of mobilising sufficient 
numbers to further neo-liberal reform, Labour’s leaders chose not to seek active consent 
for its ‘modernised’ macroeconomics so much as to deactivate potential opposition to it.  
It is here that we see most vividly the appropriation of state power to depoliticise, through 
the creation of globalising dynamics, the reproduction of a social structure of 
accumulation which was being identified in public debates as increasingly dysfunctional.  
Insofar as the neo-liberalising effects of globalisation were constructed through the usual 
language of inevitability, the image of neo-liberal ‘necessity’ which was proving ever 
more susceptible to public dispute had an element of that ‘necessity’ restored to it. 
 
Note that there are two separate processes at work here.  The first relates to tendential 
political mobilisation within society, which threatened to undermine the continued 
legitimacy of an accumulation project cast in the image of neo-liberalism.  The second 
relates to a ‘buffer zone effect’ created through the use of state power, which served to 
downplay the need for popular legitimacy for the reproduction of that project.  
Globalisation enters this story only as the means through which such reproduction is able 
to take place, whether it is accompanied by supportive political mobilisation or not.  
Claims about globalisation effectively remove the need for arguments about ‘neo-liberal 
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necessity’ to be won within society.2  Indeed, under the perceived influence of such 
tendencies, the debate about economic ‘necessity’ in general has been turned from a 
political to a merely technical set of questions.  The dominant trend is clear.  No longer 
should researchers be looking at the way in which governments seek legitimacy within 
society by asking about the sort of economic policy which society at large would like to 
see being introduced.  Instead, I suggest that it is more important that we begin to look at 
the way in which governments seem able to do without such legitimacy, simply by 
‘educating’ their populations about the limits of feasible economic policy-making in an 
era of globalisation. 
 
Note also, then, the difference between this argument and that of the conventional 
wisdom of globalisation.  Under the terms of the conventional wisdom, globalising 
tendencies have emerged in a form which renders the state problematic at the national 
level.  However, I argue that state power has been used to create globalising tendencies 
which allow for economic policies to be imposed without the need for active consent to 
those policies being mobilised within society.  Far from the state being by-passed by 
globalisation, I suggest that it is popular political mobilisation to the continued 
reproduction of state power in its current form which is being increasingly by-passed.  
Thus, globalisation can be seen to act as some sort of external enforcement mechanism in 
those circumstances in which the status quo is already distinctively neo-liberal.  Let us 
                                                          
2 It is noticeable that neither the Thatcher nor the Major Governments engaged as conspicuously with the 
idea of globalisation’s political logic of ‘neo-liberal necessity’ as has the Blair Government.  This may be 
explained by the fact that unlike its predecessors, the Blair Government is not overtly comfortable with 
making the ideological case for ‘neo-liberal necessity’.  Thus, it has opted instead to appropriate disursive 
practices which serve to displace the need for such a public show of support for the political ideology which 
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now return for the final time in this chapter to the British case, to see how this suggestion 
fits with the institutionalisation of globalising tendencies in that country. 
 
No account of the globalisation experience in Britain is complete unless it is set within 
the wider context of the Labour Party’s ‘modernisation’ and, in particular, within the 
context of the electoral conditions of that ‘modernisation’.  For, the recent trajectory of 
British politics has been dominated by the Labour Party’s attempts to renew itself 
electorally, and an important element of that renewal has taken place through the party’s 
active engagement with both the dominant discourse and political practice of 
globalisation.  Indeed, within British politics, no party has engaged with globalising 
‘necessities’ anywhere near as actively as has New Labour. 
 
The attractions of such a stance for Labour’s current leaders are clear.  The party 
simultaneously came to perceive a number of key objectives which had a shared end of 
electoral rejuvenation, but whose means to that end appeared to be mutually 
contradictory. 
 
i) The party’s leaders convinced themselves that they had to broaden the party’s 
electoral base by appealing to a new range of voters.  Significantly, these were 
voters whose material interests were assumed to coincide with many aspects 
of the existing social structure of accumulation (especially on matters of fiscal 
policy). 
                                                                                                                                                                             
nevertheless underpins its strictly orthodox macroeconomic policy.  For its Conservative predecessors, 
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ii) At the same time, they had to contend with popular sentiment animated 
through the media that wholesale, and maybe even paradigmatic, change was 
now necessary in those areas in which they thought that electoral advantage 
was to be gained from advocating the status quo. 
iii) The party’s leaders also had to quell internal party dissent to any 
programme that refused to overturn every aspect of the Thatcherite legacy in 
order to confirm to the electorate that it was now a party ‘fit to govern’.  In 
short, the task was huge.  Not only did the party’s leaders set out to uphold key 
aspects of a social order which was already beginning to be identified as 
contradictory within public discourse.  This was also a social order which 
large numbers of the leaders’ own party would always argue was contradictory 
irrespective of whether the general orientation of public discourse was to agree 
with that line or not. 
 
So huge was this task, and so mutually incoherent were its individual elements, that it is 
difficult to see how it could have been completed successfully purely within the context 
of active consent.  Quite clearly, it was not unreasonable for Labour’s leaders to have 
expected that they would be able to mobilise popular support for the fiscal status quo 
from certain sections of the electorate.  Indeed, as is now well known following the 
publication of Philip Gould’s book on Labour’s ‘modernisation’ (Gould 1999), the party 
deliberately targeted those constituencies who had declared an interest in voting Labour 
only in the event of the party having already ruled out progressive tax reform (see also 
                                                                                                                                                                             
however, the case for neo-liberalism was purely a matter of ideology, and could be presented as such. 
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Ellison 1997; Hay 1999; Seyd 1998).  Equally, however, that same reluctance to 
reactivate fiscal policy ran counter to important currents within both party and public 
discourse (see, for instance, Hutton 1996; Leys 1996; Kennedy 1998).  As a consequence, 
New Labour’s leaders required a more coercive means to prevent more widespread 
popular mobilisation against its arguments for reproducing the existing social structure of 
accumulation.  This it found through appeal to the conditioning effects of exogenous 
international economic forces.  Globalising pressures were thus constructed as denying 
the very possibility of successful political mobilisation to anything other than the status 
quo.  Put simply, globalisation was presented as having robbed all other political 
alternatives, irrespective of how well-intentioned they were, of their feasibility. 
 
Through enlisting the image of inexorable economic forces, then, the Labour Party found 
itself able to appeal to a broader coalition of constituencies than it would otherwise have 
been able to do.  For those who were committed to preserving the status quo in any case, 
arguments about the conditioning effects of globalisation were effectively superfluous.  
The interests of these constituencies lay in reproducing in its current form both the 
existing social structure of accumulation and also, of course, the particular essence of 
state power which makes the reproduction of such a structure possible in the first place.  
Active consent for these outcomes could have been expected from these constituencies 
with or without arguments about globalisation.  By contrast, for those whose commitment 
to the status quo was not assured, appeals to the image of globalisation played a much 
more important role.  The way in which such appeals were accompanied by further claims 
about the futility of dissent to the existing social structure of accumulation were 
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particularly significant.  Active consent to the status quo has proved to be increasingly 
unimportant in circumstances in which external events are suggested to have confirmed 
that the status quo is now, in any case, something of a functional ‘imperative’. 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
As the above example clearly demonstrates, as soon as we move beyond the suggestion 
that globalisation comes complete with its own spontaneous order, we return to 
arguments about the constructed nature of ‘economic necessity’.  Globalising outcomes 
are only likely to be apparent in those contexts in which they are consistent with the 
dominant understanding of ‘economic necessity’.  In circumstances in which they are at 
odds, we will be less likely to see such outcomes.  Hence, we must always leave open the 
possibility that there will be counter-tendencies against globalisation, as well as 
tendencies towards it. 
 
Of course, there can be many reasons why there might be political mobilisation to a 
conception of ‘economic necessity’ which produces outcomes consistent with the 
globalisation hypothesis.  Significantly, however, all of these reasons are sufficiently 
contingent upon domestic political dynamics that we can dismiss the idea that there is any 
external logic to globalisation.  In the British case, for example, we have seen that it 
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would be a mistake to try to disentangle the politics of globalisation as practised by the 
Blair government from the electoral concerns which drove the Labour Party’s 
‘modernisation’ more generally.  From this one illustration alone, it becomes clear that 
there is little to gain from assuming that international economic restructuring operates to 
its own ‘natural’ rhythm.  Without an acknowledgement of the domestic political 
conditions of international economic restructuring, much of that restructuring is destined 
to remain unexplained. 
 
Set within the context of the more general arguments of this chapter, this single 
illustration also shows why it is necessary to move beyond a theoretical framework of 
‘states versus markets’.  In addition, I have also argued that this is not automatically to 
countenance an alternative framework of ‘states and markets’.  Such a framework may 
well be an improvement on one which views the two categories as autonomous aspects of 
social reality.  Yet, there is no guarantee that such a framework allows us to interrogate 
fully the domestic political conditions of international economic restructuring.  What we 
need is a framework which is capable of locating both states and markets in concrete 
historical time, thereby enabling us to view the specific social relations which condition 
the form that both the state and the market take at any given moment.  If we choose to 
overlook those social relations which are so important to the way in which states and 
markets form, then we limit the things that we are able to say about the way in which 
states and markets interact.  As globalising outcomes are one manifestation of that 
interaction, any explanation of globalisation which fails to take account of the domestic 
social conditions of its existence is rendered necessarily incomplete. 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR: 
 
THE MATERIAL AND DISCURSIVE CONDITIONS 
FOR EXPERIENCING ‘GLOBALISING OUTCOMES’ 
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Through the introduction of ‘society’ into the analysis of globalising trends, it is clear that 
there is little to be understood about globalisation when such tendencies are set solely 
within the framework of economistic explanations.  The economy acquires its current 
form because of wider political mobilisation within society.  The residual economic 
determinism of the conventional wisdom consequently obscures more than it reveals in 
terms of causal explanations of why certain communities might be experiencing the world 
in a manner consistent with the assumption of globalisation. 
 
Let me issue a word of caution at this stage.  To insist on the necessity of moving beyond 
economistic accounts of globalising outcomes is not to suggest that the economy becomes 
in any sense irrelevant to the experience of such outcomes.  I have argued that there are 
no grounds to claim that the form of the economic base has a determining influence on 
the functions of the political superstructure.  Thus, to the extent that we must always 
leave open the possibility of successful political mobilisation to counter-tendencies 
against globalisation, there can be no innate logic to the globalisation experience.  
Equally, however, this is not to claim that the particular essence of the economy in a 
given environment will have anything other than an important conditioning effect on 
political outcomes within that environment.  Indeed, as Leonardo Paggi notes, following 
Gramsci, “politics becomes permanent action and gives birth to permanent organisations 
precisely insofar as it identifies with economics” (Paggi 1979: 141, emphases added; see 
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also Gramsci 1971: 139-40).  In other words, the manner in which the economy is 
organised may in some circumstances facilitate successful political mobilisation against 
globalisation, whilst in others it may facilitate successful political mobilisation to 
globalisation.  Whether we see mobilisation to or against globalisation is likely to depend 
on the result of prior political struggles within society over the dominant understanding of 
‘economic necessity’. 
 
In general, then, I suggest that the experience of outcomes consistent with the 
globalisation hypothesis can be traced to both the material and the discursive context in 
which that experience takes place.  Certain economic environments will be more 
conducive to embedding globalising trends than others.  The economy therefore acts as a 
material anchor making possible mobilisation to globalising outcomes in some instances, 
and resistance to them in others.  At the same time, certain political environments will be 
more conducive to embedding globalising trends than others.  Dominant political norms 
therefore act as a discursive anchor making possible mobilisation to globalising outcomes 
in some instances, and resistance to them in others.  These are issues which I explore in 
turn in this chapter. 
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Liberal Market Economies and the Tendency Towards Globalisation 
 
As the analysis has unfolded over the opening chapters, the need to place the experience 
of globalising tendencies within specific social and political contexts has become 
increasingly obvious.  Help may well be at hand in this respect, thanks to the growing 
influence within political economy scholarship of the comparative capitalisms literature.  
This literature has developed with the sole aim of dispelling assumptions that the capital 
relation bears a single identity across the range of advanced industrial economies.  Thus, 
through sustained empirical comparison, it has been shown that there is no single 
systemic logic of capitalist development operating contemporaneously throughout the 
world. 
 
At the same time, however, this literature has also tended to suggest that there are 
sufficient similarities between certain groupings of national capitalisms to be able to talk 
tentatively about a plurality of sub-systemic logics, albeit only ever in purely heuristic 
terms.  For example, the most common typology of this nature contrasts liberal market 
economies with co-ordinated market economies.  Britain and the United States are 
typically assumed to be the closest real-life approximations to the former model; whilst 
the latter is assumed to split into a distinctive West European variant and an equally 
distinctive East Asian variant (see, variously Zysman 1983; Goldthorpe 1984; Streeck 
1991; Scharpf 1991; Albert 1993; Cerny 1993; Sjöstrand 1993; Berger & Dore 1996; 
Kester 1996; Porter 1996; Preston 1998; Coates 1999; Kitschelt et al 1999). 
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At face value, there would seem to be much to gain from adopting the comparative 
capitalisms framework in order to shed light on those aspects of globalisation which the 
conventional wisdom keeps hidden from view.  It may well be that we eventually feel the 
need to dismiss the claims of the comparative capitalisms literature.  In particular, its 
identification of clear clusterings of national capitalisms may serve to draw attention 
away from significant political differences within those clusterings; thus, merely replacing 
the systemic economic logic of the conventional wisdom with a series of sub-systemic 
logics.  If we are to accept the argument that the experience of globalisation is conditional 
upon contingent political dynamics, then it is not enough merely to assume that we will 
witness a number of internally-consistent ‘regime’ responses to external economic 
pressures.  In other words, we must be sensitive to the possibility that there may be very 
different forms of political mobilisation around the issue of globalisation within a distinct 
clustering of national capitalisms.  Only then will we be able to theorise the experience of 
globalisation in truly contingent terms.  Just because the institutional framework in which 
globalising tendencies are being introduced appears to be similar in two different cases is 
itself no guarantee that globalising outcomes will be experienced in the same way in two 
such cases.  Set within the context of two countries in which society is mobilised to very 
different understandings of ‘economic necessity’, no amount of institutional similarity is 
likely to be sufficient to guarantee a similar experience of globalisation. 
 
Of course, this is a question which can only be resolved at the empirical rather than the 
theoretical level.  Irrespective of how accurate the above warnings may eventually prove 
to be under empirical investigation, it would be premature to dismiss the potential utility 
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of the comparative capitalisms theory before that theory is explored.  It is sufficient to 
note at this stage that the comparative capitalisms framework cannot be expected to offer 
an explanation of globalising outcomes per se.  Rather, it is limited to providing a 
theoretical context for subsequent empirical explanation at a level of analysis which is 
more sensitive to the contingent aspects of the globalisation experience. 
 
Arguably the most striking aspect of the globalisation phenomenon has been the 
apparently global diffusion of ideas about globalisation (see Gill 1993: Hay & Marsh 
1999).  Even in countries where as recently as five years ago there was no direct 
translation even of the word ‘globalisation’ within public disourse, its Anglophone 
variant is now in common usage.1  This is not to say that there has been a similar 
convergence in ideas about the necessary response to globalisation.  Indeed, when viewed 
through a comparative capitalisms framework, the notion of convergent responses is 
almost explicitly ruled out.  Within this literature, we are told to expect a number of 
‘regime’ responses to globalisation, with similar national capitalisms mediating the 
demands that globalisation is assumed to make in a similar manner. 
 
                                                          
1 I am indebted to my multi-lingual colleagues, Dan Wincott and Jonathan Hopkin, for this observation.  
Dan has enlightened me on the gradual introduction of the Anglophone variant of ‘globalisation’ into 
popular political discourse in France; Jonathan of a similar trend in Italy. 
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For instance, Peter Hall suggests that the institutional arrangements of liberal market 
economies makes them more directly amenable to the political practice of globalisation 
than their co-ordinated market counterparts (Hall 1998: 17).  Written into such an 
assumption is an implicit notion of comparative institutional advantage.  The institutions 
which make liberal market capitalism possible are also assumed to make liberal market 
economies ‘better placed’ to accept the internal restructuring which globalising outcomes 
require.  By the same token, the institutional arrangements which typically govern co-
ordinated market economies are thought to throw up more potential points of resistance to 
globalising ‘imperatives’.  With a tradition of extensive social protection designed to 
ensure that basic market conflicts are attenuated through political intervention (see Martin 
& Ross 1998), they are assumed to be more likely to foster political counter-tendencies to 
the use of globalising norms to privilege market outcomes.  In short, the comparative 
capitalisms literature tends to suggest two likely links: one between liberal market 
economies and potential political mobilisation towards the institutionalisation of 
globalising tendencies; and another between co-ordinated market economies and potential 
political mobilisation against the institutionalisation of globalising tendencies.  Such 
links cannot be explored in detail, however, until we understand why some economies 
follow a liberal market trajectory whilst others follow a co-ordinated market trajectory. 
 
According to David Soskice, the ‘type’ of capitalism that a country is likely to display 
depends primarily upon the way in which its business interests are organised (see Soskice 
1990; 1991; 1994; see also Thelen 1994).  Co-ordinated market economies tend to be 
distinguished by a high incidence of generalised exchange or resource pooling, which is 
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administered through a hierarchical association of firms and business groupings.  Access 
to factor inputs and technological developments is secured through collaborative 
arrangements amongst ostensibly competitive firms, mediated at the level of the state.  
Hence, individual firms typically become locked-in to collective institutional agreements 
which aim to enforce implicit contracts as a means of setting minimum standards for the 
rules of competitive engagement (Hall 1998: 4).  By contrast, the state tends to be by-
passed as a potential agent of business co-ordination in liberal market economies.  
Instead, spot market contracts are likely to take the place of institutionally-guaranteed 
resource procurements (Kitschelt et al 1999: 428). 
 
In liberal market economies, then, accumulation decisions are seen as the prerogative of 
the private sector (see Coates 1999: 645).  As a consequence, the state is likely to be 
implicated in economic management only to the extent that it is called upon, first, to 
create markets and, subsequently, to safeguard their liberal attributes from the 
encroachment of further political interventions aimed at rearticulating their underlying 
modus operandi.  In other words, the dominant form of political mobilisation in such 
environments revolves around the use of state power to deactivate popular opposition to 
market regulation.  Globalisation would therefore appear to represent little more than the 
formal extension of liberal market logic.  Perhaps more accurately, those tendencies 
which together form the basis of what we know as ‘globalisation’ provide additional 
means through which the appeal to the ‘necessity’ of liberal market regulation becomes 
ever more unquestionable. 
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Liberal norms, for instance, are intrinsic to the operation of the most dynamic sectors of 
job creation in the global economy: those of low-paid work.  Moreover, under the 
influence of the conventional wisdom of globalisation, resistance to corporate strategies 
aimed at maximising the use of low-wage labour is assumed to have become increasingly 
futile.  The potential to flourish in such sectors requires for firms to be able to redeploy 
their capital across different production outlets with the minimum of time delay (see, for 
instance, Rubery 1989: 171).  This may also involve the ability to move capital across 
space.  The conventional wisdom of globalisation states quite unequivocally that this is 
something which all firms are now able to do at will.  Thus, no one country has the 
incentive to prevent firms from driving down labour standards to the lowest common 
denominator, because firms will always have the chance of re-locating to another 
environment in which labour standards more closely approximate the liberal market 
norm.  Globalisation is therefore thought to privilege a ‘hire-and-fire’ mode of labour 
market regulation. 
 
Note, however, that globalisation itself does not need to be a reality for us to experience 
outcomes consistent with the globalisation hypothesis.  Labour market effects which are 
now so frequently attributed to globalisation also dominated liberal market environments 
in the pre-globalisation era.  Moreover, the increasing visibility of such effects in the 
current era may be less the result of globalisation than they are the result of the spread of 
liberalising norms. 
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Financial Liberalisation and the Increased Visibility of ‘Globalising Outcomes’ 
 
The move towards financial market liberalisation has been especially important in this 
respect.  Capital controls have progressively been withdrawn at the domestic level by 
governments anxious to comply with multilateral agreements activated through the 
OECD and the IMF (see Strange 1986; Frieden 1991; Goodman & Pauly 1993; Helleiner 
1996).  Indeed, in western Europe, such controls have been eliminated altogether under 
the single capital market clauses of the Maastricht Treaty.  As Hugo Dixon wrote in The 
Economist’s Yearbook for 1999, “The process of European union is rich in ironies.  But 
few more so than that the single currency will accelerate the replacement of the 
continent’s stakeholder model of capitalism with one giving pre-eminence to shareholder 
value” (Dixon 1998: 128).  In other words, the collapse of discrete national capital 
markets into a single EU-wide market has robbed the economies of western Europe of 
one of their most important institutional brakes against the encroachment of liberal 
market norms.  Hence, we have no need to appeal to the image of globalisation in this 
instance to explain effects which are commonly attributed to globalising ‘necessities’.  
For, we can see that they are actually being driven by the process of financial 
liberalisation built into wider dynamics of European integration (on the relationship 
between globalisation and European integration, see Hay, Watson & Wincott 1999). 
 
Financial liberalisation and globalisation are therefore not necessarily the same thing.  
Moreover, it is financial liberalisation which typically acts as a better explanator of labour 
market trends which the conventional wisdom attributes instead to globalisation.  The 
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adoption of ‘hire-and-fire’ techniques is most credibly linked to the terms on which 
finance becomes available to firms under conditions of capital market liberalisation. 
 
The defining feature of a liberal market economy is its tendency to prioritise competitive 
mechanisms and short-term contractual relations in order to resolve co-ordination 
difficulties (for various articulations of this idea, see Jones 1988; Riker & Weimer 1995; 
Peacock 1996; Wagner 1996; Banett 1997; Lustzig 1998).  Nowhere is this seen more 
clearly than in the relationship between the financial and the productive sectors.  Under 
conditions of liberal finance, funding for industry tends to be sourced competitively 
through capital markets rather than co-operatively through banks (on the distinction 
between capital market-based and bank-based financial systems, see Pollin 1995).  Set 
within the context of liberalised international capital markets, institutional pressures 
privilege the ‘arms-length’ relationship between finance and industry which has 
traditionally been a feature of liberal market economies.  This is not to treat international 
institutional arrangements as a strict functional imperative, physically precluding the 
more integrated relationship between finance and industry which has typified co-
ordinated market economies.  However, single capital market rules do make it more 
difficult to reproduce relationships of this latter type without the fear of predatory 
takeovers being sourced through the capital market (see Financial Times surveys, 
27.11.1998, 11.06.1999; Business Week 05.04.1999). 
 
In many instances, we have seen that the mere presence of capital-rich institutional 
investors operating in a liberalised international financial environment has been sufficient 
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to promote liberal norms within domestic finance as well (on which point, see Harmes 
1998).  The short-term contractual relations operating between finance and industry in 
liberal market economies are typically made manifest in ‘fluid’, as opposed to 
‘dedicated’, capital investments (see Watson & Hay 1998).  The key difference between 
the two is that, under conditions of ‘fluidity’, capital investments tend to be aimed at the 
highest possible rate of return across the shortest possible time horizon.  Returns can 
clearly be maximised over either the short-run or the long-run, and there is no guarantee 
that maximising short-run returns will automatically lead to the maximisation of long-run 
returns.  That said, liberal financial regimes tend to promote short-run capital 
accumulation over longer-run concerns.  As a consequence, ‘exit’ is more likely to be 
viewed as a rational strategy under conditions of liberal finance. 
 
Of course, the conventional wisdom which we encountered in earlier chapters claims that 
‘exit’ is the effect solely of globalisation.  Here, however, we have traced the emergence 
of outcomes consistent with the globalisation hypothesis without needing to appeal to 
globalisation itself in order to attribute causality.  This is significant.  For, it confirms that 
operating within a liberal financial environment can serve to render globalising 
predictions in some way ‘correct’; certainly in the sense that the world is experienced in a 
manner which the globalisation hypothesis would suggest is ‘evidence’ of the world 
having been globalised.  However paradoxical this might sound on first reading, what we 
may need to explain before we can begin to understand the emergence of ‘globalising 
outcomes’ may not be the tendency towards globalisation per se.  It may be that we would 
be better advised to try to explain the tendency towards financial liberalisation. 
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In this respect, the British case could prove to be particularly interesting.  The British 
economy historically has had high levels of external trade linkages with the rest of the 
world (see Pollard 1992).  This means that we could plausibly argue that it has always 
had a ‘global’ outlook.  Moreover, this orientation towards the external economy has 
traditionally been driven by its highly liberalised financial sectors. 
 
For instance, successive British governments have made much of Britain’s ‘success’ in 
the inward investment game (see, for instance, HM Treasury 1996).  Superficially at least, 
there is sufficient evidence for such claims to appear well-placed.  Since the worldwide 
relaxation of capital controls in the early 1980s, Britain has attracted more per capita 
foreign direct investment than any other G7 economy (UNCTAD 1993).  Despite this, 
however, Britain has actually been a consistent net exporter of capital (see Watson 
1999b).  When flows of invisibles from the financial sector are included in the analysis, 
talk of ‘success’ immediately becomes more difficult to sustain.  Overall inward 
investment flows - visibles plus invisibles - have outnumbered overall outward 
investment flows in only one year since 1980 (Economic Trends 49: 20B). 
 
When we take a closer look at the figures for inward investment, then, we find evidence 
that the real picture is rather more complex than it is made to appear in successive British 
governments’ rhetoric.  Furthermore, when we try to establish causal links, we serve 
merely to add another layer of complexity.  According to the Blair Government, Britain’s 
successful attraction of foreign direct investment has its origins in globalising tendencies.  
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It is globalisation which makes the attraction of foreign direct investment possible in the 
first place, and it is the government’s strategy of accepting the political limits of 
globalising necessities which has made Britain such an appealing alternative for footloose 
firms.  Once we scratch the surface of such rhetoric, however, two things become clear.  
Firstly, British ‘success’ in the inward investment game continues to be overshadowed by 
the export of capital through international financial markets.  Secondly, this dominant 
outward flow of capital has a long history, stretching back not only into the pre-
globalisation era but into the pre-Gold Standard era as well.  It is the liberal orientation of 
Britain’s capital markets which explains this outcome, not the putative increase in 
globalisation.  Moreover, these markets have been oriented in this way ever since their 
inception, which casts further doubt on the need for the notion of globalisation in order to 
explain their operation in the current time period. 
 
It is often said that globalising pressures within international finance have created a new 
market for hostile takeovers in a way which mitigates against long-term corporate strategy 
(see Campbell 1999; Ewing 1999).  At most, it is thought that long-term strategic 
decisions are now the sole preserve of predators within the equity market.  For those more 
likely to find themselves cast in the role of the prey, survivalist instincts are assumed to 
focus attention purely on the short-term.  Yet, there is a well-established literature on 
relative British economic decline which suggests that the appeal to globalisation is 
superfluous to explanations of short-termism in Britain.  Once again, we discover that 
globalising tendencies are being used to explain ‘new’ developments which, when set 
within the context of British capitalism, turn out to be not so new after all.  The link 
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between globalisation and the market for hostile takeovers is assumed to rest on the way 
that competition within global financial markets undermines firms’ long-term financial 
planning.  However, British firms have always had to rely on the allocation of financial 
assets on the basis of prices established in highly competitive and highly liquid capital 
markets (Lee 1996; Woolcock 1996).  As a consequence, they have traditionally faced a 
structure of corporate finance which did little to promote their productive interests. 
 
Moreover, the generic short-term tendencies of British capitalism are also reflected in a 
body of liberal company law which discourages strategic investments beyond immediate 
time horizons.  That law privileges private property rights which are made manifest in a 
liberal financial environment in stock markets which display high liquidity demands (see 
Watson 2000a).  This in turn compresses the time-scale over which investments are 
expected to pay for themselves (CBI 1994; Bond & Jenkinson 1996; Harmes 1998).  
Given liquidity demands of this nature, the performance of investment fund managers is 
judged on a quarterly and, in some instances, even a monthly basis.  As a result, the 
ability of firms to raise equity in a liberal financial environment is adversely conditioned 
by the need for investment managers to create shareholder value in the short-term 
(Watson & Hay 1998). 
 
Put together, these two aspects of liberal market accumulation serve to create an active 
market for corporate control.  Hostile takeovers, forced mergers and asset-stripping 
acquisitions have long been constituted as the norm in such regimes (see Buckle & 
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Thompson 1995; Franks & Mayer 1990).2  In the absence of all globalising tendencies, 
the continued reproduction of liberal market capitalism would in itself be sufficient to 
ensure that long-term productive performance remained subordinate to short-term 
financial returns.  Capital market based financial systems thus act to discipline potential 
outcomes within liberal market economies (Cosh, Hughes & Singh 1990; Dixit 1992; 
Grieve Smith 1997).  In particular, they serve to contain those risk-taking activities which 
are the very essence of dedicated capital investments through the continuous exposure of 
the ‘prudence’ of managers’ decisions to shareholders’ demands for short-term dividends. 
 
From this brief excursion into the comparative capitalisms literature, it would appear that 
it is the distinctively liberal structure of the domestic market economy which is the most 
important explanator of contemporary economic policy in Britain, not the structure of the 
global economy.  However, in the following section, I suggest that the comparative 
capitalisms literature itself raises as many questions as it answers.  In terms of answers 
which can be treated as provisional conclusions at this stage, the comparative capitalisms 
framework provides significant evidence that the emergence of outcomes consistent with 
the globalisation hypothesis is not necessarily confirmation of that hypothesis.  In other 
words, outcomes which are predicted under the assumption of globalisation can be 
observed for reasons which are independent of actual globalising dynamics.  In terms of 
questions which demand future exploration, the comparative capitalisms literature says 
                                                          
2 Moreover, this is also increasingly becoming an international norm.  Aided by the single capital market 
rules of the Maastricht Treaty, for instance, ‘merger mania’ has become an ever more significant part of the 
European corporate landscape (Dixon 1998; Business Week 05.04.99). 
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very little about the way in which dominant forms of political mobilisation serve to 
sustain a domestic consensus for reproducing the economy in its historical form. 
 
The danger of neglecting the political dimension of economic restructuring in this way is 
clear.  The comparative capitalisms framework may well provide a means of liberating 
our understanding of globalisation from the shackles of economic determinism.  Put 
simply, its focus on the institutional specificities of a range of national capitalisms allows 
us to view a range of different experiences of the capitalist economy, some of which may 
be consistent with the globalisation, but others of which are not.  Yet, it remains vitally 
important not to imply that these differences are solely attributable to the institutional 
context in which they emerge.  We can safely say that some national capitalisms display 
very different institutional arrangements to others.  We can also safely say that some 
national capitalisms display very different experiences of globalisation to others.  
However, there is no basis on which to say that different experiences of globalisation are 
caused purely by different institutional arrangements.  Whilst this is a claim which can be 
read into much of the comparative capitalisms literature, there are no grounds to construct 
a simple one-to-one mapping of this nature.  This is the issue which I address in the 
following section. 
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The Discursive Conditions for ‘Globalising Outcomes’ 
 
My main contention with the use of the comparative capitalisms literature is that it tends 
to be employed to forward causal arguments.  Here, I use a comparative capitalisms 
framework no more than heuristically; to provide a context for a more substantive 
investigation of the experience of ‘globalising outcomes’ in a specific setting, rather than 
as an explanation of globalisation per se. 
 
Let us return briefly to Peter Hall’s suggestion that liberal market economies are 
structurally more susceptible to globalisation than organised market economies and, as 
such, will display more signs of globalising outcomes.  It may well be the case, as Hall 
implies, that liberal market economies such as Britain are more likely to have facilitated 
globalising tendencies precisely because of their pre-existing liberal characteristics.  For 
one thing, the political practice of globalisation would appear to represent less of an 
upheaval in those countries in which a liberal market economy was already an established 
part of ‘normal politics’.  For another, it would appear to be reasonable to expect that 
firms which were already responding to a liberal environment by liquidating existing 
assets before redeploying them in more profitable locations elsewhere would adapt most 
quickly to circumstances in which globalisation made exit ever more possible.  In short, 
Hall’s notion of comparative institutional advantage suggests that liberal market 
economies are likely to be furthest along the road to globalisation because globalising 
necessities represent less of a break with past practices.  Superficially at least, such a 
position would seem to have much to commend it; providing, as it does, one way of 
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capturing the essential variety of globalisation experiences.  At the same time, however, it 
leaves many of the most important elements of that experience entirely unexplained. 
 
Perhaps most importantly, tendencies towards globalising solutions and counter-
tendencies away from them are assumed to be played out solely at the level of 
institutions.  Arguably the most influential, and certainly the most detailed, analysis 
which falls into this trap is Geoffrey Garrett’s book, Partisan Politics in the Global 
Economy.  In the hands of Garrett, the comparative capitalisms framework is used to 
suggest that globalisation sustains multiple-equilibria (Garrett 1998).  Put somewhat 
crudely, for those economies in which pre-existing institutional arrangements privilege 
distinctively liberal accumulation regimes, globalisation is thought to exaggerate the 
institutional advantage to be gained from further institutionalising liberal accumulation.  
Indeed, at times, there is little difference between the logic of neo-liberal necessity to be 
found in Garrett’s work and the logic of neo-liberal necessity to be found in the 
conventional wisdom of globalisation.  The only distinction of any note concerns the 
extent to which the neo-liberal logic of no alternative is likely to be experienced.  In the 
conventional wisdom it applies across-the-board, whereas for Garrett it applies only to 
those economies which were already neo-liberal in orientation.  By contrast, for those 
organised market economies with no history of liberal accumulation, globalisation is no 
longer assumed to come complete with the same logic of political inevitability.  The 
political space for resisting the encroachment of liberal norms is still thought to exist.  
Indeed, at times, Garrett goes as far as to suggest that comparative institutional advantage 
can only be maintained for organised market economies within the context of active 
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resistance to globalisation’s liberalising norms.  Once again, globalisation is thought to 
exaggerate the gains which are there to be made from further embedding the status quo. 
 
As we can see from these arguments, the comparative capitalisms framework is often 
utilised in order to argue that the ‘type’ of globalisation experience which we can expect 
to see is dictated by the ‘type’ of institutional arrangement prevailing in the country under 
review.  Given that it falls outside the influence of society to fully override institutional 
legacies in the short-term (see Archer 1995; Pierson 1993; Steinmo 1993; Stzompa 1993; 
Thelen 1994; Tilly 1994), here we come across another analytical framework in which 
we, as consciously acting social subjects, would appear to have no choice in our own 
globalisation experience.  The general tendency within the comparative capitalisms 
literature is for globalisation to be treated just as much as a process without a subject as it 
is in the conventional wisdom. 
 
In both accounts, we are presented with the argument that globalisation is purely a 
material process.  In the conventional wisdom, globalisation is assumed to come complete 
with a neo-liberal logic of no alternative irrespective of context, because this is the only 
political settlement which the material structure of the global market will tolerate.  In the 
comparative capitalisms approach, globalisation is assumed to come complete with a neo-
liberal logic of no alternative for liberal market economies only, because this is the only 
political settlement which the material structure of liberal markets will tolerate under the 
influence of globalisation. 
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However, we may rightly be suspicious of the structuralist assumptions which dominate 
both of these literatures (see, for instance, Maier 1987; Blyth 1997; Hay & Wincott 1998; 
Sibeon 1999).  The experience of globalisation cannot be reduced solely to the question 
of the feasibility of experiencing globalisation in a specific social setting, nor yet to the 
feasibility of experiencing resistance to globalisation.  It is still possible that we may not 
wish to dismiss Hall’s notion of comparative institutional advantage altogether from 
discussions of globalisation.  Yet, it is necessary that we find a way to link that notion to 
empirical evidence explaining the precise manner in which successful political 
mobilisation takes place in certain contexts to the desirability of facilitating globalisation. 
 
In order to account for the globalisation experience in Britain, for instance, we need to 
look beyond the prevailing institutional structure of Britain’s liberal market economy and, 
hence, beyond those factors which appear to make globalisation more possible in Britain 
than elsewhere.  We also need to look at the prevailing political and ideological structures 
operating in Britain, in an attempt to identify those factors which make the globalisation 
experience more desirable in Britain than elsewhere.  Irrespective of the extent to which 
the British economy’s liberal character provides a suitable institutional platform for 
experiencing outcomes consistent with the globalisation hypothesis, it is inconceivable 
that such experiences would have been as pronounced as they have been in the absence of 
successful political mobilisation within British society to their desirability.  Had 
successful political mobilisation taken place instead to the desirability of resistance to 
globalisation, then we can reasonably assume that the experience of outcomes consistent 
with the globalisation hypothesis would have been less marked. 
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In short, then, we have to be aware that there are discursive, as well as material, 
conditions underpinning the experience of ‘globalising outcomes’.  Governments which 
are unable to operate within a discursive context in which globalising solutions have 
taken on the appearance of ‘common-sense’ are likely to find that their ability to embed 
such solutions is constrained.  The possibility that prevailing institutional arrangements 
are a good, even perfect, fit with globalising demands is unlikely to change this basic 
condition for experiencing ‘globalising outcomes’. 
 
It is therefore clear that, in relation to economic policy, political actors are more than 
mere bearers of institutional logics (see Watson 1998a).  The complex process of political 
change which is made manifest in the interaction between globalising tendencies and 
counter-tendencies cannot simply be ‘read off’ from the institutional environment within 
which they occur.  Driven by the laudable underlying assumption that institutions matter 
(on which general point, see Steinmo et al 1992; Pierson 1993; Skocpol 1996), the 
comparative capitalisms literature all-too-often falsely elevates the institutional structure 
to the status of causal phenomenon (see Blyth 1997; Jenson 1989; Weir 1992).  Missing 
almost entirely from such accounts is an appreciation of: i) the manner in which political 
interests in facilitating globalisation are formed in any given setting; ii) how those 
interests are articulated through the adoption of certain economic ideas; and iii) those 
aspects of the prevailing ideological context which allow such ideas to be turned into, 
firstly, a resonant political discourse and, subsequently, a decisive call to action. 
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We must therefore view ‘globalising outcomes’ in terms of the historical struggle which 
makes them possible.  Quite clearly, the processes of historical struggle are shaped by a 
multitude of contingent factors operating simultaneously at local, national, regional and 
international levels.  As a consequence, globalising tendencies are also inscribed with an 
essential contingency. 
 
 
 
 
Dominant Discursive Formations in Britain and the Institutionalisation of Globalising 
Tendencies 
 
In an attempt to discover more about the globalisation experience in Britain, the focus of 
the analysis now turns to those aspects of the discursive environment in that country 
which have aligned the dominant understanding of ‘economic necessity’ to the production 
of outcomes consistent with the globalisation hypothesis.  In this respect, it is difficult to 
overstate the influence of previous historical struggles to impose a single conception of 
the competitive imperative to which the whole of British society would be oriented in the 
future. 
 
At no stage has such a struggle been completely ‘won’, of course, at least in the sense of 
full discursive closure having been achieved.  The processes of struggle carry on, and 
there are a number of influential social groups who continue to mobilise against its 
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temporary ‘resolution’.  Nonetheless, a dominant trajectory can be discerned and, in 
relation to the political practice of competitiveness concerns, this trajectory is reflected 
both in élite discourse and public policy.  Indeed, élite discourse tends to exaggerate the 
extent to which the dominant understanding of the competitive imperative underpinning 
public policy represents the settled will of the British people.  Public policy in this area is 
consequently more coherent than public discourse. 
 
The economic policy of both the Blair Government and its Conservative predecessors 
demonstrate the fact that élite discourse in Britain revolves around conceptions of 
competitive advantage which are founded on strategies for minimising labour costs (see 
Rubery 1989; Leys 1996; Coates 1999).  To return for one moment to the comparative 
capitalisms framework, we revisit arguments about the way in which this understanding 
of competitiveness concerns is a good fit with the institutional context in which it has 
emerged.  For instance, the ability to displace the burden of the competitive imperative 
onto labour is assisted by a liberal body of law which enables the swift redeployment of 
resources into lower-cost production.  Here, however, we come across another 
‘possible/desirable’ dichotomy.  Although the material context may well render cost 
competitiveness strategies possible in Britain, in no sense can it be seen as determining its 
desirability.  Yet, we must be clear that it is the discursive construction of its desirability 
which has served to embed this particular strategy for enhancing national competitiveness 
as the norm in Britain. 
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That construction has complex roots.  Moreover, our ability to isolate them is hampered 
still further by the way in which they have been hidden behind a façade of legitimating 
rhetoric.  Much of that legitimating rhetoric has become so familiar as the conventional 
wisdom of globalisation that it has increasingly seemed to lose its status as mere rhetoric, 
taking on the appearance of actual causal dynamic instead. 
 
As John Wiseman argues, under the influence of the globalisation hypothesis, the debate 
about competitiveness in Britain has become increasingly dominated by ‘economic 
rationalists’ (Wiseman 1996: 98).  Set within the context of assumptions about a single 
global market, it has been portrayed as ‘rational’ to suggest that additional market share 
will be the reward for governments who are able to exploit a comparative advantage in 
wage costs.  Rational firms are assumed to exercise mobility options in the search for 
lower production costs, which means that rational governments will provide a context in 
which the struggle over wages is deliberately structured to provide lower production 
costs.  Viewed through this perspective, it is suggested that political mobilisation is 
taking place to cost competitiveness strategies because this is the direction which all 
political mobilisation must adopt if the national interest is to be secured in an era of 
globalisation. 
 
However, I wish to argue that this is merely legitimating rhetoric for a competitiveness 
strategy which was already in place before we entered the period commonly identified as 
‘globalisation’.  Indeed, it is the pre-existence of cost competitiveness norms, allied to the 
way in which they have been constructed as fundamentally ‘unquestionable’ in public 
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discourse, which is the most important factor helping us to explain the experience of 
supposedly global outcomes in Britain.  As a consequence, our search must go on for the 
roots of the dominant discursive construction of the desirability of cost competitiveness 
strategies. 
 
Such a search leads us to the impact of Thatcherite constructions of ‘common-sense’ 
within British politics.  Clearly, this question has generated an enormous amount of 
specialist literature, both in relation to their impact at the time and also in relation to their 
lasting impact as mediated through New Labour.  Equally clearly, an extensive review of 
this literature falls outside the scope of this thesis.  Nonetheless, a few general 
observations are certainly in order. 
 
First of all, it is necessary to point out that the debate about the extent of change which 
the Thatcher governments were able to impose of the institutions of the British state are 
superfluous to the nature of my enquiry (however, for that debate, see Minogue & Biddiss 
1987; Hennessy & Seldon 1987; Crewe 1988; Jessop et al 1988; Benyon 1989; Gamble 
1990; Kavanagh 1990; Cloke 1992; Marsh & Rhodes 1992; Moon 1994; Dorey 1995; 
Kerr et al 1997).  Rather, I am concerned solely with the way in which Thatcherism has 
conditioned the ideas which are used to circumscribe the parameters of ‘normal politics’ 
in contemporary Britain.  In this respect, at least, arguments about the impact of 
Thatcherism would appear to be well-grounded. 
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Perhaps most significantly, the Thatcher Governments managed to instil a particular 
conception of the events of the 1970s which was consistent with widespread perceptions 
that Britain was experiencing economic crisis, and which remains relatively intact to this 
day.  Moreover, as Colin Hay has argued, that conception contained not only a description 
of what had gone wrong at that time, but a prescription for future action as well (Hay 
1996: 268).  Given that the Thatcherite diagnosis of the difficulties of the 1970s remains 
relatively intact within public discourse to this day, likewise the prescription of potential 
remedial action continues to resonate. 
 
Whilst still in opposition, the Conservative Party was able to mobilise sufficient 
constituencies to the idea that the economic crisis of the 1970s could only be exited from 
the right.  Moreover, the model of ‘popular capitalism’ which it offered to the electorate 
as the solution to the crisis generated sufficient consent to secure four successive general 
election victories.  The most eloquent comment on the extent to which such consent is 
now considered to be an element of ‘normal politics’ in Britain is to found in the Labour 
Party’s increasing refusal to contest the Conservatives’ taxation policies (see Corry 1997; 
King 1998; Seyd 1998).  For, it was the fiscal policy of ‘popular capitalism’ which gave 
the Thatcher governments their populist appeal, and which provided the basis for the 
mobilisation of successful electoral coalitions around their ideas (Giddens 1998). 
 
The de-politicisation of the tax agenda has also impacted upon the way in which cost 
competitiveness concerns have been constructed as ‘desirable’ in Britain (Norris 1999; 
Hay & Watson 1999b).  Cost competitiveness concerns make a positive virtue out of 
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minimising the tax components of firms’ production costs; indeed, of minimising tax 
burdens per se.  Within the parameters of public discourse in contemporary Britain, any 
attempt to lower tax burdens tends to be automatically constructed as ‘desirable’.  As a 
consequence, cost competitiveness strategies have acquired a similar status, albeit 
somewhat by default, due to the way in which they provide an economic means to the 
wider political end of deactivating fiscal policy. 
 
Thus, current British economic policy may well be dominated by the sort of neo-liberal 
leanings which the conventional wisdom suggests is an ‘inevitable’ aspect of living 
within a global world.  However, the neo-liberal tendencies which we can observe can 
actually be shown to have emerged as a result of the neo-liberal ‘solutions’ which have 
been articulated to the dominant understanding of the competitive ‘needs’ of the British 
economy.  Moreover, that articulation can also be shown to have only taken place because 
it reinforces the dominant discursive trends - those towards the ‘desirability’ of fiscal 
inertia - pre-existing within British politics. 
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Conclusion 
 
As we can see, then, the production of outcomes consistent with the globalisation 
hypothesis can often involve processes which are far more complex than those associated 
with the simple assertion that we now live within a global world.  Such an assertion 
suggests that the experience of globalisation is purely a material phenomenon relating to 
economic processes.  Whilst in no sense do I wish to argue that the economic moment is 
unimportant to ‘globalising outcomes’, I do wish to contest the suggestion that it is 
determining.  In this chapter, I have argued that there are also important discursive 
conditions underpinning the production of ‘globalising outcomes’. 
 
This raises another series of crucial questions, concerning the relationship between the 
material and the discursive conditions for experiencing the ‘predictions’ of the 
globalisation hypothesis.  The logic of the argument which I am developing in this thesis 
is to suggest that its particular manifestation is always likely to be context-specific, 
depending on the dominant form of political mobilisation operating at a given point of 
both time and space.  As such, this is an empirical question, which must remain open 
pending more concrete forms of enquiry. 
 
That said, it is still possible at this stage to comment on the nature of the relationship 
between the material and the discursive elements of the globalisation experience.  For, 
this is an analytical rather than an empirical question.  In the introduction, and in order to 
state quite clearly an important distinction between the conclusions to be found in this 
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thesis and those in much of the rest of the literature, I focused solely on the way in which 
ideas about globalisation can produce outcomes consistent with the globalising 
hypothesis, irrespective of the presence of pre-existing globalising trends.  Whilst I insist 
on leaving open the possibility that, in some instances at least, ideas can have 
independent causal effects on political outcomes (see, for instance, Watson 1998a, 1999b, 
2000a), I do not wish to broaden this out into a general claim that discursive practices 
necessarily cause material processes.  Similarly, whilst I also refuse to reject the 
possibility that, in other instances, the economy will set very definite parameters for 
potential political outcomes (see, for instance, Watson 1997, 1999a, 2000b), I do not wish 
to broaden this out into a general claim that material processes necessarily cause 
discursive practices.  In general, I prefer to view the relationship between the material and 
the discursive as constitutive rather than causal (on which distinction, see Wendt 1999). 
 
At all times, the relationship between the material and the discursive should be analysed 
in fundamentally dialectical terms.  Material processes contribute to the constitutive logic 
of discursive practices, just as discursive practices contribute to the constitutive logic of 
material processes.  Neither ever exists independently of the other. 
 
In conclusion, let me return briefly to the conventional wisdom of globalisation.  For, it is 
based on the underlying premise that the reprojection of the capital relation onto a supra-
territorial plane has produced a material structure which does now operate independently 
of wider discursive practices.  As such, the distance which I have placed in the opening 
chapters of the thesis between my understanding of ‘globalising outcomes’ and that to be 
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found in the conventional wisdom should be clear.  Moreover, that distance will be 
maintained in the chapters which follow due to my commitment to the assumption that 
there are no circumstances in which material processes operate autonomously from 
discursive practices. 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER FIVE: 
 
GLOBALISATION AND THE QUESTION OF 
NEO-LIBERAL HEGEMONY IN BRITAIN 
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The aim of previous chapters has been increasingly to assert the significance of discursive 
practices to the study of ‘globalising outcomes’.  Ideas are a constitutive element of the 
world which we experience.1  As such, the struggle to institutionalise a dominant set of 
ideas represents nothing less than a contest to impose parameters around the politically 
possible.  The process through which that struggle takes place may not always be 
conscious, but the outcome is the same nonetheless.  Just as material structures can serve 
to limit the range of possible political outcomes, so too can discursive structures.  At any 
moment of time, society tends to be oriented to a series of authoritative rules, and such 
rules themselves reflect the ideas that most closely approximate the prevailing ‘common-
sense’ (on which point, see Maier 1987: 16). 
 
In circumstances in which external events serve to render the prevailing ‘common-sense’ 
unquestionable, talk tends to turn to questions of hegemony.  It is frequently argued that 
current circumstances are entirely consistent with talk of this nature.  For ‘external 
events’ in current circumstances read globalisation, and for ‘prevailing common-sense’ 
read neo-liberalism.  Thus, globalisation is assumed to have rendered neo-liberal 
economics increasingly unquestionable, subsequently hegemonising neo-liberal policies 
within public discourse.  In this chapter, I set out to investigate such claims, with specific 
reference to the British case. 
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The End of Post-War Legitimation Norms and the Move to Legitimation Through Growth 
 
Of course, having been at such pains to distance my analysis from that of the 
conventional wisdom, it is unlikely that I would commit myself to the line of reasoning 
suggested above.  In previous chapters, I have attempted to demonstrate the conceptual 
cul-de-sacs which we are led into whenever we assume that globalisation is merely an 
‘external event’.2  Having made this point repeatedly, it would then be somewhat 
contradictory to fall back on such an assumption at this stage.  That said, this is not to 
argue that an investigation into the possible hegemonic status of neo-liberal ideas in 
modern-day Britain has no value.  As I have also attempted to demonstrate, we may see 
the emergence of trends which are absolutely consistent with the predictions of the 
globalisation hypothesis without globalisation necessarily being the causal influence.  It is 
therefore important to hold open such a possibility in this instance as well.  Put simply, I 
reject the assumption that neo-liberal ideas are currently hegemonic in Britain due to 
exogenous economic pressures associated with globalisation, and I do so on the basis that 
this is a complete mis-specification of the way in which globalising outcomes are 
experienced.  However, the question of whether the current period in British politics is 
                                                                                                                                                                             
1 Of course, as I have argued in previous chapters, the significance of ideas can also be causal as well as 
constitutive. 
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nonetheless one of neo-liberal hegemony must remain open pending further empirical 
analysis. 
 
If we have arrived at a situation of neo-liberal hegemony in Britain, then hegemonic 
forces cannot simply be traced to globalisation.  It is true that the struggle for hegemony 
takes place within a material environment.  However, changes in that environment 
(whether evidence of globalisation or not) are not in themselves sufficient to ensure that a 
certain set of ideas becomes hegemonic. 
 
Hegemonic practices are fundamentally discursive practices.  Ideological struggle is 
conducted in the first instance at the level of discourse.  It responds to attempts to 
rearticulate existing social norms so that they may be able to act as a unifying standard for 
a suitably reconstituted general interest (Gramsci 1971: 130-3; for commentaries, see 
Jessop 1982: 142-53, Mouffe 1979: 198).  No amount of change in material conditions 
will ever be sufficient to hegemonise any set of ideological principles, unless that change 
occurs within the context of popular political mobilisation to the assumption that those 
principles also represent society’s general interest. 
 
As a consequence, the search for the potential origins of the moment when neo-liberalism 
became hegemonic in Britain must not be constrained by arguments about globalisation.  
Irrespective of the claims of the conventional wisdom, globalisation is simply not a causal 
phenomenon which would be capable of making things ‘happen’ in this way.  Indeed, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
2 Or, perhaps more accurately, globalisation tends to be conceived as a series of mutually reinforcing 
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arguments about globalisation may prove to be altogether misleading in this instance.  
The search must instead focus on those moments in which successful political 
mobilisation took place to a conception of the general interest which served to render 
neo-liberal solutions functional to the process of economic management. 
 
Such moments are difficult to pinpoint with any degree of precision.  However, over the 
past two decades, we have seen a tendency within British politics for successive 
governments to respond to contradictions within the capital relation by privileging 
accumulation over legitimation demands.3  Once again, arguments about globalisation 
could well ‘get in the way’ here if we allowed them to.  For, faced with evidence of 
policies which appear to institutionalise the dominance of accumulation demands, 
globalisation is often appealed to as the reason.  If the conventional wisdom of the 
‘inevitability’ of welfare state retrenchment tells us anything, then it is surely that 
legitimation demands are now to be considered as structurally subordinate to those of 
accumulation.  Globalisation is assumed to undermine the political potency of 
legitimation demands to the extent that it provides capital with a new-found ability to by-
pass the state.  This, it is argued, allows for the pursuit of accumulation goals safe in the 
knowledge that the circuit of capital is now able to transcend legitimation demands which 
are processed through the state. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
external events which serve to highlight a single systemic logic. 
3 Moreover, the dominant discourse accompanying such interventions tends to relocate the source of the 
contradiction so that it fails to be experienced directly as a contradiction of the capital relation. 
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Yet, in terms of Britain at least, there is an important chronological contradiction 
involved in attempts such as this to ascribe causal agency to globalisation in the process 
through which legitimation demands have become subordinate to those of accumulation.  
Quite clearly, successful political mobilisation to the ‘need’ to downgrade policies aimed 
at legitimation occurred in Britain considerably before successful political mobilisation to 
the image of globalising ‘necessities’ (see, for instance, Singh 1977; Harrison 1980; Elam 
1990; Allsopp 1991; Pollard 1992; Thompson 1996).4  In this respect, the qualitative 
novelty of globalisation is restricted to the manner in which it has been appealed to in an 
attempt to de-politicise such trends (see Watson 1999b; Burnham 1999). 
 
Legitimation imperatives have been constructed as ‘rationality deficits’ existing at the 
heart of British economic policy-making ever since the Conservative Party began its 
attempts to recast post-war legitimation norms in the mid-1970s.  The extent to which 
this corresponded to the implementation of a coherent blueprint for change is still a 
matter of some dispute within the academic literature (on which, see Hall & Jacques 
1983; Jessop et al 1988; Leys 1990; Marsh & Rhodes 1992; Moon 1994).  What it would 
be more difficult to contest, however, is the suggestion that change in legitimation norms 
has occurred. 
 
Equally, we have seen change in the dominant form of political mobilisation to the 
question of legitimation demands.  In the absence of successful mobilisation against the 
continued reproduction of post-war legitimation norms, it would be inconceivable that 
                                                          
4 It can be traced more precisely to the rise of New Right ideology - discursive shifts which occurred in the 
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those norms could have been superceded to the extent that they have.  The lack of 
concerted popular opposition to the Blair Government’s continuing overhaul of the 
remaining elements of universal welfare state provision (on which point, see The 
Guardian editorial, 10.11.99) is surely testament to the fact that ‘times have changed’.  
The welfare state is becoming ever more conditional in Britain (King & Wood 1999), and 
it is being led in that direction under the influence of a dominant public discourse which 
increasingly doubts the need to defend more universal provision. 
 
The conscious construction of an explicitly inegalitarian politics has increasingly 
fragmented the nature of legitimation demands in Britain (see Jessop et al 1988 for a 
discussion of Thatcherism as a ‘two-nation project’).  Twenty years of redistribution in 
the direction of greater inequality has enabled wage rates in some sectors of the labour 
market to rise rapidly, at the same time as more coercive measures have been deployed to 
hold wages down in other sectors5.  Indeed, where wage growth has been strong, it has far 
exceeded the reduction of the social wage resulting from the abstraction of the state from 
universal welfare provision.  As such, the loss of legitimation-enhancing welfare 
provision has been more than compensated by a flow of material gains in those sectors of 
the labour market in which wage growth has remained buoyant. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
absence of arguments about globalisation. 
5 Such coercion has been introduced by both state and capital. 
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Post-war legitimation norms have been overwritten in Britain insofar as a greater 
proportion of Britain’s electorally-ascendant middle-classes than ever before no longer 
need the state to be run in accordance with such norms.  It is the middle-classes who 
typically inhabit those sectors of the labour market in which wage growth has been 
strong, and the compensatory wealth effects of this ‘two-nation’ labour market policy 
have led to a heightened use of private insurance markets.  Increasingly, private contracts 
are replacing the state in the role of service provider across a whole range of social policy 
areas (see Ellison 1997; Ainley 1999).  Under the terms of the post-war welfare 
settlement in Britain, the role of the state in social policy was to act as a direct substitute 
for ‘missing markets’ in areas such as health care, pensions and education.  Moreover, the 
reproduction of state power in its traditional post-war form was conditioned by the 
legitimation resources generated from the successful pursuit of such a role. 
 
Today in Britain, however, the attempts of successive governments to roll back the 
welfare frontiers of the state have undermined the ability to source legitimation demands 
in this way.  In fact, for those who continue to depend upon the public sector for social 
provision, we should perhaps be thinking in terms of the progressive institutionalisation 
of legitimacy deficits within the structures of the state.  Talk of ‘crisis within the NHS’, 
for instance, has become an everyday part of the vocabulary of British politics.  That said, 
it would still be premature to suggest that these legitimacy deficits will lead automatically 
to a full-blown state crisis of political rationality.  For, the dominant form of political 
mobilisation in Britain today actually serves to displace the potential for such a crisis (on 
New Labour’s politics of ‘expectation suppression’, see Hay & Watson 1998).  In the 
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wake of the Labour Party’s ‘modernisation’, the target constituencies of British party 
politics has become concentrated ever more closely on the scramble for middle-class 
votes (on which point, see Leys 1996; Kennedy 1998; Marquand 1998; Vincent 1998; 
Gould 1999; Dorey 1999).  These are the same middle-classes who have shown 
themselves, as a group, to be willing to confer continued legitimacy upon a system which 
has allowed them to be compensated materially for a less activist social state. 
 
The legitimation discourse which dominates in Britain today is therefore tied more 
explicitly to the performance of the economy than previously in the post-war period.  The 
ability to sustain systemic legitimation in the face of reduced social provision through 
selective material compensation depends upon the ability to maintain a level of economic 
performance which is capable of sustaining the means of funding those compensatory 
payments.  In circumstances in which prevailing growth rates are inadequate to such a 
task, there is less scope for offsetting the legitimation deficits which emerge from the 
retrenchment of publically-funded social provision. 
 
In this respect, the situation appears to have become ever more one of legitimation 
through growth.  Indeed, we may even have reached a situation of legitimation through 
anticipation of growth.  Legitimation concerns in the sphere of social welfare have 
increasingly been superceded as social policy has been recast, in Bob Jessop’s terms, as 
an ‘extra-economic aid to national competitiveness’ (see, for example, Jessop 1993, 
1994b).  Popular political mobilisation used to take place to the idea that social welfare 
was a public good in its own right.  Now, that idea has been increasingly subordinated to 
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the view that social policy only becomes a public good in the event of it assisting British 
firms in the search for new markets (Jones 1996; Ainley 1999).  As the results of the Blair 
Government’s comprehensive review of welfare provision begin to be published, a clear 
pattern is emerging.  Welfare-enhancing expenditures which are assumed to have a 
positive effect on the future growth trajectory of the British economy continue to be 
tolerated; those that fail to live up to such standards increasingly do not.  What we have 
witnessed, then, is the tendency to move towards sourcing legitimation demands through 
accumulation. 
 
It is at this point that our discussion can return to the question of neo-liberalism.  For, as I 
argued in the previous chapter, accumulation concerns have increasingly been set in 
Britain within the context of a dominant public discourse which privileges distinctively 
neo-liberal conceptions of the competitive imperative.  It is not merely accumulation 
demands to which post-war principles of legitimation are being sacrificed.  It is the 
demands of a specifically neo-liberal accumulation regime.  The growth imperatives 
which have clearly replaced welfare state imperatives as a defining element of ‘normal 
politics’ in contemporary Britain are equally clearly neo-liberal growth imperatives (see 
Hay & Watson 1999c).  That said, however, the fact that New Labour has chosen to adopt 
a macroeconomic stabilisation policy which does not fundamentally depart from the 
terms of its neo-liberal inheritance (see Watson 1997) is not, in itself, evidence of neo-
liberal hegemony.  As such, the analysis must move on. 
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Gramsci and the Consensual Element of Hegemony 
 
Hegemonic tendencies require for popular political mobilisation to elevate a particular 
interest to the status of ‘general interest’.  The dominant form of mobilisation in Britain 
seeks to orient the rest of society to the need to treat particular interests in the sphere of 
accumulation as the general interest.  Given that accumulation strategies currently display 
distinctive neo-liberal attributes in terms of both labour market and macroeconomic 
policies, there is nothing here to rule out the possibility of neo-liberal hegemony in 
contemporary Britain.  Moreover, hegemonic tendencies are linked to the reproduction of 
the status quo.  The addition of ‘Third Way’ rhetoric notwithstanding, the rationality 
underlying the economic status quo in Britain remains fundamentally neo-liberal.  Once 
again, there are no grounds here necessarily to dismiss claims of neo-liberal hegemony.  
Such grounds are to be found elsewhere. 
 
The complex institutional structure of a modern state is most likely to convey a sense of 
substantive unity when set within the context of a fully developed hegemonic project.  It 
is through the perspective of a permanent resolution of the contradiction between its 
accumulation and legitimation imperatives, for instance, that the state is most able to 
reflect the appearance of a coherent unitary actor.  Yet, although we may well have 
evidence that this contradiction has been temporarily resolved in Britain through the 
move towards sourcing legitimation demands through accumulation, there is no evidence 
that this is anything other than a temporary resolution.  The test of a truly hegemonic 
moment is that ideological compliance for the circumscription of political contestation is 
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freely given (see Gramsci 1971: 206-76).  Only in circumstances such as these should we 
expect to observe anything approaching a permanent resolution to the internal 
contradictions of state policy-making.  In all other circumstances, the absence of 
ideological compliance is likely to be sufficient to ensure that contradictions are no more 
than displaced into a future time period.  The reason to doubt that Britain is currently 
experiencing a moment of neo-liberal hegemony, then, lies in the fact that its neo-liberal 
accumulation regime is being reproduced in the absence of overwhelming popular 
consent. 
 
Truly hegemonic moments require a dominant vision of society to be institutionalised 
which the vast majority of the population feels predisposed to ‘buy into’.  This is perhaps 
sufficient to ensure that truly hegemonic moments are rare in practice.  Yet, it is also 
sufficient to suggest that talk of neo-liberal hegemony would be misplaced if we were to 
discover that the primary means of institutionalising neo-liberal solutions in 
contemporary Britain was coercive.  The stress which Gramsci placed on the formation of 
a collective will through active support implies that hegemonic tendencies cannot be 
sustained merely through the use of force (Gramsci 1971: 130-3; see also Jessop 1982: 
144-9).  Hegemony should maybe be seen as the more consensual ‘alter-ego’ of coercion, 
acting to mobilise sufficient - although not necessarily overwhelming - numbers to a 
dominant world-view.  Thus, coercion is to be seen only as a last resort, when all other 
means of shaping perceptions of a shared national interest appear to have been exhausted. 
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Set in this context, what is perhaps most significant about the neo-liberal experience in 
Britain is the extent to which its reproduction has relied on the last resort option being 
implemented.  As such, British society has been led further down the road to neo-
liberalism in a way which sits uncomfortably alongside Gramsci’s understanding of 
‘leadership’ under conditions of hegemony.  Gramsci assumed that a particular balance of 
social forces was only likely to be sustainable in the long-run should those who currently 
hold the balance of power be able to justify that position through the assertion of 
‘intellectual and moral leadership’ (on which point, see Femia 1975: 30-1).  It was only in 
circumstances such as these, he argued, that active consent could be secured for 
ideological compliance.  As Gioseppe Fiori observes, it was entirely necessary for 
Gramsci to lay such stress on ideological compliance, for consent to be governed under 
conditions of hegemony amounts to “acceptance of a ‘conception of the world’ which 
belongs to others” (Fiori 1970: 238).  In the absence of ‘intellectual and moral leadership’ 
of this nature, no amount of raw political power is likely to be sufficient to enable an 
ascendant social group to temporarily suspend the distinction between its own ethical, 
political and cultural values and societal norms (Mouffe 1979: 198). 
 
Moreover, in the absence of successful ‘intellectual and moral leadership’, the 
preservation of the status quo becomes increasingly reliant on the exercise of forceable 
‘domination’.  It is within this latter context that arguments about globalisation appear to 
be particularly relevant.  The political practice of globalisation may well involve an 
increase in the level of ‘domination’ within society.  At a number of different levels in 
Britain, the coercive apparatus of the state has been used to actively promote globalising 
  191 
dynamics in order to ‘enforce’ the tendency towards economic neo-liberalism within 
domestic politics.  As we saw in the opening chapter, the world remains stubbornly 
resistant to the creation of truly global markets.  Equally, however, a truly global system 
of markets has not been necessary for arguments about globalisation to have been 
constructed as an external enforcement mechanism for neo-liberalism in public discourse 
in Britain. 
 
In this respect, two examples of the way in which economic policy-making responsibility 
has been effectively externalised are particularly instructive.  On the one hand, the British 
government has been complicit in de-politicising fiscal policy by signing international 
trade and investment agreements which supercede national law.  On the other, it has also 
been complicit in de-politicising monetary policy by contracting out the power of 
initiative to an unelected committee of technical ‘experts’ working for the Bank of 
England.  These developments are interesting for a number of reasons.  Firstly, although 
globalising tendencies have provided a convenient alibi for the government’s actions in 
these instances, globalisation itself has not needed to be an empirical reality for such 
actions to have been undertaken.  Secondly, in the context of discussions of hegemony, 
this is hardly evidence of hegemonic leadership.  Indeed, to the extent that economic 
policy is now run increasingly in line with ‘automatic pilots’ located within international 
markets (see Watson 1998a), this would appear to be the effective abrogation of 
leadership.  At most, we have a curious conception of leadership in which ‘to lead’ 
appears to equate with closing off the possibility of being led anywhere else in the future.  
Dissatisfaction with the status quo in Britain could well turn into popular political 
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mobilisation against the continued dominance of neo-liberal economics.  Indeed, such 
dissatisfaction may already be only too apparent.  Irrespective of the extent of 
mobilisation against the neo-liberal status quo, however, there is no guarantee that it 
would necessarily be successful.  Given the increasing use of external enforcement 
mechanisms for economic policy-making, it is far from clear that the institutional 
capacity still exists for translating popular political demands into decisive action of this 
nature. 
 
This, to me, most accurately captures the attraction of globalisation for contemporary 
public policy-makers in Britain.  Senior members of the Blair Government have 
repeatedly passed positive judgement on the emergence of globalising tendencies (see, for 
instance, Blair 1996a, 1996b, 1998, 1999; Brown 1996, 1998b, 1999).  Yet, this is less a 
judgement on globalisation per se than a judgement on the way in which arguments about 
globalising effects can be appropriated in order to re-shape popular political debates to 
the government’s own advantage.  In this respect, globalisation impacts so spectacularly 
because it is seen to remove the need for active consent to further neo-liberal 
restructuring. 
 
It is necessary to question the extent to which we, as citizens, have the ability to 
undermine the legitimacy of the neo-liberal status quo by withdrawing our consent to it.  
In general, it is only possible to affect political outcomes through refusing to consent to 
the effects of the decision-making process when one highly important condition holds: 
namely, that the decision-making process itself is democratically accountable.  It is far 
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from certain, however, that channels of democratic accountability remain open to us 
should we wish to resist the further encroachment of neo-liberal norms currently being 
introduced behind the façade of globalisation.  In Britain at least, such channels would 
already appear to have been closed.  Under the Conservative Governments of Thatcher 
and Major, channels of resistance to neo-liberal restructuring were shut down as a matter 
of ideological ‘necessity’.  Under New Labour, the Blair Government has displaced yet 
more sites of potential resistance to neo-liberal restructuring by creating a range of new 
external enforcement mechanisms for policy as a response to perceived globalising 
‘necessities’. 
 
These external enforcement mechanisms have taken many forms.  Firstly, there are 
multilateral institutions such as the World Trade Organization and the International 
Monetary Fund.  The channels of representation that are open to us to influence the 
decision-making processes of these institutions is strictly limited, and what representation 
we have is mediated through the national government.  No economist working as a policy 
advisor for either the WTO or the IMF is appointed using democratic procedures.  As 
such, democratic procedures cannot be called upon to remove policy advisors who are 
responsible for diffusing neo-liberal ideology, even when the processes of diffusion take 
place in contexts in which the local population is mobilised to resist that ideology.  
Moreover, on those recent occasions in which local resistance has attempted to question 
the legitimacy of WTO and IMF interventions, the Blair government has remained 
steadfastly committed to the official line.  For instance, both the US-EU dispute over 
bananas and the Asian financial crisis were met with a British endorsement of existing 
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international institutional arrangements and, perhaps more importantly, of the economic 
‘truths’ which such institutions promote (for the Chancellor of the Exchequer’s views on 
these issues, see the Treasury’s web site at http:www.hm-treasury.gov.uk; see also Baker 
2000). 
 
Secondly, whilst it is multilateral institutions which have set the context for liberalisation, 
it has been key actors such as multinational corporations which have actually driven the 
liberalising trend through their investment decisions.  Here, too, there are no readily 
apparent channels of representation which would enable us to have democratic input into 
the decision-making process of multinational corporations.  Indeed, the British 
government has actively promoted the replacement of local political structures with the 
corporate boardroom as the site in which local economic decisions are taken (Watson 
1997, 2000b).  For instance, inward investors will generally only re-locate into areas in 
which local trade unions are weak (cf Bellak 1997).  In this respect, the British 
government has minimised inward investors’ search costs.  For, it has repeatedly 
guaranteed the rights of multinational corporations to sign no union deals or, at most, a 
single union deal where individual trade unions were invited to compete against one 
another to see which one could offer the most ‘user-friendly’ package (on the specific 
case of Japanese inward investment into Britain, see for instance Heitger & Stehn 1990; 
Munday & Wilkinson 1993; Peck & Stone 1993; Williams et al 1993; Palmer 1996; 
Dicken & Tickell 1997).  As such, the usual channel of representation between shop floor 
and board room is increasingly being denied. 
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Thirdly, the Blair Government has done much actively to court the external discipline 
which trading in international financial markets is assumed to imply.  The normalising 
effect of speculative capital movements is most apparent in circumstances in which 
capital flows are unchecked by government regulation.  Blair himself has consistently 
spoken of the economic benefits which are to be gained from operating in such an 
environment, and hence from allowing the international financial markets the power of 
determination over monetary policy (see, for instance, Held 1998; Blair 1996a, 1998, 
1999). 
 
Furthermore, when New Labour has entered the international debate on the need for a 
‘new financial architecture’ (see Economic Report of the President 1999; World Bank 
1998; Eichengreen 1999), it has done so on distinctively neo-liberal terms (Watson 
2000d).  In particular, it has argued most forcefully for new rules to increase the 
transparency of financial transactions.  However, its favoured conception of 
‘transparency’ involves a highly asymmetic relationship between domestic governments 
and international financial markets.  Under the terms of New Labour’s appeal to a ‘new 
Bretton Woods’, governments would have a responsibility to the markets to act in a 
‘transparent’ manner.  For instance, international supervisory bodies would be required to 
give governments incentives to pre-commit the terms of macroeconomic management 
beyond the short-term, in order to allow markets to assess the risk of potential 
investments more accurately.  At the same time, the proposals make no provision for a 
reciprocal relationship of ‘transparency’, in which the markets would bear a responsibility 
to governments, in turn allowing them to plan beyond the short-term.  The Blair 
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Government continually refuses to question the sanctity of the private property rights of 
individuals acting within international financial markets, neither in its current actions nor 
in its proposals for the future.  As a consequence, its advocacy of a ‘new financial 
architecture’ serves merely as a means of further empowering the owners of capital to 
restrict the policy-making parameters which governments work within.  Clearly, then, 
these are also proposals to restrict the impact of popular political mobilisation on the 
economic policy-making process in general, and proposals to restrict the impact of 
popular political mobilisation against the prevailing neo-liberal order in particular. 
 
As we can see, a whole host of mechanisms are already in place to act as external 
enforcement mechanisms for the reproduction of the neo-liberal status quo in Britain, and 
more will soon be in place should the Blair Government be successful in implementing 
its plans for international financial reform.  Put together, they form a material structure 
which actively displaces the need for consent to the continued ascendancy of neo-liberal 
economics.  Moreover, it is not only at the level of material structure that the need for 
consent is being displaced in this way.  There is nothing in the Gramscian notion of 
‘domination’ which suggests that the process through which subordinate social groups 
come to be dominated necessarily has to have its origins in material structures (Gramsci 
1971: 247; Forgacs 1989: 86; de Brunhoff 1978: 102; Howarth 1995: 121).  ‘Domination’ 
can also be imposed through the realm of ideas.  In the remainder of this chapter, I turn to 
question the way in which the public discourse of globalisation has been used in Britain 
as an external enforcement mechanism for neo-liberal norms.  Whilst I continue to 
dispute the causal status of the link between the material reality of globalisation and the 
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‘necessity’ of neo-liberalism, evidence of a link between the dominant discourse of 
‘global imperatives’ and neo-liberal outcomes in Britain is much easier to sustain. 
 
 
 
 
The Educative Role of the State and the Creation of a Political Logic of ‘No Alternative’ 
 
As soon as we begin to explore the way in which ‘domination’ is enacted through the 
realm of ideas as a means of analysing the impact of the dominant discourse of 
globalisation, we return to the suggestion that the state is indispensible to the emergence 
of ‘globalising outcomes’.  The conventional wisdom ascribes a sense of rationality to 
interventions which bear the hallmark of a logic of neo-liberal necessity.  The mere 
appearance that political interventions are rational typically serves to dampen down 
popular resistance to them.  Rational decision-making is therefore most likely to lead to 
popular responses which are consistent with ideological compliance.  However, to focus 
purely on the perceived rationality of the decision-making process leaves a series of even 
more fundamental questions unasked.  How, for instance, are we to decide on the type of 
interventions which are to be deemed rational in any given setting?  Who, in addition, 
gets to set the standards by which we take those decisions?  In order to search for answers 
to such questions, let us revisit previous arguments about the role of the state within 
society. 
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From a Gramscian perspective, the state is traditionally cast in the role of ‘educator’.  The 
state apparatus is appropriated in order to shape the dominant cognitive structure, 
typically in a manner consistent with the reproduction of the ideological status quo.  The 
very possibility of political change is policed by this use of the state to disseminate 
certain knowledge claims as objective ‘facts’ relating to ‘the way we are’.  In any instance 
in which knowledge claims cohere into a systemic common-sense, future choices tend to 
be reduced in line with the emergence of a political logic of ‘no alternative’. 
 
According to Ralph Miliband, actors working within the institutions of the state have 
been able to harness recent technological advances to their own ends.  Such advances 
have increased the ability to disseminate information within society.  As a result of 
which, the state’s role as a factor of ideological cohesion within the social formation is 
arguably now more deeply entrenched than at any previous time (Miliband 1985: 264-5, 
1994: 11).  Hence, the state now possesses perhaps unprecedented means of fulfilling the 
‘educative’ function which Gramsci took to be a fundamental aspect of its reproduction 
of the status quo.  Moreover, then, we may have also reached a position in which we are 
more likely to witness the creation of cognitive structures consistent with political logics 
of ‘no alternative’. 
 
Of course, there is much more to the creation of cognitive structures of this nature than 
the simple ability to co-ordinate the dissemination of knowledge claims as objective 
‘truths’.  For a start, there is a plausibility criterion.  If we, as consciously acting political 
subjects, are to accept the putative ‘truth’ claims of a political logic of no alternative, then 
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there has to be a sense in which those claims accord with the way in which we perceive 
the world.  In this respect, experience is crucial.  We tend to perceive the world in ways 
which ensure that those perceptions are consistent with our everyday experiences of that 
world.  Under the preference-shaping influence of active political strategies to condition 
what we hold to be true about the world in which we live, perceptions of reality are every 
bit as important as reality itself. 
 
Perceptions of globalisation, for instance, have been every bit as important in shaping 
political outcomes in modern Britain as globalisation per se.  Given the data presented in 
Chapter One, which show that the dominant discourse of globalisation remains 
committed to assumptions of a ‘one-price world’ even though the world itself remains 
stubbornly resistant to true dynamics of global supply and demand, this may not be all 
that surprising.  It occurs for one very good reason.  Public policy responses cast in the 
image of ‘globalising necessities’ not only reinforce an experience of the world which 
was already part of ‘normal politics’ in Britain.  It also reinforces the dominant 
knowledge claims being disseminated through the communicative arms of the state about 
the way in which Britain should be governed in the future.  In other words, not only have 
‘globalising necessities’ been decoded in a manner which has been consistent with the 
reproduction of the existing macroeconomic regime.  Such ‘necessities’ have been 
deliberately encoded as a political logic of no alternative in the first place precisely so that 
they could be decoded to facilitate the reproduction of the status quo. 
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Perhaps the most important knowledge claim contained within the dominant discourse of 
globalisation is that the new economic ‘reality’ reduces the scope of feasible 
macroeconomic management at the national level (see also Rosamond 1999).  But, as 
even the most cursory reading of recent developments within British politics would 
reveal, the existing macroeconomic regime has been tied for some time to the 
mobilisation of an electorally-acendant coalition to the normative case for withdrawing 
active arms of the state from the economy.  The incentive for constructing globalisation 
through the perspective of a political logic of no alternative is clearly heightened in 
Britain, then, for those parties that identify their own interests in a commitment to the 
economic status quo.  In the British case, a dominant discourse of globalisation has been 
linked, with significant political implications, to a resonant logic of ‘neo-liberal 
necessity’.  The relative ease with which that link has been established must surely be 
related to the fact that it reinforces dominant norms and values which were already being 
carried within the cognitive structure of political common-sense within that country.  It is 
likely that this is more an élite common-sense in practice than a strict Gramscian 
interpretation of a common-sense which runs all the way through society.  That said, the 
communicative functions of the state are triggered first and foremost through the way in 
which élite discourse encodes material experiences.  Moreover, given the influence of the 
communicative functions of the state in conditioning the decoding of that discourse in 
society more generally, the significance of élite common-sense to subsequent political 
outcomes should be clear. 
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Of course, there is no guarantee that élite common-sense will bear direct correspondence 
between country cases.  This helps to explain our observations of a distinctively multi-
speed globalisation process.  Indeed, it may be more apt to think beyond the single 
political logic of no alternative which tends to dominate the Anglophone literature on 
globalisation, instead holding open the possibility of multiple logics of no alternative 
appropriate to multiple élite common-senses.  The likely public policy response to 
perceptions of globalising imperatives could then be expected to fall anywhere on a 
spectrum from all-out embrace to all-out resistance.  The Anglophone response to 
globalising trends has essentialised a logic of ‘neo-liberal necessity’ as the political logic 
of no alternative because this currently reflects the cognitive structure which dominates 
rationality hypotheses in the English-speaking world, but only because of this.  Set within 
a cognitive context predisposed to question the perceived rationality of market liberalism, 
globalisation’s political logic of no alternative is more likely to reinforce pre-existing 
tendencies towards resisting the encroachment of market liberal norms than it is create 
new tendencies towards enabling them. 
 
The fact that this thesis focuses on Britain, however, means that these potentially fruitful 
avenues of investigation must temporarily be closed down pending future empirical 
research.  ‘Truth’ claims relating to globalisation have been functional to the reproduction 
of Britain’s distinctively neo-liberal macroeconomic status quo through the way in which 
they have been used to narrow the perceived scope of political conflict within the policy-
making arena.  A dominant discourse of globalisation has been used in Britain, then, to 
increase the potency of arguments for imposing a uni-dimensional rationality onto the 
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structures of the state.  In particular, the image of globalisation has provided a means of 
pushing through neo-liberal reforms in circumstances in which ideological compliance to 
such a strategy cannot be guaranteed.  The very language used to describe globalisation in 
public discourse in Britain - ‘the impersonal forces of the market’ operating to ‘an 
inexorable logic’ on ‘a supraterritorial plane’ - attempts to displace human subjectivity as 
a dynamic agent in political and economic change.  Instead, the image of a determining 
structure of pure market relations tends to be asserted in order to maintain the legitimacy 
of further neo-liberal change within the existing macroeconomic order.  For, in the 
perceived absence of subjects enacting change, change becomes in some sense ‘natural’, 
and therefore to be accepted as a ‘fact-of-life’ (on which point, see van Dijk 1998: 256). 
 
The decision not to question the fundamentals of the existing macroeconomic order - 
indeed, to appeal to ‘globalising imperatives’ to render that order increasingly 
unquestionable - does not reflect a simple situation of neo-liberal hegemony.  Consent 
has been secured for the reproduction of the status quo only through the success of 
disciplining expectations that the economy could be organised in any other way.  The 
changing policy priorities of the Labour Party are crucial in this respect, because the 
strategic reorientation of Labour’s preferred macroeconomic stance has rendered it 
increasingly unable to mobilise popular countermovements to the demands of neo-liberal 
accumulation.  It is not that globalisation has been used to ‘lead’ a coalition of social 
forces to give active support for continued neo-liberal restructuring in a true Gramscian 
sense.  Rather, the general will to conform has been secured in the absence of the 
alternative of being ‘led’ in any other direction.  Indeed, the dominant public discourse of 
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globalisation in Britain has had such significant effects precisely because it displaces both 
the political capacity to lead and the need for consent to be led.  Globalisation’s dominant 
construction as a process without readily identifiable subjects is therefore inherently 
depoliticising. 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The reproduction of the status quo in contemporary Britain appears to depend less on 
consent than on resignation to the structural ‘impossibility’ of successful political dissent 
(see also Miliband 1994: 11).  Gramsci constructed the situation of ‘passive revolution’ to 
describe a tendency towards the normalisation of perceived systemic imperatives amidst 
mobilisation to the idea that there is, in any case, no feasible alternative to the status quo.  
The concept of ‘passive revolution’ suggests the likelihood of a temporary 
depoliticisation of the state’s policy-making agenda.  Of course, depoliticisation does not 
mean ‘apolitical’.  Depoliticisation is itself a deliberate governing strategy (see Burnham 
1999), born of a highly political struggle to establish a dominant ideological 
understanding of the ‘needs’ of the economic system.  Once such an understanding is 
established, it tends to serve as a political blueprint for identifying the common-sense 
solution to any problems of organisation within the social formation. 
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This, I suggest, closely approximates the situation we witness in Britain today.  We have 
seen the production of ideological consent for the continued maintenance of a 
distinctively neo-liberal macroeconomic status quo.  And we have seen that consent 
mediated through the construction of a political logic of no alternative enforced by 
‘globalising imperatives’.  In order that such a logic should resonate, the British economy 
has been increasingly integrated into an international restructuring dynamic which 
facilitates the ‘believability’ of arguments about globalisation. 
 
The increasingly coercive aspects of the reproduction of the macroeconomic status quo in 
Britain can therefore be identified at two quite distinct levels.  At the material level, the 
systematic liberalisation of the structures of the international economy has created a 
context for domestic policy-making which has been strategically selective of neo-liberal 
policies.  Successive British governments have attempted to lock the domestic economy 
into binding multilateral norms which have enforced the sense of strategic selectivity.  
Moreover, in those instances in which policy-making responsibility has remained at the 
national level, most particularly monetary policy, that responsibility has been voluntarily 
passed to committees of technical experts.  At the discursive level, locking-in processes 
are also apparent.  The construction of a depoliticising logic of ‘neo-liberal necessity’ has 
contributed significantly to the image of an increasingly ‘forced’ reproduction of the 
status quo. 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER SIX: 
 
PUBLIC POLICY-MAKING 
IN THE SHADOW OF GLOBALISATION 
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I have used the previous chapters to argue that the link between economic globalisation 
and subsequent political outcomes is much more complex than a simple line of causation 
running from material economic reality to political effect would suggest.  In particular, I 
have emphasised the significance of the dominant discursive construction of ‘globalising 
necessities’ to which society is mobilised politically.  As a consequence, I have suggested 
that there is much at stake in the public construction of ‘knowledge’ about globalisation 
(Watson 1999b; Hay & Watson 2000; Hay, Watson & Wincott 1999; see also Rosamond 
2000).  In this respect, it is perhaps surprising that the literature on the political influence 
of ideas about globalisation is still in its infancy.  Indeed, it is necessary to point to the 
conspicuous absence of literature charting the independent constitutive role of ideas about 
globalisation in the production of political effects which are so often attributed to 
globalisation itself. 
 
At this stage in the analysis, let me recap what I am not arguing, as a means of shedding 
light on what I am arguing.  For a start, in suggesting that the dominant discourse of 
globalisation has become institutionally embedded in Britain to the extent to which it now 
produces substantive effects is not to imply that there is no extra-discursive realm.  I have 
argued against the tendency within the literature to treat economic globalisation as a 
structural given from which political outcomes can simply be read off.  But, I have not 
been at pains to make this argument only to replace it with a counter-argument that ideas 
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about globalisation are a structural given from which political outcomes can equally 
simply be read off.  An extra-discursive realm does indeed exist.  All that I am suggesting 
is that governments will tend to act on perceptions of reality rather than an unmediated 
objective reality per se.  This will be as true in the specific case of globalisation as it is in 
general.  In other words, I have used the previous chapters to argue that the British 
government has tended to act on a particular perception of ‘globalising necessities’ rather 
than an unmediated objective reality of globalisation per se. 
 
From this, it is hopefully clear that my emphasis on the rhetorical production of 
‘globalising outcomes’ should not be mistaken for the view that recent years have seen no 
qualitative transformation in and of the structures of the international economy.  
Significant, and path-shaping, change has most definitely occurred.  Nowhere is this more 
evident than in a series of crucial and on-going interventions designed to impose extreme 
liberal norms on the operation of international financial markets (see, for instance, 
Helleiner 1996; Eichengreen 1998).  In terms of both their form and their functions, 
contemporary financial markets are unrecognisable when compared to those of the 
Bretton Woods era.  That said, to describe such change necessarily as evidence for 
globalisation may well be to jump the gun.  There is surely much to be gained from 
repeating Andreas Busch’s use of the word ‘revolutionary’ in an attempt to capture the 
recent growth of traded volumes on western financial markets (Busch 2000: 48).  
However, the notion that globalisation acts as a suitable label for that ‘revolution’ is to 
conflate arguments about the extent of change on those markets with arguments about 
their nature.  Without doubt, such a conflation exerts a powerful grip on the political 
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imagination of contemporary public policy-makers.  Yet, to run these two arguments 
together is fundamentally to mis-specify the actual dynamics of current processes of 
change.  As The Economist concedes, “despite all the hyperbole, a global capital market 
does not yet exist ...  Capital markets do not fully transcend national boundaries” (The 
Economist 1997a: 139, emphases added). 
 
‘Globalisation’, then, is not necessarily a synonym for ‘change’.  Yet, in terms of both the 
academic literature and public policy debates, there is a tendency for these two words to 
be used as direct substitutes in discussions about international economic processes.  Put 
simply, the fact that financial markets are not what they were is beyond question.  The 
suggestion that they now respond to the rhythm of global supply and demand is another 
matter altogether.  My aim is not to contest the notion of change per se.  It is, however, to 
query that the nature of such change is necessarily in the direction of out-and-out 
globalisation. 
 
There are, then, two distinct arguments about financial market restructuring which tend to 
be taken as one, not only in the existing academic literature, but also in public discourse.  
As the thesis progresses in the chapters which remain, I suggest that such developments 
have resulted in increasingly contradictory macroeconomic policy-making.  This has 
placed important restrictions on perceptions of political possibility which, in turn, have 
served to discipline expectations of new social formations.  Great practical significance 
can therefore be attached to the failure to treat as separate very different claims about, 
firstly, the extent of recent financial market change and, secondly, its nature.  Given that 
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significance, we need to explore the analytical distinction between these two tendencies 
in more detail. 
 
 
 
 
Speculation and Self-Fulfilling Attacks 
 
If we are trying to find the single most important aspect of recent financial market 
restructuring, then our search should surely begin with the sheer quantity of funds with 
which those markets are now awash.  A far higher proportion of GDP in every economy 
in the west is now devoted to non-productive purposes than at any previous time.  As 
Kurt Hübner suggests, “the world money market is [now] not merely a place where 
portfolios are optimised: since the late seventies, the money market itself has become a 
genuine realm for the valorisation of capital” (Hübner 1991: 58-9).  Financial transactions 
are no longer undertaken merely - even primarily - to facilitate productive investments.  
Monetary assets now act as commodities in their own right and, as such, increasingly are 
traded for purely speculative purposes (Watson 1999a). 
 
The fact that speculation has become the major impulse for transacting financial business 
has been both a consequence and a cause of significant developments within the 
international economy.  On the one hand, speculation has been facilitated by prior market 
liberalisation.  In general, speculative price formation reflects increased incentives to hold 
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liquid funds for future portfolio investments (Harvey 1999: 201), and incentives of this 
nature have been provided by the systematic withdrawal of institutional constraints on 
capital flows.  On the other hand, the mere existence of profitable speculative bubbles has 
offered further encouragement for those intent on retaining capital in the most liquid form 
possible.  This self-reinforcing relationship between heightened liquidity preference and 
increased speculative activity has been the trigger for a massive reallocation of funds 
away from productive investments.  Such has been the trend towards non-productive 
investments that it is little exaggeration to talk of a truly ‘exponential’ increase in the 
volume of international financial market trading over the last thirty years. 
 
Nowhere are such developments more obvious than on the world’s currency markets.  
With the extreme liquidity of these markets offering almost instantaneous profits to those 
capable of identifying the prevailing market mood, the volume of currency market 
transactions as a percentage of world trade doubled in only five years between 1987 and 
1992.  Moreover, if current projections turn out to be anywhere near accurate, it will take 
less than a decade for that figure to double again (Strange 1999).  The annual volume of 
world trade is now less than five times the daily volume of currency market transactions 
(Busch 2000: 49).  Every day, turnover on the foreign exchanges is now greater than the 
whole of the central bank currency reserves of all IMF member countries in aggregate 
(Martin 1997: 19).  This must be the most sobering of thoughts for contemporary public 
policy-makers.  For, it suggests that intensive bouts of one-way speculation, designed 
specifically to ‘pick-off’ individual currencies, will always succeed in overwhelming 
domestic governments’ stated policy objectives (Watson 1999a: 64).  Given the sheer 
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weight of capital which can be deployed against a particular currency, no amount of 
concerted central bank resolve would ever appear sufficient to stave off co-ordinated 
market attacks. 
 
Could it be possible to provide a more chilling indictment of the policy travails associated 
with globalisation?  According to the conventional wisdom to which policy-makers 
throughout the west now increasingly subscribe, the answer is a pretty definite ‘no’.  
However, my aim is to caution against such a conclusion.  I argue that the disciplinary 
effects which result from speculative price formation can be explained without reference 
to globalising tendencies.  Indeed, I go further to condemn the indecent haste with which 
‘globalisation’ is introduced as a causal phenomenon capable of capturing all current 
economic trends.  It is precisely this rush to attribute all contemporary economic policy-
making dilemmas to globalising dynamics which prevents a clearer understanding of the 
actual constraints which speculative currency attacks are able to impose on autonomous 
macroeconomic policy. 
 
Speculative activity poses a significant threat to the independence of national policy-
makers, not because it is evidence of globalisation, but because of its capacity to become 
self-fulfilling.  Indeed, there is a very real sense in which financial markets that operated 
in the manner suggested by the conventional wisdom of globalisation could actually 
mitigate against the development of self-fulfilling dynamics.  The conventional wisdom is 
founded on the assumption that individual investors now conduct “a kind of global 
plebiscite on the monetary and fiscal policies of governments issuing currency” (Writson, 
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cited in Wiseman 1996: 95).  The mere existence of access to computer links which relay 
statistical information about the current state of the market is considered sufficient to 
enable a global equilibrium price to emerge.  At no stage is the prevailing market ‘mood’ 
thought to be conditional upon personal contact between those whose investment 
decisions ultimately determine the underlying price level.  Clearly, however, such a 
conclusion requires for faith in ‘invisible hand’ assumptions to be privileged over all 
available evidence.  Self-fulfilling dynamics positively thrive in the intimate environment 
of face-to-face discussions conducted between investment brokers. 
 
Autonomous monetary policy-making does not fall foul of the emergence of global 
equilibrium prices driven solely by underlying market fundamentals.  Global ‘invisible 
hand’ analogies of this nature are wholly inappropriate to explanations of governments’ 
increasing inability to intervene in line with an ‘optimal’ exchange rate policy.  Rather, 
any sense of government helplessness is more accurately linked to the joint initiatives of a 
number of highly-leveraged investors acting in concert with one another.  Such actions 
may be consistent with the state of underlying fundamentals, but that is by no means a 
necessary condition for the success of speculative attacks.  Much more important is the 
ability of investment managers to move available capital assets onto the same side of the 
market at the same time.  Unlike the textbook examples of a model economic market, 
financial assets are not priced in a context in which supply and demand are independently 
given (Soros 1999).  Rather, price formation reflects the general perception of market 
possibilities.  Self-fulfilling dynamics are but one manifestation of a market possibility, 
and are activated when the demand for a particular asset is deliberately structured in line 
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with the desire to force a specific price movement.  It is this pricing structure which 
enables investment managers to suspend the ‘laws’ of the market and exploit concerted 
one-way betting.  The incentive for investing significant quantities of money on one side 
of the market only is clearly increased in circumstances in which the most likely nature of 
the dominant market trend is effectively known in advance (Watson 1999a).  Such 
knowledge derives directly from the development of close personal relationships between 
investment managers operating within the same market environment. 
 
The tendential loss of policy-making autonomy is rightly attributed in public discourse in 
Britain to an increase in the range of market possibilities.  However, that same discourse 
then errs in its suggestion that such an increase is due entirely to the new ‘reality’ of 
global capital flows.  In fact, the heightened range of market possibility currently being 
presented to investment managers results from there being no such thing as an 
independently given market ‘reality’.  Rather, that reality is an active part of their creation 
(Soros 1997).  Market possibilities seem so great in the context of self-fulfilling dynamics 
because market actors are responsible for effecting their own possibilities. 
 
As such, the story of the public policy-making dilemmas associated with the currency 
markets’ ability to overwhelm governments’ stated policy preferences is not merely a 
story of globalisation.  It is not even primarily a story associated with the emergence of a 
global market.  Such outcomes result from the everyday operation of much more 
parochially based markets whose pricing structure is dominated by speculation.  The fact 
that the daily turnover on the world’s currency markets now exceeds the exchange 
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reserves of all IMF member countries put together may well make for headline news.  
Yet, despite much talk of this being symptomatic of the political ‘power’ of economic 
globalisation, it would be a mistake to think that contemporary currency crises represent a 
grand global stand-off between all the advanced industrialised nations acting in tandem 
on one side and all the world’s speculators acting in tandem on the other.  It requires 
much less than that for the markets to get what they want in terms of fundamental 
realignments of international currency prices.  All the available evidence from recent 
episodes of currency crisis suggests that the trigger for the critical juncture is not the 
market moving as a whole, but a limited number of highly-leveraged investment 
managers seeking to reposition themselves in relation to the rest of the market.  Optimal 
exchange rate policies are not blown off-course by the gradual emergence of a new, 
potentially more stable, global equilibrium price.  States seem ever more beleaguered 
because of the increased frequency with which small groups of investors make decisive 
interventions aimed at recasting the prevailing ‘mood’ of the market.  The only hurdle 
which investors have to overcome to enable them to encourage concerted one-way betting 
of this nature is gathering together sufficient funds to kick-start a new market trend.  
Given the underlying context of capital liberalisation, however, individual investors have 
acted on the basis of heightened liquidity preferences to effect a massive reallocation of 
assets towards non-productive investments.  This has ensured a guaranteed flow of funds 
to back whatever short-term position is considered most profitable.  Constrained policy 
options are therefore linked less to capital globalisation than they are to capital 
liberalisation. 
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These two trends are therefore conceptually distinct in a way which the dominant 
discourse overlooks.  This suggests that the analytical foundations on which the 
conventional wisdom is constructed are in urgent need of rethinking.  I turn to this issue 
in the following section. 
 
 
 
 
Capital Mobility: Spatial Versus Functional Interpretations 
 
Insofar as financial markets must continue to figure prominently in descriptions of 
constrained policy autonomy, the above analysis has shown that such constraints relate to 
the sheer volume of contemporary financial transactions.  However, this does not tend to 
be the notion of causality which is highlighted in the conventional wisdom.  The 
dominant public discourse elides the distinction between the extent and the nature of 
recent financial market restructuring so as to treat the precipitous rise in activity on the 
world’s foreign exchanges as unequivocal evidence for globalisation.  As such, the 
significance of restructuring dynamics is typically linked solely to the introduction of a 
truly disembedded space of economic activity.  Technological arguments take 
precendence over those of a more political persuasion (although see Underhill 1997), in 
that it is now thought to require merely the flick of the cursor to transfer any amount of 
money denominated in any national currency to any market in the world (see, for 
instance, Greider 1997).  According to Jan Aart Scholte, for instance, the activity which is 
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processed through the foreign exchanges now takes place on a fundamentally 
‘supraterritorial’ plane.  Written into such an assumption is the assertion that, “Global 
relations are not links at a distance across territory but circumstances without distance 
and relatively disconnected from particular location” (Scholte 1996: 49). 
 
Yet, as the preceding discussion of self-fulfilling dynamics made clear, if global relations 
are to be understood as being ‘without distance’, then the most important fact of our 
historical moment is the extent to which financial market relations resist being 
characterised as ‘global’.  The speculative trading which dominates these markets is 
conditional upon close, and highly personalised, networks of investors forming within 
specific markets situated in specific locations.  Even within financial markets, then, the 
compression of time and space is necessarily limited.  However, such limits do not apply 
in the sense that “capital must eventually touch down in distinct places” (Mittelman 1996: 
229).  For, the increased use of assets purely to fund portfolio investment suggests that a 
greater volume of capital than ever before does not now ‘touch down’ at all, certainly in 
respect of it failing to be made concrete into productive investments (Watson 1999a: 61).  
Rather, the limits of time/space compression should be understood in terms of the face-
to-face contacts that need to develop before perceptions of the most likely future market 
trend are turned into concerted momentum trading. 
 
Contrary to the conventional wisdom, then, the physical barriers which demarcate 
different markets have retained significant economic meaning.  This is because the 
physical environment which distinguishes one market from another also serves to enforce 
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personal ties which those who operate in that environment share and those who operate 
elsewhere do not.  Irrespective of the pervasiveness of assumptions about capital’s 
hypermobility, it is the physical proximity of the context in which investment managers 
work which enables them to exercise an effective veto on governments’ monetary policy 
autonomy, not the assumed spacelessness of that context.  For, it is the intimate nature of 
their work environment which allows investment managers to co-ordinate their activities; 
thus, reducing the risk of being caught on the ‘wrong’ side of the market, and therefore 
increasing the incentive to back the emerging market trend.  Of course, any shift in the 
risk structure of a market which serves to de-sensitise investors to the underlying level of 
risk can only be expected to increase the activity within that market (Watson 2000a). 
 
In this respect, assumptions about capital’s hypermobility must give way to ones about its 
hyperactivity.  The qualitative novelty to be found in the operation of contemporary 
financial markets is not globalisation.  Rather, it is the sheer scale and range of the assets 
which are now traded on them.  Moreover, the ideological structures which have 
sustained the legitimacy of the financial markets in the face of growing public dissent (see 
Gill 1994; Gills 1997) continue to be aimed in the first instance at defending their right to 
be active per se, rather than their right to enjoy a global reach. 
 
However, whilst public debate continues to concentrate on capital’s ever expanding 
spatial horizons, the speculative attacks which emerge from within local markets and 
which subsequently pose such a threat to the autonomy of national policy-makers seem 
destined to remain relatively unexplored.  Certainly, the Blair Government appears to be 
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in no haste to look beyond the perceived reality of globalisation to focus instead on the 
actual reality of self-fulfilling speculation.  As a result, New Labour’s articulation of 
feasible public policy-making continues to highlight the possibility that transaction costs 
have been reduced to such an extent that currency trading now takes place within a totally 
disembedded space of capital flows.  It is this radical spacelessness which is assumed to 
mean that a strategic re-regulation of the foreign exchanges is out of the question.  
Investors are believed to enjoy limitless access onto whichever financial market they care 
to trade from, and this has enabled them to profit from information about fluctuating 
interest and exchange rates, wherever in the world such fluctuations emerge. 
 
However, in recent years, it has become increasingly evident that speculative activities 
are not directed solely at existing differentials between countries in terms of interest and 
exchange rates.  Vast sums of short-term assets are moved in anticipation of emerging 
differentials; indeed, physically to force the market trend into line with the dominant 
anticipation of where the next big profit opportunity is to be found.  The volume of short-
term capital movements associated with contemporary currency crises is out of all 
proportion to the underlying imbalance in macroeconomic fundamentals in existence 
before the onset of speculative activities.  It is speculators themselves who whip up 
monetary storms by triggering capital movements of such magnitude that adjustments in 
both interest and exchange rates must follow.  It is capital’s hyperactivity then - the sheer 
weight of financial transactions now dominating the foreign exchanges - which has set a 
monetary context that acts as an impediment to autonomous policy-making.  Therefore, it 
is fundamentally to misdescribe such constraints to attribute them instead to increased 
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mobility options associated with globalising tendencies.  A high degree of market 
leverage resulting from the concentration of massive amounts of funds and a high degree 
of spatial leverage resulting from the globalisation of economic relations are not one and 
the same thing. 
 
As such, it is necessary to look beyond the conventional wisdom - and in particular its 
focus on capital’s spatial mobility - in order to understand those tendencies that are most 
commonly linked to globalisation.  Indeed, insofar as ‘globalisation’ is assumed to refer 
to a totally disembedded space of capital flows, I suggest that it is almost certainly 
necessary to look beyond such a characterisation altogether to explain the public policy 
dilemmas associated with the recent restructuring of international financial markets.  
Claims for the significance of globalisation are typically grounded in assumptions about 
capital’s increased spatial mobility.  In place of both, however, I seek to develop a rather 
different appreciation of the constrained environment in which public policy-makers 
currently find themselves.  The most important issue here is recent changes in capital’s 
functional mobility.  As is made clear in the palpable disparity which now exists between 
the volume of funds being prepared for productive and non-productive purposes, the 
heightened liquidity preferences of those holding capital assets has fundamentally 
redefined the dominant circuit of capital.  To an ever greater extent, that circuit now both 
begins and ends within the money markets.  The degree to which portfolio investment 
now completely overshadows all other demands for money (see Harvey 1999) provides 
the most telling indication of the functional form in which the vast majority of capital is 
currently maintained. 
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As a consequence of this fetish for liquidity, capital shortfalls have become increasingly 
evident in productive sectors throughout the west.  Yet, as the above analysis has shown, 
it is a mistake to try to attribute productive capital shortage simply through reference to 
some innate ‘logic’ of globalisation.  The appeal, then, should not be to an ‘inevitable’ 
relocation dynamic, whereby capital departs the high-wage, high-cost locations of the 
west in search of lower-cost locations on the newly industrialising periphery (see 
Wieczorek 1995; Thompson 1995).  Yet, of course, it is precisely this sort of appeal 
which makes headline news throughout the western world, and which features so 
prominently in the notion of constrained autonomy currently articulated by most western 
governments.  The assumption that globalisation equates with direct head-to-head 
competition between individual countries for a fixed share of world jobs has led to an 
increase in the use of ‘survival of the fittest’ metaphors in public policy-making discourse 
(see Watson 2000b).  Evidence of productive capital shortage is thus most commonly 
read as evidence of an inability to survive in this new competitive environment.  Here, by 
contrast, I overlook such arguments about capital’s new-found spatial reach and suggest 
that capacity shortfalls are better explained with reference to the functional mobility of 
capital.1  Put simply, productive capital shortage is the result of the current international 
financial regime providing a range of incentives for rationally-acting, profit-seeking 
capital investors to concentrate an ever larger proportion of their investments in financial 
assets.  That regime is neatly captured by the term ‘hyperliberal’.  A whole generation of 
politicians have systematically relaxed the regulation of international financial markets, 
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and this extreme liberalisation has served to exaggerate the possibility of making profits 
out of money.  Set in such a context, it is hardly surprising that capital is now 
overwhelmingly maintained in the functional form of money.  When highly liquid assets 
present the best available returns, it is highly liquid assets which will tend to be traded 
with greatest vigour. 
 
 
 
 
Financial Futures and Further Functional Immobility 
 
Moreover, it is not only through the world’s currency markets that increased liquidity 
preferences have led to capacity shortfalls in productive sectors.  Neither are such markets 
alone in having released self-fulfilling speculative dynamics which have been responsible 
for overriding the policy autonomy of national governments.  Both tendencies can also be 
observed in the operation of derivative markets in financial futures. 
 
The emergence of derivative markets, although a relatively recent phenomenon, has 
occurred at a pace which has made the growth of other financial markets appear sluggish 
in comparison.  For instance, it took fourteen years from 1985 for the traded volume of 
international currency transactions to increase ten-fold.  Yet, a similar increase on the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
1 This is a tendency which is already particularly acute in Anglo-US forms of capital regime (on which 
point, see Driver 1996a, 1996b; Watson & Hay 1998). 
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derivative markets for interest rate futures and options took just six years from 1986 
(Hirst & Thompson 1996: 41). 
 
The allure of derivatives trading comes in the offer of almost perfect liquidity (Carlton 
1984: 254).  The derivative contracts which have succeeded most often in displacing their 
cash market equivalents have tended to be those which are the most liquid in relative 
terms (Fitzgerald 1993: 3).  In these markets, the total open positions for financial futures 
regularly exceed those in the associated securities markets.  As a consequence, prices in 
cash markets now frequently reflect trading in the related derivative market.  This, of 
course, represents a complete reversal of the economic ‘logic’ of futures trading and, 
indeed, the whole raison d’être of such markets.  Futures trading is now instrumental to 
the process through which prices are formed on cash markets (Carroll 1989: 1; 
Houthakker & Williamson 1996: 279; Steil 1994: 2).  The demand for futures contracts is 
therefore much more than the ‘derived’ demand symptomatic of a secondary market.  It 
now forms the basis of the demand in what was once the primary market.  As such, 
futures markets would appear to have the capacity to discipline the very same cash 
markets which themselves have proved to be able to discipline ostensibly autonomous 
domestic economic policy-makers.  An increasing amount of capital is not only being 
spent on monetary rather than productive assets.  It is also being directed in ever larger 
quantities towards the purchase of money substitutes. 
 
These effects are grounded in restructuring which has facilitated the consolidation of 
highly liquid assets as the dominant functional form in which capital is now held.  Once 
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again, there would seem to be no need to appeal to the notion of ‘globalisation’ in order 
to explain such trends.  In the previous section, it was shown that the most important 
causal dynamic in relation to public policy constraints was capital liberalisation rather 
than capital globalisation.  Here, it is equally clear that further limits on governments’ 
room for manoeuvre have been imposed by financial innovation and not financial 
globalisation. 
 
We may well be able to see outcomes which are entirely consistent with those that 
globalisation are assumed to produce.  As such, a story of the long-term effects of 
capital’s spatial mobility can be made to appear highly convincing.  There are numerous 
examples, for instance, of its predictions supposedly coming ‘true’.  There can be little 
doubt that western workers are currently under-utilised amidst a developing tendency 
towards demand deficiency within the labour market.  Both mass unemployment and the 
increasing casualisation of work throughout the advanced industrialised world suggest as 
much.  Similarly, labour is becoming ever more subordinate to capital.  Statutory trade 
union rights are being dismantled in the west at exactly the same time that western multi-
nationals are heightening their exploitation of sweatshop economies in the developing 
world.  However, evidence of effects which are commensurate with those of the 
globalisation hypothesis is not necessarily evidence of globalisation as causal 
phenomenon.  The fact that western labour markets currently fail to clear quite so 
conspicuously is not because of direct wage competition from newly industrialised 
economies with a comparative advantage in labour costs.  Politically resonant talk of 
‘sclerotic’ tendencies may well confirm the stranglehold which liberal ideas currently 
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exert on the public policy-making imagination (on which point, see for instance Pierson 
1992).  Yet, it does little beyond that.  For, such talk remains silent on the real problem of 
systemic capital shortage in productive sectors. 
 
It is this latter tendency which the development of a whole range of derivatives markets 
has done much to promote.  There is a clear link, then, between futures markets which act 
to impede the full circuit of capital and a situation in which labour supply consistently 
exceeds labour demand.  It is the process through which the dominant circuit of capital 
both begins and ends within the financial markets which leads not only to labour being 
underutilised, but also enhances its susceptibilities to the political demands of capitalist 
class actors.  The development of a range of markets in financial futures deepens such a 
process and, as such, enhances the state’s inability to redraw the balance of the capital 
relation in the interests of labour. 
 
Derivatives contracts allow highly-leveraged investment managers to cover the downside 
of their speculative bets.  Trading in futures markets revolves around prices which reflect 
some average of the beliefs of market participants (Carlton 1984: 241); a fact which 
presents traders with a hands-on influence in price formation.  This in itself is sufficient 
to serve as ‘advance warning’ of the direction in which the market is most likely to move.  
In addition, the ease with which investors can now trade simultaneously in related 
primary and secondary markets has increased still further the ability of fund managers to 
lock-in a desired market trend. 
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A single example is perhaps all that is necessary to illustrate such dynamics.  Hedge funds 
used the immense amount of leverage that they can command as soon as their intentions 
become known within the market to try to ride on the back of the Asian financial crisis 
for their own profit making purposes.  In October 1997, with a number of forced 
devaluations already under their belts, the world’s currency markets turned their attention 
to the peg between the US and the Hong Kong dollar.  In an attempt to pressurise that peg 
by forcing up the value of the American dollar, hedge funds stepped up their demand for 
US Treasury bills.  This they did by selling short $30 billion worth of Hong Kong stocks 
on the futures markets (for a more detailed discussion of such dynamics, see Krugman 
1999).  With such a simple move - albeit one available only to the most highly-leveraged 
investment managers - the hedge funds effectively covered all eventualities.  Their 
strategic use of the futures markets was driven by the expectation that the additional 
demand for US dollars would lead to the collapse of existing currency pegs and a 
subsequent devaluation of the Hong Kong dollar.  In such circumstances, the hedge funds 
stood to make enormous gains from being able to buy back ‘cheaper’ Hong Kong dollars 
with the profits from their previous currency tranactions.  Moreover, the situation looked 
no less rosy for them in the event of the Hong Kong monetary authorities resisting the 
devaluation by pushing up interest rates.  In this latter environment, the price of local 
stocks would be bound to fall.  Any loss of value in the stockmarket would subsequently 
reveal the funds’ short position on the associated futures market as highly advantageous.  
Either way, the investment managers stood to make an awful lot of money from their 
trade in derivative contracts.  Equally, however, irrespective of the response of the Hong 
Kong Government, the reconstituted financial environment which emerged in the wake of 
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that response would be detrimental to the smooth flow of new productive investments.  
The gains which the hedge funds stood to make in the futures markets represented 
simultaneous losses in the labour market. 
 
Clearly, then, the onset of self-fulfilling speculative attacks triggered through the futures 
markets has a range of significant knock-on effects.  It is perhaps the supreme irony of 
derivatives trading that the extensive use of such instruments, ostensibly for the purpose 
of risk management, actually increases the underlying level of uncertainty in other areas 
of the socio-economic system.2  Thus, the new world order of financial futures is one 
which injects fundamental disorder elsewhere within society.  Given the observations of 
textbook economic theory, there seem to be few obvious flaws in the assumption that 
futures markets should act to stabilise cash markets (see, for instance, Carroll 1989 :14).  
It appears eminently plausible for the risks associated with unpredictable short-term 
movements in cash prices to be redistributed through passive hedging operations; thus 
allowing for portfolios to be ‘immunised’ through offsetting actions in related markets.  
Viewed through this perspective, futures seem to offer only positive benefits to overall 
economic management. 
 
However, the understanding of general equilibrium to be found in orthodox financial 
theory is limited to that sphere alone.  The world outside the financial markets is deemed 
either not to exist, or not to matter.  In particular, no account is taken of the interaction 
between the financial and the productive sectors of the economy.  Silence prevails where 
                                                          
2 However, there is no guarantee that this is of any concern to those engaged in such transactions. 
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a more rounded theory would have much to say about the way in which futures markets 
have been the progenitor of new systemic risks elsewhere within the international 
economy.  Far from being solely the agent of risk management they appear as in orthodox 
financial theory, derivatives contracts impart new disequilibrating effects onto productive 
sectors.  Perhaps the most important outcome of the ensuing effects of capacity shortfalls 
has been the willingness with which western governments have come to play the inward 
investment game. 
 
 
 
 
‘The Chase Is On’: Footloose Firms and FDI 
 
Quite clearly, New Labour’s concerted efforts to attract inward investors are entirely 
compatible with its insistence on setting the public policy debate within the context of 
assumptions about capital’s hypermobility.3  Indeed, any indication that foreign direct 
investment flows are on the increase enables the Blair government to present ‘evidence’ 
that the world we experience every day is much the same as that predicted by the 
globalisation hypothesis.  Foreign direct investment has been routinely constructed as an 
‘inevitable’ effect of economies becoming ever more interdependent (see Watson 2000b).  
Thus, the increasing penetration of the British economy by inward investors is seen to 
                                                          
3 In this respect, there is little which we could identify as being qualitatively novel about the Blair 
Government when its actions are compared with those of its immediate predecessors. 
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confirm both the reality of ‘globalisation’ and the ‘common-sense’ nature of the 
government’s argument about globalisation’s political logic. 
 
The Blair government’s attempts to rationalise its own acceptance of globalisation’s 
perceived necessities through appeal to the ‘realities’ of inward investment may, 
however, require rather closer scrutiny.  Under the glare of anything other than the most 
casual of empiricism, the connection between inward investment and globalisation is 
more tenuous than that implied by the conventional wisdom.  As John Dunning suggests, 
the main motivation for high-tech multimationals to extend the scope of their production 
activities through foreign direct investment is to establish a presence in each of the three 
major regional trading blocs (Dunning 1996: 12).  Unless it is to be argued that the 
processes of globalisation and regionalisation are conceptually indistinguishable, it is 
almost certainly a mistake to attribute recent inward investment activity purely to 
globalisation.  Indeed, given the actual pattern of observed capital flows, talk of its 
limitless spatial reach is misplaced.  Only one in six of these supposedly ‘global’ 
investments are either sourced or received outside of the core economies of the advanced 
industrialised north (Busch 2000).  The sudden surge in inward investment since the 
1980s (see Bairoch 1996) has not seen capital flow down spatial gradients to the lowest-
cost location.  In fact, and as outlined in Chapter One, the south’s share of foreign direct 
investment is now smaller than it was at the end of the Bretton Woods era (Wade 1996).  
Globalising tendencies are typically assumed to have created a world of unlimited exit 
options for capital.  Yet, presuming that their inward investment strategies are indicative 
of more general trends, the owners of capital would only seem to be interested in taking 
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advantage of such options in order to re-concentrate their activities in the relatively high-
cost production circuits of the north (Krugman 1991; Wieczorek 1995).  In general, then, 
claims for globalisation rest uneasily alongside actual inward investment flows. 
 
More specifically, there is much to doubt in terms of the Blair Government’s 
characterisation of inward investment as a ‘white knight’ sector for the British economy.  
Inward investors have acquired such a status because they are believed to act as a 
stimulus to domestic firms to better their previous productivity performances.  At regular 
intervals throughout the 1980s and 1990s, for example, the concept of ‘Japanisation’ has 
been floated as the means through which the British economy may be able to make good 
its productivity gap with its industrial competitors (see, for example, Oliver & Wilkinson 
1992).  However, the implications of more recent empirical work into Japanese inward 
investors paints a somewhat different picture.  As Karel Williams and colleagues have 
argued, the Japanese transplant sector is “statistically indistinguishable from the rest of 
British manufacturing” in terms of its profitability and productivity rates (Williams et al 
1993: 4). 
 
Moreover, in this respect, there may be nothing particularly unusual about inward 
investment into Britain.  As Michael Porter suggests, many multinationals only make the 
decision to become inward investors because their productivity advantages over domestic 
competitors are insufficient to enable them to supply target markets profitably without 
first establishing a production outlet in those markets (Porter 1990: 7-8).  Dunning agrees 
that inward investors’ success on consumption markets is linked more to their ability to 
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co-ordinate cross-border production than it is to any integral competitive market 
advantage (Dunning 1993: 203).  Indeed, if any evidence of such an advantage is to be 
found, it is almost certainly going to be superficial.  In most cases, it will be almost 
entirely accounted for by the array of state subsidies which are offered as an incentive 
package for securing re-locating firms (Watson 2000b).  If the Blair Government persists 
in linking British ‘success’ in the inward investment game to assumptions about the 
underlying competitiveness of the national economy, then it is appealing to a curious 
notion of competitiveness.  It is clearly not the usual economic definition, couched in 
terms of product innovation and advances in total factor productivity.  Rather, it would 
appear to be defined solely by the size of the ‘sweetener’ that the government is willing to 
offer potential newcomers.  Without such inducements, manufacturing transplants 
operating in Britain have shown that they struggle significantly to out-perform an 
indigenous industrial sector which is consistently maligned for its lack of vitality 
(Williams et al 1993).  As such, it is hardly credible to presume that the inward 
investment sector - a sector which would seem to be displaying traditionally ‘British’ 
characteristics - can act as a spur to increase the trend performance of the whole of the 
domestic economy.  Yet, the Labour Government has proved equally as reticent as its 
Conservative predecessors in treating inward investment as anything other than the 
‘golden goose’ which it dare not shoot.4 
 
                                                          
4 Interestingly, the Conservative Governments felt no need to invoke globalisation arguments in order to 
rationalise their stance on inward investment.  In their place, their concentrated only on competitiveness 
concerns. 
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It is frequently claimed, not least in official government circles, that the British economy 
provides something of a ‘stand alone’ case in relation to the debate about globalisation.  
Its liberal market tradition, which has created an unusual degree of exposure both to the 
international market in general and to the international financial markets in particular, is 
argued to have made the British economy more structurally compatible with globalising 
dynamics than almost all others.  In this respect, statistics which show Britain to be the 
world leader in terms of the per capita attraction of inward investment flows are assumed 
to be merely symptomatic of wider tendencies. 
 
World leader or not, however, such figures cannot disguise the fact of just how marginal 
are foreign direct investment flows for the present health of the British economy.  A 
single illustration should suffice to dispel the ‘golden goose’ notion.  Wales is an 
important case in relation to inward investment into Britain, because it has been more 
successful than any other part of the British economy in attracting footloose foreign firms.  
No visitor to any British airport or mailine railway station with connections to South 
Wales can fail to notice the way in which the Welsh Development Agency markets the 
‘vibrancy’ of the Welsh economy specifically through its successful pursuit of inward 
investors.  Nonetheless, the actual figures suggest a less than perfect correlation between 
rhetoric and reality.  The following statistics relate to 1991: a time at which the prevailing 
economic environment should, if anything, have overstated the significance of FDI.  
Cyclical fluctuations had pushed the Welsh economy to the bottom of a recession, with 
employment levels in domestic sectors consequently well below their trend rate in 
relation to those in transplant sectors.  At the same time, as the date for the completion of 
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the European Single Market neared, firms from outside the EU were attempting to 
establish a production foothold in Europe to take advantage of the imminent expansion of 
the European consumption market.  At this time, then, the sudden acceleration in the 
dynamics of European integration would surely have raised employment levels in 
transplant sectors well above their trend rate in relation to those in domestic sectors.  Yet, 
such tendencies notwithstanding, the whole of the Asian-sourced manufacturing sector 
operating in Wales in 1991 employed just 12,000 people (Morris 1995: 60).  Despite the 
fact that investments sourced from this region continue to be those which are promoted 
most vigorously as newsworthy events by the Welsh Development Agency, this amounted 
to less than 1% of the Welsh workforce.  Moreover, given that the average pay levels in 
these companies was below the Welsh average (Simpson and McNabb 1994), this 
translated into only 0.7% of Welsh consumption potential (Watson 1997). 
 
This is hardly unambiguous evidence that the reality of globalisation has made the chase 
for inward investment an increasingly crucial element of running a successful economy.  
Nor, for that matter, is it indicative of the ‘reality’ of globalisation itself.  However, the 
major theme running through this thesis is that the uses to which the idea of globalisation 
can be put need bear little, if any, relation to its basis in fact.  As Nikolas Rose puts it, 
“The truth effects of discourses of economic globalisation [tend to be] somewhat 
independent of the veracity of the analysis” (Rose 1996: 354).  As such, it is entirely 
possible that we will continue to see actual public policy dilemmas go unresolved, 
primarily because the gaze of the policy-making community remains fixed elsewhere.  
The Blair Government, for example, shows no inclination to resist playing the inward 
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investment game to the full, despite there being scant evidence that the gains from such a 
game are anything other than marginal. 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Perhaps the single biggest impediment preventing the Blair Government from 
fundamentally redefining its stance on inward investment is the extent to which it has 
presented its current thinking on such matters through the language of ‘compulsion’.  
Assertions about capital’s new-found spatial reach have provided a context for arguing 
that no government can now afford the luxury of opting out from chasing footloose firms. 
 
As Gordon Brown’s first three budget speeches have all made clear, there is a growing 
sense of unease within the Treasury that the British economy is now suffering from 
systemic capacity shortfalls (Brown 1997; 1998a; 1999).  As a statement of fact, there is 
little here to contest.  What is much more dubious, however, is the government’s 
attribution of productive capital shortage to the enhanced exit options afforded by 
globalisation.  Moreover, its attempts to make good the capacity gap by persuading others 
to take advantage of their exit options through a strategy of competitive subsidisation are 
equally dubious. 
 
  234 
The Blair Government appears to be locked-in to an understanding of capital mobility 
which emphasises heightened spatial reach.  An altogether different conception of policy-
making constraints emerges from re-thinking capital mobility in functional terms.  My 
aim in the preceding pages has been to briefly formulate such an approach.  This chapter 
has highlighted the problems which policy-makers face when their decisions are 
subjected to the effective veto of self-fulfilling speculative dynamics within international 
financial markets.  Such problems are rooted in the way in which the dual processes of 
market liberalisation and financial innovation have provided additional incentives for 
maintaining capital in the functional form of money.  Yet, these processes are generally 
disregarded as possible causes of capacity shortfalls and, therefore, of the constraints 
within which policy-makers are forced to work.  Instead, all eyes tend to be focused on a 
third process, that of capital globalisation, which unlike the other two is grounded in 
spatial mobility assumptions. 
 
In the following chapter, I explore in more detail the mis-specification of the policy 
environment which arises as a result of the conflation of the three distinct processes of 
market liberalisation, financial innovation and capital globalisation.  In particular, I seek 
to chart both the economic and the political consequences of that mis-specification. 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN: 
 
HYPERMOBILITY ASSUMPTIONS 
AND THE POLICY LOGIC OF SELF-PERPETUATING 
STRUCTURAL CONSTRAINTS 
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The dominant discourse of national competitiveness to which the Blair Government’s 
macroeconomic policy is oriented would appear to be founded on empirically suspect 
assumptions about capital’s hypermobility.  Globalisation is presented by New Labour as 
offering such limitless exit options that individual nations are now engaged in direct 
competition for a fixed share of footloose funds.1  In one sense, it perhaps matters little 
whether it is the realities of globalisation or merely perceptions of such ‘realities’ which 
are driving the government to act in the way it does.  Either way, policy outcomes are 
likely to be the same.  However, in another sense, it matters a great deal whether the 
actual constraints which are so often attributed to globalisation are to be found in capital’s 
new-found hypermobility as the globalisation hypothesis contends, or whether they have 
their roots elsewhere.  In the previous chapter, I argued that New Labour routinely 
appeals to a notion of capital’s hypermobility in order to explain those effects that are in 
fact more plausibly related to the sheer volume of capital which is now traded as financial 
assets.  In this chapter, I go further to suggest that the way in which the government has 
responded to assumptions of capital’s hypermobility has actually deepened the dynamics 
which have resulted in its hyperactivity.  Thus, by appealing to the ‘necessity’ of 
attenuating the constrained autonomy it associates with globalisation, it has been 
responsible for reinforcing the actual constraints which emerge from the sheer weight of 
funds which flow around the international financial markets. 
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‘Exit’ as Enhanced Liquidity Preference 
 
At the heart of contemporary public policy dilemmas lies the highly liberalised 
environment in which financial business is now conducted.  In particular, the deregulatory 
blitz of recent times has eliminated those transaction costs that are symptomatic of more 
restrictive controls on capital flows.  As a consequence, investment managers have 
experienced few difficulties in being able to satisfy heightened liquidity preferences by 
maintaining profitable assets in the functional form of money. 
 
The most important issue, then, is that of liquidity.  However, in order to focus on the 
highly liquid nature of most contemporary investment portfolios, a very different notion 
of ‘exit’ has to be introduced to that which appears in the dominant discourse of 
globalisation (on the theorisation of ‘exit’, see Hirshman 1970, 1986).  Set in the context 
of hypermobility assumptions, increased exit options correspond simply to the enhanced 
spatial reach of globally mobile funds (see, for instance, Ohmae 1995; Reich 1992; Levitt 
1983; Sachs & Warner 1995; Greider 1997).  Yet, such a characterisation allows us to say 
nothing about the actual policy-making dilemma posed by heightened liquidity 
preferences.  Globetrotting funds are not necessarily liquid funds; decommodified 
                                                                                                                                                                             
1 Perhaps more precisely, such options are assumed to be presented by states pursuing the most orthodox 
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productive assets which have been converted back into money are.  Capacity shortfalls 
are therefore linked less to a lack of spatial constraints on productive mobility in an era of 
globalisation, and more to the decisions taken by investment managers to overlook 
productive circuits of capital altogether (Watson 1999b).  When we talk of increased 
‘exit’ options, then, we need to resist the image of productive capitals forever relocating 
in search of a more profitable home (see Wieczorek 1995).  Rather, ‘exit’ impacts most 
significantly as a public policy constraint through the way in which the money markets 
now allow investment managers to maintain profits whilst opting-out entirely from the 
preparation of ‘dedicated’ long-term productive capital.  The moment that financial assets 
are made concrete through the acquisition of corporate equity or debt, those assets 
become tied into a binding relationship with that company.  A ‘dedicated’ supply of 
productive capital thus compromises the future options of investment managers by 
locking-in otherwise fluid assets (Watson & Hay 1998).  It is this process of ‘dedication’ 
and ‘locking in’ which financial liberalisation has made it possible to bypass. 
 
Of course, much has already been written about the perennial shortfall of ‘dedicated’ 
capital within the British economy.  Such a condition features prominently in an 
extensive literature on British decline; a significant element of which emerged long 
before the trend towards financial liberalisation.  This literature is founded on the 
assertion that the distinctive trajectory of decline experienced by the British economy in 
the post-war period can be traced to the peculiar dislocation of financial and industrial 
                                                                                                                                                                             
neo-liberal economic policies within the context of globalisation. 
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capital and, in particular, the persistent ascendancy of the former within the policy-
making environment (Nairn 1976, 1993; Anderson 1992). 
 
The institutional structure of Britain’s financial system has been progressively embedded 
over the last century and more through the resolution of a series of political struggles.  
What has emerged is a structure which, throughout the post-war period, has been seen to 
impede the supply of ‘dedicated’ capitals for British production markets (Pollin 1995).  
The high liquidity demands of London’s money markets has ensured a general reluctance 
to free up capital to fund long-term projects.  The City has consequently been held to 
account as a structural constraint which has consistently stood in the way of industrial 
modernisation (Ingham 1984; Leys 1986; Hirst 1989; Cowling & Sugden 1990; Hutton 
1996; Woolcock 1996).  Britain’s highly developed and increasingly liberalised capital 
markets have encouraged portfolio investments which bypass the concentrated purchase 
of corporate equity so typical of other national capitalisms (Zysman 1983).  Assumptions 
of ‘British exceptionalism’ thus emerge in the contrast between capital-market based and 
bank-based financial structures.  British capitalism appears particularly distinctive in its 
lack of a commercial banking sector explicitly committed to consolidating large amounts 
of domestic firms’ debts into single portfolios.  Such strategies have enabled banks in 
other countries to reduce the risk associated with making funds available to any one firm.  
As a result, these banks have shown themselves willing to engage actively with the 
capitalisation of new productive investments, and certainly much more actively than 
comparable institutional investors in Britain.  In addition, they have also teamed up with 
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national governments to provide exactly the sort of low-cost credit that has tended to 
prove elusive for British firms. 
 
Under the watchful eyes of state supervision, bank/industry partnerships have flourished 
in a number of national economies (see Zysman & Tyson 1983; Albert 1993; Orrù 1993; 
Gourevitch 1996; Porter 1996).  By comparison, the British economy has historically 
displayed a distinctive lack of integration between its financial, productive and state 
spheres.  British producers have consequently had to approach London’s capital markets 
in search of investment funds (see Lonsdale 1997) knowing that there are no state-
sponsored compromises to shelter them from the markets’ competitive instincts.  Thus, 
the assets which they hope to turn into new productive capacity tend to be priced in line 
with the interests of the financial sectors rather than their own (Watson 1999b: 138).  
This has ensured that loan repayment terms have typically been very different for British 
firms operating on London’s capital markets than they have been for overseas firms 
operating in bank-based financial systems (Lee 1996).  The markets’ overriding desire for 
liquidity has guaranteed that the average British firm has faced higher capital costs than 
those of almost all its industrial competitors.  It has been the exceptionally short time 
periods over which British firms have been expected to repay capital loans sourced on 
London’s money markets which has done most to undermine successful industrial 
regeneration strategies. 
 
Of course, such a conclusion refocuses the analysis on the importance of increased 
liquidity preferences.  This is because the shorter the time horizon over which loan 
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repayment terms are set, the more liquid is the form in which the original capital asset 
was held.  By the same token, the shorter the time horizon over which loan repayment 
terms are set, the easier it is for asset holders to terminate existing economic 
relationships.  As such, it is clear that increased liquidity preferences and increased ‘exit’ 
options are two sides of the same coin. 
 
In general, economic relationships in which one party has a well-defined ‘exit’ option, 
while the other does not, are unequal relationships.  The owners of highly liquid financial 
assets possess a range of opportunities to ‘exit’ the production circuit in which they 
currently operate.  In such circumstances, industrial interests are effectively powerless to 
prevent financial interests unilaterally setting the nature of their relationship.  The ability 
of financiers to ‘exit’ into a dominant circuit of capital which both begins and ends in the 
money markets thus substitutes for a politically mediated resolution of the competing 
interests of finance and industry (Watson 1999a).  Indeed, investment managers’ ability to 
destabilise production merely by threatening to play the ‘exit’ card in this way is 
sufficient to grant them an effective veto over states’ industrial strategies.  The capacity 
of international financial markets to satisfy all but the most extreme liquidity demands 
has ensured that the newly liberalised financial environment is one which is dominated by 
‘exit’ as a means of exercising influence. 
 
As ‘exit’ from the production circuit has become ever more established as a manifestation 
of economic power, former industrial heartlands have been increasingly ‘hollowed out’ 
(see Lash & Urry 1987; Gottdiener & Pickvance 1991; Cooke 1995).  In the context of 
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post-war British politics, the prolonged recession of 1980-1982 offers the most vivid 
example of accelerated deindustrialisation.  One-third of the total manufacturing capacity 
of the British economy was wiped out in a single three-year period (Martin 1986; Pollard 
1992: 394-5).  Note, however, the timing of that recession.  The effects of financial 
liberalisation were being felt in a period which clearly pre-dated any public 
acknowledgement that the British economy was being subjected to globalising 
tendencies.  This provides further evidence that the two are by no means synonymous.  It 
is financial liberalisation, and not globalisation, which has increased the rate at which 
productive capital has been decommodified and converted back into the functional form 
of money.  As such, assumptions of state crisis which focus on the geographical 
mismatch between the dominant circuit of production and the nation state are misplaced.  
As I argued in the previous chapter, those effects that are so often associated with a newly 
dominant global circuit of production are actually the result of the fact that production no 
longer dominates the circuit of capital at all. 
 
The above sketch of the decline literature suggests that, in relation to Britain at least, such 
a situation is by no means unusual.  British capitalism has long been argued to display a 
series of generic tendencies which the processes of international financial liberalisation 
serve merely to exacerbate (Watson 1999b: 125).  Such tendencies are reflected in: a 
macroeconomic policy-making process which institutionalises the interests of financial 
over productive capital; a banking system which rarely makes capital available to industry 
on a competitive basis; and a body of company law which militates against long-term 
productive investments (Watson & Hay 1998: 409).  The institutional legacies of British 
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capitalism thus provide a ‘good fit’ with subsequent liberalising dynamics.  Essential 
elements of continuity can therefore be identified in the way in which international 
financial deregulation has impacted upon the British economy. 
 
To identify continuity within restructuring dynamics is not, however, to deny the 
simultaneous existence of change.  A significant degree of change is visible, for instance, 
in the Labour Party’s chosen narration of the ‘imperatives’ of the new economic 
environment.  It is to such a narration that I turn in the remainder of this chapter.  Firstly, 
I chart those developments in Labour’s macroeconomic thinking which the party 
attributes directly to the imposition of global financial relations.  Secondly, I argue that its 
policy response to perceptions of new systemic ‘necessities’ has been fundamental to a 
process through which the scope of its future actions has been further compromised.  
Through acting on assumptions of globalising ‘imperatives’, New Labour has intensified 
the actual structural constraints of financial liberalisation.  Such constraints must 
therefore be seen not only as self-perpetuating, but also, to a large extent, self-inflicted. 
 
 
 
 
Credibility as ‘Exit’-Enhancing 
 
The mismatch between the perceived constraints to which the government is ‘responding’ 
and the actual constraints with which it is faced emerges from its articulation of increased 
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exit options as an effect of capital’s heightened spatial mobility.  Set in such a context, 
New Labour’s desire to establish ‘credible’ policy-making structures must be seen as an 
attempt to persuade capital to forgo any potential relocation plans.  Put crudely, 
‘credibility’ thus reduces to buying loyalty; putting in place a range of incentives which 
make it entirely ‘rational’ for capital to seal off its own future mobility.2 
 
This the government has set out to do by purposefully re-designing the institutional 
context in which macroeconomic policy decisions are taken.  Whilst undoubtedly 
important in their own right, changes in the institutional arrangements for economic 
policy reflect wider changes in the dominant political construction of the economy’s 
systemic ‘needs’.  New Labour has moved beyond merely affirming Treasury orthodoxy, 
to the point at which it increasingly abstracts the Treasury from monetary policy 
altogether, because of concerns that it now has to compete with other governments on the 
basis of the relative macroeconomic stability it can offer footloose firms. 
 
Of course, New Labour has placed itself in a position from which macroeconomic policy 
can be seen as a source of comparative advantage only because of a prior decision to 
understand ‘exit’ in fundamentally spatial terms.  It is assumptions of capital’s relentless 
pursuit of new profit opportunities which have fed the view that the state is no longer 
capable of delivering directly long-run competitiveness.  Insofar as state-sponsored 
efficiency gains result from the forced restructuring of the private sector, newly footloose 
firms are considered certain to ‘outrun’ any state which takes such a proactive interest in 
                                                          
2 For a discussion of the academic credentials of New Labour’s use of the notion of ‘credibility’, see Balls 
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the accumulation process.  As a consequence, the government now tends to act on the 
assumption that competitiveness concerns are to be met through private sector innovation 
alone.  Such is the reasoning which leads the role of the state to be understood merely in 
terms of setting a stable macroeconomic framework for companies to operate within. 
 
New Labour has engaged actively with the externalisation of policy responsibility, in 
order that it should be seen to have heightened investors’ perceptions of ‘stability’.  The 
state has been used increasingly to lock the management of the economy into external 
enforcement mechanisms.  Thus, the conventional wisdom of globalisation is found 
wanting once again.  It is not that the capital relation bypasses the state per se.  Rather, 
the state has been used to reorganise the way in which the capital relation is experienced 
through reprojecting the policy-making process beyond the jurisdictional space which the 
government is able to police.  This has been most conspicuously demonstrated in the 
decision to cede operational control of interest rates to the Bank of England.  The 
government’s justification for depoliticising monetary policy was based on assumptions 
of the adverse effects that the institutional status quo was likely to have had on future 
flows of capital.  Explicit political input into interest rate decisions was linked to exactly 
the sort of inflationary bias at which the financial markets could be expected to take 
fright.  Exaggerated prudence has consequently been constructed as a ‘necessary’ 
government response to potentially punishing capital outflows.  Hence, we witnessed the 
transfer of responsibility for the conduct of monetary policy.  Physically, that 
responsibility passed “from Great George Street to Threadneedle Street” (Hennessy 1998: 
                                                                                                                                                                             
1998. 
  247 
7).  Much more importantly, politically, it was abstracted from wider democratic 
structures to be placed in a merely technocratic realm. 
 
The Bank of England may well be seen primarily as a “spokesman [sic] for the City” 
(Financial Times, 07.05.97: 21).  However, in terms of the likely ‘success’ of the stated 
aims of the government’s depoliticisation strategy, that may have been all to the good.  
Such a reputation could be sufficient in itself to realign private sector expectations 
towards lower trend inflation rates; thus, providing less reason to move capital assets out 
of Britain.  Certainly, it was with appeal to spatial mobility assumptions that investors 
welcomed the government’s decision to redefine the institutional context for the conduct 
of monetary policy.3  The immediate reaction of John Sheppard, then chief economist at 
the Japanese securities house, Yamaichi International, was that “the government’s 
credibility has been vastly improved by [such a] bold step”; that from Andrew Roberts, 
bond analyst at the Swiss Bank, UBS, was to remark that “it is unbelievable to gain so 
much credibility with such a simple move” (cited in the Financial Times, 07.05.97: 1).  In 
both instances, the concept of ‘credibility’ serves as a synonym for a general acceptance 
that future policies are likely to be ‘market-friendly’, and therefore are less likely to 
promote concerted disinvestment.  The task of retaining financial activity onshore has 
been Gordon Brown’s main motivation for providing institutional arrangements which 
could go some way towards persuading the financial markets that the government is as 
sensitive about inflation as they are.  Set within a context in which investment managers 
are assumed to have “more choice and freedom than ever before” in terms of market 
  248 
location (Brown, cited in Shaw 1997), inflationary expectations are believed to act in 
much the same manner as a one-way ticket.  The judgement of the markets is thought to 
bring swift and powerful retribution (see Blair 1996b).  As a consequence, capital which 
takes advantage of an ‘exit’ option to relocate into an environment in which inflationary 
expectations are lower is assumed to be capital which is lost forever.  Thus, it is easy to 
see the significance which was attached to City perceptions that “the Bank will be a lot 
less tolerant about inflation than any government could be” (Daily Telegraph, 07.05.97). 
 
However, much has been made in the last two chapters of the need to rethink the concept 
of ‘market-friendly’ in terms of ‘liquidity-enhancing’.  Inflationary tendencies are looked 
on unfavourably by financial markets to the extent that they reduce the liquidity of assets 
with anything other than the shortest of maturity times.  If two assets with identical 
characteristics exist in different inflation contexts, the one held amidst lower inflationary 
expectations offers its owner the greater future liquidity options.  Financial markets do 
not ‘welcome’ counter-inflationary policies because they seal off the need to exercise 
exit.  Rather, they react so positively because the additional liquidity which comes with 
price stability increases the potential profitability of capital investments.  As such, any 
outward display of diffidence towards concerns for price stability should not be viewed 
simply as a signal for financial activity to be forced offshore.  The notion of ‘exit’ which 
is important here is that which relates to the search for short-term maturity amidst 
heightened inflationary expectations. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
3 In order to capture the sense of urgency which the Blair Government placed on increasing central bank 
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By eradicating the party’s former antagonism to demands for price stability, New Labour 
has reconstituted the risk structure which investors have traditionally associated with 
Labour governments.  The decision to cede operational responsibility for interest rates to 
the Bank of England represents the Blair Government’s most visible attempt to be seen 
reducing the exposure of investment managers to potentially disruptive macroeconomic 
trends.  Yet, it is by no means the only one.  Indeed, the decision to grant increased 
central bank independence is less important than the previous shift in the party’s political 
priorities which served to render central bank independence such a significant aspect of 
its governance strategies. 
 
The new institutional arrangements for the conduct of monetary policy explicitly endorses 
the move away from discretionary macroeconomic policy-making (see, for instance, 
Kydland & Prescott 1977; Calvo 1978; Barro & Gordon 1983; Persson, Persson & 
Svensson 1988; Persson & Tabellini 1990, 1995).  The limits of acceptable government 
intervention into the economy are now assumed to be the implementation of a strictly 
rules-based policy.  The government has fed the market with information about its 
intentions, publishing a series of medium-term performance indicators.  The Chancellor 
may well have commanded most headlines for his policy of setting “an explicit target for 
low inflation” (Brown 1996, emphases added; see also Blair 1996c).  However, in its 
desire to foster market expectations that it has established “a credible framework for 
monetary discipline” (Brown 1995), New Labour’s inflation target is only one of many 
‘automatic pilots’ it has adopted.  Amidst much talk of ‘golden rules’ and ‘fiscal 
                                                                                                                                                                             
independence, it is important to remember that this decision was taken within a week of entering office. 
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prudence’, the Chancellor has set standards for government expenditure and social 
transfers, the public sector borrowing requirement, the budget deficit and the accumulated 
national debt.  New Labour has revived the Medium-Term Financial Strategy in all but 
the Thatcher Government’s crudest attempts to target narrow definitions of the money 
supply. 
 
Such standards tend to be rationalised in official discourse through using the language of 
‘locking-in’ future government policy.  More importantly, however, they also serve to 
lock-in investors’ expectations of the likely liquidity ratios which future government 
policy will offer.  In the following section, I move on to analyse the implications of the 
Blair Government acting as guarantor of financial market liquidity.  I suggest that those 
implications are very different from the way in which they are presented by New Labour.  
Far from dampening down the disruptive nature of financial market restructuring by 
allowing investment managers to satisfy heightened liquidity preferences, New Labour’s 
actions have merely accentuated such constraints. 
 
 
 
 
Hysterisis Effects and Demand-Induced Inflation 
 
As a rule, decisions taken in the present help to shape the context within which the future 
is experienced.  In short, ‘history matters’.  This is as true for tomorrow’s history (which 
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was created today) as it is for today’s history (which was created yesterday).  
Contemporary macroeconomic policy is conditioned by the contingently unfolding 
histories of previous macroeconomic policies.  Each iteration of the historical process 
imposes parameters on what will be possible in the future.  Thus, there is no reason to 
doubt that the Blair Government is constrained by the policies its Thatcherite 
predecessors enacted.  By the same token, there is every reason to believe that the policy 
decisions which New Labour has already taken will re-emerge as structural constraints on 
its own intentions before its time in government is up.  As such, history must be seen as 
process. 
 
However, the notion of history to which the Blair Government appeals rests uneasily 
alongside such a claim.  For one thing, history tends to matter to New Labour only to the 
extent that a particular reading of it can be called upon to force a binary opposition 
between itself and Old Labour.  For another, the conventional wisdom of globalisation 
which New Labour uses to sustain such an image of qualitative novelty invokes a 
Fukuyamian sense of history’s ‘end’.  Domestic political and international economic 
concerns thus combine to announce a decisive break with the structures of the past.  The 
notion of history as process is consequently sacrificed amidst assumptions of paradigm 
shift. 
 
Perhaps most significantly in this respect is New Labour’s use of the idea of globalisation 
in an attempt to make such assumptions resonate in public discourse.  For, the 
conventional wisdom is constructed on a specific understanding of the market from which 
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the very possibility of path-shaping histories has been abstracted altogether.  Globalising 
tendencies are assumed to have produced a single, world, economic system.  That system 
can always be expected to return naturally to positions of ex-ante equilibrium following 
the emergence of temporary disturbances to its constituent parts (see, for instance, The 
Economist leader, 21.08.99).  As a consequence, the system is assumed to be able to 
determine that changes forward or backwards in time will be perfectly symmetrical, in 
line with natural rates of both output and employment.  As Rod Cross suggests, “History, 
according to the natural rate hypothesis, is bunk” (Cross 1996: 54). 
 
At the very least, the assumption of contingent path-dependent histories is ruled out.  Set 
in such a context, no conceptual space exists to theorise systemic contradictions in the 
governance of the global economy.  Hence, distinct limits are placed on the use of the 
concept of ‘crisis’.  Certain elements of the system - that is, certain economies - may 
experience downturns which last into the medium-term.  The former ‘tigers’ of East Asia 
are currently classic examples of such cases.  Yet, the system as a whole is assumed to 
contain self-correcting mechanisms, whereby one part is able to compensate for an 
adverse disturbance in another.  For instance, a global recession has been averted despite 
the turmoil in East Asia mainly because the strength of the US economy has acted as a 
counterweight to slack in other markets. 
 
New Labour’s current macroeconomic stance certainly hints at an understanding of a self-
equilibrating global system.  Its insistence on ‘fiscal prudence’ as the priority of policy 
signals not only a desire that the British economy should avoid being the location of a 
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future adverse disturbance within the global system.  It also announces Britain as a 
suitable flag of convenience for whatever ‘hot money’ flees other trouble-spots.  New 
Labour has thus sought financial market credibility through its attempts to re-position 
Britain as a likely benefactor of the global economy’s self-correcting mechanisms. 
 
However, it is precisely such assumptions of a natural global equilibrium that I have 
challenged throughout this thesis.  Any evidence for the existence of a truly global 
system, let alone for its self-equilibrating properties, is highly suspect.  As such, it is 
necessary to look beyond the government’s own interpretation of the ‘wisdom’ of its 
prudence. 
 
In order to re-assert the relevance of history to the current state of the economy, I dispense 
with the notion of natural self-correcting equilbria, preferring instead that of hysterisis.  
Under the influence of hysterisis effects, path-dependent outcomes remain even after the 
initial causes giving rise to those effects have been removed.  Quite clearly, we are still 
party to the effects of the financial liberalisation of the 1980s, even though decisions 
taken to withdraw regulatory restrictions within the capital markets were taken a 
generation ago.  Such effects are perhaps most visible today as constraints which prevent 
national governments from unilaterally setting their own interest and exchange rates.  
Equally, I suggest that the Labour Government’s active attempts to satisfy additional 
liquidity demands within the financial sphere will add further elements to such constraints 
in the future.  In place of the conventional wisdom’s assumptions of a self-adjusting 
equilibrium, I seek to substitute those of self-perpetuating structural constraints. 
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The Blair Government has attempted to find shelter from the storms of globalisation by 
feeding the markets with advance knowledge of its future actions.  However, that 
knowledge has been used to transpose the perceived storms of globalisation into a real 
flood of additional money towards capital markets.  What is more, given the impact of 
liberalisation, these are markets over which the government has no control.  As such, it 
has derived little benefit from giving the markets prior warnings of its intentions.  Indeed, 
all the benefits would seem to have flowed in the opposite direction.  Investment 
managers have learned successfully to reconstitute their strategies as they have come to 
know more about the structured context within which they operate.  Moreover, with the 
government having created an institutional environment for locking-in ‘sound money’ 
policies, investment managers have been able to approach their decisions with an 
enhanced degree of certainty. 
 
This has had a somewhat paradoxical effect.  The adoption of a strictly rules-based policy 
is ‘prudence’ personified for the government, mainly because it is thought to avert the 
headlong rush of investors towards low-risk, high-liquidity markets.  However, New 
Labour’s success in convincing the markets of its competence to run a counter-
inflationary policy has effectively reduced the risk of operating in marginally less liquid 
investment markets.  As a consequence, it has become increasingly possible for liquidity-
to-risk ratios to be satisfied without it being necessary to enter the most liquid markets.  
In attempting to close down ‘exit’ from Britain in favour of other production circuits, the 
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government has merely succeeded in opening up new sources of ‘exit’ from the 
production circuit altogether. 
 
It is difficult to believe that this corresponds to the initial intention.  For a start, the 
liquidation of productive assets has been responsible for new capacity constraints 
emerging within the British economy.  In addition, the conversion of capital into ‘hot 
money’ has pushed the value of the pound to such a height that the incentives for 
investing in new productive technologies has been systematically undermined (The 
Guardian 07.05.97: 16).  It is relatively straightforward to find statistics to illustrate such 
a trend.  Recent Treasury data indicate that Britain’s net productive capital stock shrunk 
by 7% in the fiscal year 1995-1996 (The Guardian, 26.09.96).  That is, New Labour’s 
policy of ‘sound money’ threatens further to destabilise a capital formation process which 
was already displaying significant deficits at a point in the business cycle traditionally 
associated with surpluses. 
 
Moreover, this is far from the end of the story.  The Blair Government has done more 
than merely compound the original problem of capacity shortfalls.  It has set in motion a 
chain of events which threaten to make matters progressively worse until such time that a 
new macroeconomic stance is adopted.4  Every time the government announces that it has 
successfully achieved one of its fiscal targets, it reduces the risk associated with holding 
capital in the functional form of money.  Equally, however, so long as incentives for 
investing in monetary assets are increased by supposedly ‘prudent’ economic 
                                                          
4 By which time, it could well be too late due to path-dependent effects. 
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management, an increase in perceptions of relative risk will also be attached to 
investments in the real economy.  Such perceptions combine with a cultural commitment 
to profit-maximisation to ensure a general reluctance to engage in productive 
investments.  Set in such a context, new constraints on output are ever more likely to be 
capital constraints, representing a permanent loss to the economy (Driver 1996b: 122).  
Moreover, insofar as such constraints feed through into a subsequent inability to meet 
demand in all but the most deflated of domestic economies, this is also likely to represent 
an accelerating loss to the economy. 
 
The defensive attitude with which asset holders treat potential investments in new 
productive capacity in contemporary Britain (see, for instance, Grieve Smith 1996) can, in 
large part, be attributed to the prevailing macroeconomic orthodoxy which New Labour 
has chosen to inherit from its Conservative predecessors.  In effect, Labour’s fiscal 
prudence equates to a ‘reverse Keynesianism’; a ‘new’ demand management which 
entails the deliberate suppression of demand in an effort to keep price increases in check.  
Given the British economy’s relative shortfall of productive investments, increasing 
domestic demand cannot be met by a parallel increase in domestic supply (see Watson 
1999b: 136).  This is amply demonstrated by Britain’s burgeoning deficit on the balance 
of trade (Financial Times, 10.03.99), which recorded increases at every stage of the most 
recent economic cycle.  In the presence of capacity shortfalls which are not masked by 
additional import penetration, any element of excess demand which cannot be satisfied at 
prevailing market prices is likely to lead to inflationary price rises as product markets 
adjust to new demand conditions. 
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The irony of such a situation is clear.  The Blair Government has staked its entire 
reputation on being able to deliver a successful counter-inflationary policy.  Yet, it is 
precisely the raft of counter-inflationary legislation it has introduced which has widened 
existing capacity gaps, which in turn are now the source of inflationary tendencies within 
the economy. 
 
Of course, such tendencies have an altogether different origin to those which the 
Chancellor believes he is counteracting with his exaggerated prudence (Friedman 1956).  
The changed institutional arrangements for monetary policy-making, coupled with the 
continued invocation of the dangers of “wage irresponsibility” within the public sector 
(see Brown 1998b), has served to concentrate the anti-inflationary effort on the money 
supply.  Contrary to the conventional wisdom, however, inflation is not ‘always and 
everywhere a monetary phenomenon’, as Milton Friedman so famously insisted.  More 
basic definitions of price increases highlight ‘too much money chasing too few goods’.  
Where the more basic definition offers more valuable insights into the recent British 
experience of inflation than the Nobel Prize-winning definition is in its addition of ‘too 
few goods’ to the ‘too much money’.  For, this suggests the significance of demand 
conditions to the underlying rate of inflation.  Moreover, as Ciaran Driver argues on the 
basis of extensive CBI interview data, it is heightened perceptions of investment risk 
associated with the prospects for sustainable non-inflationary demand growth which now 
acts as the biggest single impediment preventing British producers expanding existing 
capacity (Driver 1996a: 75). 
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However, in promoting ‘sound money’ policies to alleviate inflationary tendencies 
through supply-side reform, New Labour appears set to exacerbate such tendencies 
through reproducing demand-side weaknesses.  Expectations of unsustainable non-
inflationary demand growth feed through into higher expected risk levels for any given 
rate of productive investment, which in turn act as a disincentive to invest in new 
capacity.  The outcome of such disincentives is quite clearly further to constrain the 
potential for stable non-inflationary demand growth.  Thus, the cycle begins again, only 
this time at a higher level of capacity constraint.  It is noticeable in this respect, for 
instance, that Gordon Brown used his first three budgets to report an accelerating degree 
of systemic capacity shortfall (Brown 1997; 1998a; 1999). 
 
This, though, is a ratchet which Brown himself is at least partially responsible for 
tightening.  The recent inflation history of Britain has been typified by an ever more 
vicious circle of underinvestment / ineffective supply / demand-induced inflation / 
inflationary expectations / underinvestment.  Yet, the start-point of underinvestment is 
itself a reflection of the wider monetary context in which investment decisions are made.  
‘Sound money’ policies effectively act to police continued underinvestment.  They may 
well have led to successful ‘union-bashing’ in a manner consistent with the tendential 
eradication of residual wage-pull inflation (see, for instance, Bootle 1996).  But making 
inflation is not the sole preserve of over-powerful union barons.  Inflationary dynamics 
also emerge from a monetary context which provides incentives to liquidate existing 
productive assets, and which therefore makes subsequent capacity constraints more likely.  
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In its attempts to satisfy additional liquidity demands within the financial markets through 
pre-committing monetary policy in line with a series of targets, New Labour has given a 
green light for the systematic run-down of existing productive capacity.  As such, by 
internalising the orthodox prescription for solving inflationary dilemmas on the supply-
side, the Blair Government has produced the contradictory effect of inducing additional 
inflationary tendencies on the demand-side. 
 
What price ‘prudence’ now, one could be excused for asking.  New Labour would appear, 
not only to be perpetuating the policy constraints with which it is faced, but also 
tightening them.  Each time that it successfully hits its pre-committed inflation target, the 
government has made headline news for itself.  In addition, however, it has also 
accelerated the tendency towards capacity constraint, at the same time making similar 
inflation targets more difficult to hit in the future. 
 
 
 
 
FDI and Self-Perpuating Policy Constraints 
 
The image of a ‘credible’ government, overseeing ‘prudent’ economic management, is at 
least partially saved by Britain’s continuing success in the inward investment game.  This, 
at any rate, is the defence mounted by the Blair Government against suggestions of the 
contradictory nature of self-imposed monetary restraint. 
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Such a defence bears little by way of critical scrutiny.  Its central paradox is fairly 
obvious.  The government seeks to compete on an open market for inward investment on 
the strength of its commitment to ‘sound money’ policies.  Yet, it is precisely such an 
orthodox macroeconomic stance which has led British producers to doubt that the 
domestic economy can deliver a stable, sustainable, flow of non-inflationary demand 
growth.  It is the same policies which are presented as incentives for footloose firms to 
relocate in Britain which have persuaded British investors to vacate the production circuit 
in their home country (Watson 2000b). 
 
Moreover, this threatens to become another self-perpetuating vicious circle.  Each time 
the Blair Government chooses to play the inward investment game through pre-
commitments to ‘sound money’, success in that game becomes ever more necessary.  For, 
a pre-committed rules-based monetary policy has acted as a trigger for British investors to 
‘exit’ the domestic production circuit as a strategy for enhancing liquidity.  Ensuing 
capacity constraints thus require the attraction of new faces from overseas in order to 
make good the gap in the production circuit.  However, each time that gap expands, the 
government becomes compelled to chase inward investors harder.  But it is the manner in 
which the government has chosen to play the inward investment game that has been at 
least partially responsible for the emergence of such a gap in the first place. 
 
Of course, it may be necessary to inject some element of caution into how the above 
analysis is read.  I seek merely to highlight the contradictory logic on which the 
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government’s macroeconomic stance is predicated.  I am not trying to suggest that all 
British firms are now engaged in a headlong rush to be the first to ‘exit’ the production 
circuit.  My interests lie with the logical tendency of the macroeconomic stance as a 
whole, even if that tendency is currently only marginal to the overall functioning of the 
economy.  That said, it only requires marginal movements in production norms for there 
to be significant consequential effects elsewhere in the economy.  Production, output and 
employment are all integrally related, for instance, ensuring that any tendency towards 
capacity shortage has a major bearing on future labour market policy.  As such, it is 
perhaps worth exploring in a little more detail the central contradictions of the 
government’s inward investment policy. 
 
There is now a burgeoning literature on local economic development which argues that 
globalising dynamics have heightened the power of ‘the locality’ with respect to that of 
‘the market’ (for an overview, see Wilson 1995).  Viewed through such a perspective, 
development strategies are increasingly being formulated in terms of deriving market 
advantage through aligning contingent local geographies with specialised local economic 
niches (see also Harvey 1989; Ashworth & Voogd 1990; Kearns & Philo 1993; Kotler, 
Haider & Rein 1993).  Yet, if we are to believe that production has been ‘localised’ in 
this way, it is necessary that we overlook the available empirical evidence.  For, on 
balance, this indicates that inward investment flows continue to be restricted to a strictly 
limited range of host economies.  Since the processes of ‘globalisation’ are assumed to 
have begun, inward investment has actually been the means through which capital has 
been re-concentrated in the three major regional production circuits of the North 
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(Wieczorek 1995; Bairoch 1996; Hirst & Thompson 1996; Berger & Dore 1996; Busch 
2000).  The path-dependent nature of such flows thus does much to dispel the image of 
truly localised economic activity.  Moreover, even if we were to suspend such scepticism 
to maintain that production had been effectively ‘localised’, then the same most definitely 
cannot be said of the way in which distinctive local economies are marketed to potentially 
footloose firms.  As Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell suggest, “what is striking about local 
strategies ... is just how unlocal they are” (Peck & Tickell 1994: 281). 
 
Routinely, localities now struggle with one another through a process of competitive 
place-marketing in an attempt to derive comparative economic advantage (see, for 
instance, Watson 1991; Goodwin 1993; Holcomb 1993).  Flagship property developments 
tend to act as the cornerstone of such strategies.  For, they are seen as a means of creating 
a new, dynamic place image capable of enhancing the locality’s ‘international reputation’ 
within a global hierarchy of cities.  Given that the ultimate aim is to derive comparative 
advantage, it is somewhat paradoxical that, in practice, such images do not tend to be 
constructed through emphasising the distinctive characteristics of individual localities.  
Rather, ostensibly unique places with unique attributes to promote are being marketed 
through a common language in which every city wants to be ‘bigger’, ‘better’ and with 
‘more to offer’ than any other.  This has had the effect of highlighting much the same 
features in every city.  As Chris Philo and Gerry Kearns argue, “For places, the idea is not 
so much that they be genuinely different from one another but that they harness their 
surface differences in order to make themselves in a very real sense nothing but ‘the 
same’: to give themselves basically the same sort of attractive image ... drained of 
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anything controversial - with basically the same ambition of sucking in capital” (Philo & 
Kearns 1993: 20).  Local economic development strategies are increasingly being driven 
by perceptions of the need to appear ‘competitive’ on terms dictated by potential inward 
investors (Watson 1997).  Moreover, such perceptions are being formed within a context 
in which all inward investors are assumed to have similar, if not the same, requirements.  
As a consequence, localities are now being marketed as ‘new’ homes for potentially 
footloose firms on the basis of more or less clichéd formulas (see Goss 1996).  The 
possibility that the pleasant ensemble of cultural motifs being promoted bears little 
comparison to the city’s actual cultural heritage is besides the point.  As Sophie Watson 
suggests, under the influence of the inward investment game, “places are [now] as much 
about myth as they are reality” (Watson 1991: 59). 
 
Perhaps most importantly, it is ‘business-oriented’ images which now dominate.  This 
represents a clear and unambiguous statement of intent to be ‘market-friendly’.  Of 
course, such a stance is by no means neutral in political terms.  The concept of country 
competitiveness which lies at the heart of the inward investment game carries with it a 
clearly-defined picture of the world in which all economies have to operate (Albo 1996; 
Panitch 1996; Wiseman 1996).  That world is one in which ‘easy’ productivity gains are 
to be made available to relocating firms in the form of depressed relative unit labour 
costs.  What we see, then, is potential surplus value effectively being ‘traded’ on an open 
market for inward investors.  This is amply demonstrated by the headline-grabbing 
relocation of Japanese car maufacturers, Nissan and Toyota, into Britain in the early 
1990s.  For, here, both the British Government and their prize captures were conspicuous 
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in their attempts to encourage the bidding-down of potential labour costs.  Both 
individual localities and individual trade unions were actively solicited to promote 
themselves specifically as the low-cost option. 
 
Quite clearly, such an attribute increases the level of the effective subsidy paid to inward 
investors to secure their re-location.  A firm which locates into an economy where wage 
relations are policed by ‘business-oriented’ government policies is always likely to be less 
burdened by start-up costs than a firm which locates into an economy where such policies 
are absent.  A straightforward link can therefore be drawn between an economy which is 
structured to be ‘market-friendly’ and a government which engages in ‘competitive 
austerity’ (on which, see Albo 1994). 
 
This link is clearly significant in terms of the labour market policies which currently 
constitute both the liberal norm (see Coates 2000) and also the particular way in which 
successive British governments have played the inward investment game (see Watson 
2000b).  However, other interpretations of ‘market-friendly’ must also be explored if the 
analysis is to look beyond labour market policies to the overall macroeconomic stance of 
which labour market policies are merely a part.  Moreover, such interpretations allow for 
some interesting observations to be made in relation to the Blair Government’s strategies 
for facilitating foreign direct investment as a by-product of establishing “a credible 
framework for monetary discipline” (Brown 1996; for similar sentiments, see Blair 
1996c). 
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Previously in this chapter, I argued for the need to rethink the concept of ‘market-
friendly’ in terms of ‘liquidity-enhancing’.  Viewed through such a perspective, the 
government’s willingness to subsidise relocating inward investors through new forms of 
wage discipline appear ever more necessary if the overall ‘success’ of its strategy is to 
continue.  As before, the self-inflicted nature of this self-perpetuating structural constraint 
is evident.  The Blair Government has certainly been able to provide additional liquidity 
for financial investors by pre-committing policy to a series of ‘sound money’ targets.  In 
this respect, New Labour has undoubtedly proved to be ‘market-friendly’.  However, with 
high levels of liquidity now on offer for those who bypass the production circuit 
altogether, the Blair Government has also reduced the incentive for inward investors to 
establish new productive capacity in the absence of significant sweeteners for doing so.  
These sweeteners, of course, have taken the form of highly developed subsidisation 
packages, ranging from the direct transfer of money to the rigid policing of the labour 
market.  Subsidies therefore act to compensate for the additional liquidity which is 
foregone in the process of becoming an inward investor. 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Blair Government continues to talk about the ‘necessity’ of chasing new sources of 
foreign direct investment (see Brown 1996, 1997) and about the ‘necessity’ of using 
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public funds to facilitate such a chase (see Blair 1995b).  However, subsidisation 
imperatives have only emerged in the first place because of the government’s pre-
commitment to a rules-based monetary policy.  Without the introduction of a series of 
pre-stated targets to serve as automatic pilots for the economy, the government would be 
in no position to act as guarantor of liquidity within the financial markets.  Take away the 
government’s ability to perform such a role, and there would immediately be less need to 
offer both economic and political inducements as an incentive for foreign firms to 
become inward investors.  Thus, the subsidisation trap into which the government seems 
intent on falling is one primarily of its own making. 
 
Indeed, I have argued that the capacity constraints which lie at the heart of contemporary 
public policy-making dilemmas are, to a significant extent, the result of government 
macroeconomic policy.  New Labour’s assertions about the policy environment in which 
it finds itself are by now well-known; typified as they are by a repetitive appeal to the 
‘realities’ of globalisation.  The ability of globalisation to demand concessions from 
governments provides ample justification for the party’s new-found commitment to 
‘sound money’.  However, in this chapter, as in the one before, I have rejected both 
aspects of such a characterisation.  Firstly, I have suggested that a reflex appeal to the 
policy logic of globalisation serves merely to mask the real nature of the structural 
constraints which economic policy-makers currently face.  Secondly, I have suggested 
that the government’s mis-specification of the policy environment has led it to reproduce, 
indeed heighten, those same structural constraints.  Such conclusions set the context for 
the following chapters. 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER EIGHT: 
 
DE-POLITICISATION AS A 
CONSCIOUS POLITICAL STRATEGY, 
GLOBALISATION AS A MEANS OF DE-POLITICISATION 
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Much conceptual confusion continues to surround the notion of globalisation.  Given the 
frequency with which globalising tendencies are called upon to explain all that appears 
new within the international economy, some degree of conceptual slippage is perhaps to 
be expected (on which point, see Allen & Thompson 1997).  In an attempt to strip away 
at least some of the problems which are encountered in this respect, the previous two 
chapters have concentrated on the type of analytical work which the concept of 
globalisation is incapable of performing. 
 
The appeal to globalisation tends to be associated with explanatory models which are 
predominantly economic in nature.  Thus, the image of a truly global capital relation is 
most commonly used to capture the essence of contemporary public policy-making 
constraints in the economic sphere.  Subsequently, as policy explanation and policy 
prescription are collapsed into a single line of argument, that same image is also used to 
justify the commitment to a macroeconomic stance which is sensitive to the demands of 
the new, global environment.  The aim of the previous two chapters has been to show the 
logical inconsistency inherent in such reasoning.  The very notion of globalisation is 
constructed using economic logic which is both mis-specified and mis-applied.  This has 
resulted in policy-making which is riddled with contradictions.  Global invisible hand 
metaphors provide for wonderfully parsimonious models.  As explanatory models, 
however, they are found sorely wanting.  The aim of this chapter is to suggest why the 
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Blair Government has maintained its focus on the ‘necessity’ of sound money policies, 
despite the fact that the presumed source of that necessity, economic globalisation, is far 
more limited in reality than it is in government rhetoric. 
 
Two possible accounts of such a tendency present themselves.  Either: i) It is to be 
assumed that New Labour is fundamentally unaware that its globalisation rhetoric 
routinely misrepresents the actual dynamics of change within the international economy.  
Therefore, to its mind at least, rhetoric and reality bear more or less perfect 
correspondence.  From this, we are left to conclude that the government’s systematic 
misinformation about globalisation is purely unintentional, and thus carries no attendant 
political agenda.  Alternatively: ii) It is to be assumed that the Blair Government is aware 
of the fundamental mismatch between its globalisation rhetoric and the wider reality 
which such rhetoric purports to represent.  In this reading, we can dismiss the possibility 
that the notion of globalisation performs significant analytical work in guiding our 
understanding of the way in which the international economy is currently being 
reconstituted.  Yet, despite this, New Labour refuses to give up its globalisation rhetoric;1 
indeed, quite conspicuously so.  This raises a rather more intriguing possibility, tempting 
the conclusion that the Blair Government has appropriated the notion of globalisation as a 
conscious strategy designed to help achieve wider political goals.  In other words, whilst 
globalisation rhetoric is incapable of doing substantial analytical work, the same cannot 
be said of its ability to do far-reaching political work.  In this chapter, I suggest that this is 
the reason that the Blair Government maintains a rhetorical stance which so closely 
                                                          
1 Moreover, it should be noted just how infrequently it is ever challenged to give up that rhetoric. 
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mirrors the radical globalisation thesis’ empirically unsustainable assumptions of a 
‘borderless world’. 
 
 
 
 
Blair’s ‘New Bretton Woods’ 
 
The ‘common-sense’ status of ideas about globalisation may well prove to be a powerful 
force capable of producing effects which are entirely consistent with how a global world 
would look (see Piven 1995; Rose 1996; Douglas 1997; Hay & Watson 1998).  So long 
as the existence of a truly global capital relation remains unchallenged in public 
discourse, governments are able to provide legitimation for themselves merely by acting 
on the basis of globalisation’s perceived imperatives.  Attempts are being made to 
reconstitute the way in which the economy is experienced in order to fit pre-existing 
perceptions that the economy has already been globalised.  In this instance, reality is 
being shaped to bring it into line with rhetoric.  This is the exact opposite of the usual 
processes of reflexive learning, through which rhetoric is remoulded as more becomes 
known of the underlying reality.  Yet, here, it is the Blair Government’s globalisation 
rhetoric which appears to be fixed.  To the extent that the government displays the 
attributes of reflexive learning, it is the perceived need to reconfigure the material context 
in which it is situated that seems to be the most prominent outcome of that learning.  In 
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this way, New Labour has provided us with experiences of the capital relation which 
serve to ‘confirm’ its own globalisation rhetoric. 
 
This tells us much about the reason why the Blair Government persists with the 
‘necessity’ of guaranteeing financial market liquidity, despite the fact that globalising 
tendencies which are the presumed source of that necessity prove to be much more 
limited than the government implies.  Most significantly, it suggests that New Labour’s 
determination to be seen blazing the globalisation trail is a conscious strategy.  As such, it 
also shows that the government’s insistence on presenting the assumption of globalisation 
in ‘common-sense’ terms cannot be related simply to cognitive dissonance.  New Labour 
is facilitating the insertion of globalising dynamics within the British economy as a 
deliberate act of policy.  The introduction of a more coercive domestic statecraft should 
not be viewed as an ‘inevitable’ effect of globalising imperatives (on which, see Evans 
1997; Thompson 1997).  Rather, it is necessary that we reverse the causality here.  It is 
the mask of a continued and unquestioned belief in globalisation which is now being used 
as the means of legitimating the institutionalisation of a new disciplinary mode of 
governance. 
 
Nowhere is this more apparent than in the Labour Party’s flirtation with public 
pronouncements on the need for a “new Bretton Woods” (see Blair 1998).  Ever since the 
demise of the original settlement, the image of a reinvigorated Bretton Woods has served 
as a means of mobilising political opinion behind the expansion of citizenship rights 
through the institutionalisation of a socially-inclusive economic policy.  However, it is 
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only too clear that this is not what the Blair Government means by its insistence on 
qualitative novelty.  The government’s proposals certainly revolved, as did the original 
settlement, around the creation of sufficient institutional capacity to oversee the 
regulation of international economic relations.  But this was by no means a call to reverse 
political time and restore the conditions which made possible a former ‘golden age’ of 
national economic management.  Rather, it signified the government’s desire to accelerate 
the ‘modernisation’ of the post-national present by making it still more global.  The 
original Bretton Woods settlement attempted to slow down the movement of capital, 
impeding the development of a global capital market in the interests of facilitating a 
socially-inclusive domestic statecraft.  By contrast, Blair’s ‘new Bretton Woods’ seeks to 
speed up that movement to create a truly global circuit of capital.  Thus, the British 
Government has been committed to provide state support for completing a job which the 
international financial markets have been unable to do for themselves.  Far from 
following in the footsteps of those who established the original Bretton Woods 
institutions by throwing sand in the wheels of international finance (on which point, see 
Tobin 1978, 1997; Eichengreen, Tobin & Wyplosz 1995; Collingsworth, Goold & 
Harvey 1994), New Labour merely proposes to oil them still further. 
 
Of course, the very fact that the Blair Government should feel compelled to quicken the 
pace of globalisation reveals a number of things about both the material and the ideational 
contexts in which it operates.  i) It shows that globalisation itself is far from complete.  
To state the obvious, it would be impossible to speed up a process which was already 
finished.  ii) More fundamentally, it shows that globalisation is a process.  Furthermore, it 
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is a process which consciously acting subjects have the capacity to shape to their own 
ends.  Contrary to invisible hand metaphors, then, there is nothing natural about the 
emergence of globalising tendencies.  iii) Finally, and perhaps most significantly, it shows 
that the Blair Government is fully aware that its globalisation rhetoric is an exaggeration 
of a much less global reality.  If New Labour actually believed what it says in relation to 
globalisation, then there would be no need for it to be concerned with making financial 
market relations more global. 
 
Yet this, quite clearly, is its concern.  As the Prime Minister revealed in his proposals for 
a ‘new Bretton Woods’, his wider aim is to provide a transnational mechanism capable of 
forcing national governments to institutionalise fiscal and monetary ‘transparency’ (Blair 
1998).  That mechanism is to be the creation of a truly global circuit of financial capital.  
With financial flows finally liberated from those government regulations which survived 
the 1980s (see The Economist Survey 1995), whatever policy-making discretion currently 
remains is to be sacrificed in order to make international financial markets respond more 
sensitively to global equilibrium pricing structures (see The Economist Survey 1999: 5).  
In Tony Blair’s own words, his intention is to use these newly reconstituted financial 
markets in order to “strengthen the incentives on governments to pursue ‘sound’ policies” 
(Blair 1998). 
 
The irony of such a comment is palpable.  For, the most likely effects of such re-
regulation would be to tighten still further the noose which financial liberalisation has 
been able to place around policy-making autonomy.  On one front, New Labour routinely 
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laments its inability to respond more proactively to demands for social inclusion because 
of the constraints of financial liberalisation (for arguments which emphasise such effects, 
see Kenny & Smith 1996; Ellison 1997).  Yet, here we see its leader advocating that the 
government’s own hand be used to give that same process additional impetus.  It is clear, 
then, that the Prime Minister’s proposals for re-regulating the international financial 
markets are not part of a design for creating new space for autonomous government 
activity (by contrast, see Watson 1999a).  His plans consequently contain no new 
initiatives which could lead to the re-politicisation of existing monetary values like the 
original Bretton Woods settlement did; let alone to the popular mobilisation of 
progressive political movements to brand new forms of monetary policy-making 
altogether.  Insofar as these proposals aim to make financial markets work ‘better’, this 
only appears to be in the sense of allowing them to make it easier to impose the fiscal and 
monetary policy priorities of the prevailing macroeconomic orthodoxy. 
 
The possibility of implementing anything other than the most strictly orthodox policy will 
be constrained in particular by the Prime Minister’s personal pledge to ensure that, in the 
future, financial investors will be able to work in a context conducive to them “pric[ing] 
risk more accurately” (Blair 1998).  This pledge is entirely consistent with the actions of a 
government which has moved decisively to position itself as a guarantor of financial 
market liquidity.  However, given that liquidity-enhancing interventions provide investors 
with extra incentives to ‘exit’ the production circuit, it is also consistent with the actions 
of a government which is likely to exacerbate the economy’s existing tendency towards 
capacity shortfalls.  In the preceding chapter, I argued that economies which display 
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persistent capacity shortfalls within a macroeconomic context of ‘sound money’ are 
susceptible to being locked-in to a vicious circle of self-perpetuating policy constraints.  
The Prime Minister’s proposals for a ‘new Bretton Woods’ seem sure to increase the 
possibility of becoming structurally bound to such constraints. 
 
Of course, there are no grounds for suggesting that this is exactly what the Prime Minister 
is trying to do.  However, his concerns for accelerating financial market liberalisation do 
imply a conscious engagement with international economic reform as a way to discipline 
the domestic political agenda.  Across a range of countries, globalising tendencies appear 
to be most developed where policy-making has been dominated by political parties who 
have previously declared an interest in maintaining a strictly orthodox macroeconomic 
stance.  Indeed, the history of globalisation could well be characterised as the search for 
an effective means of depoliticising state economic policy in the image of a ‘best-practice 
neo-liberalism’.  At the very least, the insertion of a global dynamic into the domestic 
economy serves to make more difficult the future disarticulation of such a stance.  It is to 
this point that I turn in the following section. 
 
 
 
 
Globalisation as Self-Created External Constraint 
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The Blair Government in Britain is but one of a number of governments which have been 
only too keen to appropriate both the idea of globalisation and globalising tendencies 
themselves in circumstances in which some wider political end is fulfilled by doing so.  
Such an argument suggests a tendency towards over-simplification in much of the 
existing literature on globalisation.  In general, that literature is united in its construction 
of globalisation as a structural constraint on economic policy-making, especially for those 
policy-makers with aspirations to resist the prevailing neo-liberal orthodoxy.  Here, 
however, a rather different emphasis is brought into view.  As the previous section on the 
Prime Minister’s proposals for a ‘new Bretton Woods’ demonstrated, New Labour is 
much more than a merely passive recipient of globalising trends.  The dominant message 
sent out by the party’s leaders both before and after the 1997 election was that the change 
which such trends were likely to impart onto the British economy was to be encouraged 
rather than rejected (see, for instance, Blair 1996b, 1996b; Brown 1998, 1999).  Whilst 
New Labour has typically put a positive spin on change in general (see Kavanagh 1997; 
Kellner 1997; Norris 1997), the specific changes to be wrought by the further 
institutionalisation of globalising tendencies have been particularly keenly embraced.  
The Party has done more than just accept the ‘inevitability’ of such tendencies; it has 
been eager to be seen actively embedding them.  As such, it is inadequate to view 
globalisation merely as a structural constraint on economic policy-making.  Rather, it is 
necessary to assess the way in which it has been constructed specifically as a constraint 
on the autonomy of policy-makers to implement anything other than ‘sound money’ 
policies. 
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This requires for many of the most prominent claims in the globalisation literature to be 
systematically re-thought.  Prime amongst them is the idea that globalising tendencies 
compel governments to externalise an ever greater number of its policy responsibilities 
(on which, see Cerny 1990, 1997).  The state has been used to lock the management of 
the economy into a range of external enforcement mechanism.  The collapse of the 
original Bretton Woods settlement is assumed to have made it more difficult for any 
government to manage its economy successfully.  In particular, enhanced capital mobility 
is thought to have increased the power of veto which financial markets are able to 
exercise over government decisions which are overtly political (see Bryan 1995).  As 
such, the sole remaining option open to governments is believed to be that they 
increasingly cede the right to make decisions at all.  Financial markets are assumed to 
have most faith in the ability of orthodox central bankers to sustain a ‘market-friendly’ 
policy environment.  Accordingly, large swathes of policy-making responsibility have 
been transferred from elected politicians to non-elected technical experts.  Globalisation, 
it seems, has heightened both the range of demands that financial markets can 
legitimately make of governments, and also the incentives which governments have to 
accept those demands and give up their policy-making role. 
 
This is a version of events which I set out to challenge.  It is not the case that it is 
credibility constraints associated with globalisation which ‘necessitate’ the use of external 
enforcement mechanisms to act as automatic pilots for policy.  Rather, globalising 
tendencies have been consciously authored as an external enforcement mechanism in 
their own right.  Liberalising dynamics have been successfully institutionalised within the 
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world’s financial markets as a means of creating a truly global circuit of capital.  The 
deliberate encouragement of such dynamics represents an attempt to ‘contract out’ the 
terms on which economic policy is set.  The right of state officials to initiate policy has 
increasingly been handed to private sector investors.  As a simple statement of fact, there 
is little to distinguish this conclusion from the position adopted elsewhere in the literature 
and introduced in the previous paragraph.  Where the accounts differ quite fundamentally, 
however, is in their competing notions of causality.  I suggest that most of the existing 
literature is wrong to argue that the process of policy externalisation has occurred because 
of globalisation.  Rather, it is occurring through globalisation.  De-politicisation is, in 
itself, a comprehensive political strategy designed to demobilise opposition to the 
prevailing social order.  The reprojection of investment decisions into markets which 
exist on a different spatial scale to that of the national economy is merely one part of such 
a strategy.  That is, globalisation is a means to the end of de-politicising macroeconomic 
policy, and not the tendency which compels such a stance. 
 
Of course, much has been made throughout this thesis about just how far there is still to 
go before we can talk in any real sense about the existence of truly global economic 
markets.  The empirical evidence surveyed in the opening chapter suggests not merely 
that the tendency towards globalisation is incomplete, but also that in many cases it may 
not even have begun at all.  As an efficient means of externalising policy, global markets 
thus leave a lot to be desired.  Global dynamics of supply and demand are unable to 
perform the role of external enforcement mechanism for domestic economic policy 
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without ‘assistance’ from elsewhere.  Much has also been made in the preceding chapters 
of the fact that it is dominant ideas about globalisation which provide such assistance. 
 
Indeed, it may well be through decisive interventions in the ideational sphere that the 
Labour Party can be seen most clearly to be an agent of the structural constraints with 
which it is faced.  In certain circumstances, dominant discursive representations of reality 
can impact in much the same way as the material structure of that reality itself in terms of 
conditioning subsequent political outcomes.  Such circumstances are readily apparent 
whenever a dominant discourse becomes seen, no longer as a dominant discourse, but 
merely as ‘the way things are’.  Moreover, this is exactly what the current Labour 
leadership has tried to do in relation to the dominant discourse of globalisation.  We have 
seen the Blair Government expend much political energy in its attempts to reduce the 
conventional wisdom to the status of mere ‘common-sense’.  The restriction of the 
government’s room for manoeuvre is every bit as much a reflection of the ideas which the 
government itself is promoting about the economic environment in which it exists, as it is 
of that actual environment. 
 
That New Labour has engaged extensively with the dominant discourse of globalisation is 
beyond doubt (see, for instance, Balls 1998).  What we also need to be aware of is the 
precise terms on which it has chosen to do so (see Hay & Watson 1998: 18).  This 
suggests that the party’s political positioning brought about as a result of globalisation 
may be more subtle than much of the existing academic literature implies.  New Labour 
has enjoyed a relatively free hand in defining what globalisation is to ‘mean’ in political 
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debates in Britain (see Watson 1998a).2  It has used this to its own advantage, presenting 
globalisation as ‘common-sense’ specifically to close off the perceived parameters of 
viable competition over the terms of future economic policy.  The party’s internal 
assessment of four successive general election defeats was that it was paying an 
unacceptable price for a failure to suppress expectations that it could not be trusted to run 
an orthodox macroeconomic policy (for differing explanations of such an assessment see, 
amongst others, Lipsey 1992; Blair 1993; Gamble 1996; Mandelson & Liddle 1996; 
Brivati 1998; Driver & Martell 1998; Sassoon 1998; Shaw 1998).  New Labour’s 
conscious appropriation of a discourse of globalisation must be seen as a means of 
gaining that missing trust.  The appeal, not only to globalising tendencies but also to their 
inexorable nature, has presented the party leadership with an opportunity formally to 
exclude all but the most orthodox understanding of the ideal form of the capital relation.  
The Labour Party’s conversion to macroeconomic orthodoxy appears all the more 
convincing when set within a dominant discourse which renders all alternatives 
impossible.  Its willingness to enforce a restrictive economic agenda has acquired a 
‘taken-for-granted’ character proportionate to its success in reducing the conventional 
wisdom of globalisation to mere ‘common-sense’. 
 
Thus, insofar as the limits of that considered politically possible are being actively 
policed, they are being policed for a reason.  Dominant ideas about the structural 
constraints of the international economy have been institutionalised in Britain in order for 
the Labour Party to be able to demonstrate that its conversion to an orthodox economic 
                                                          
2 In contrast to many other areas of the political economy of New Labour, the discursive legacy of 
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stance is ‘for real’.  As a consequence, there is clearly a need to be operating within an 
analytical perspective which is sensitive to the causal influences contained within the 
realm of ideas (see Blyth 1997).  The ideas through which economic policy is constructed 
portend decisive distributional effects within society.  For, they contribute to the process 
through which the ‘correct’ form of the capital relation is defined.  As Adam Przeworski 
suggests, “economic theories are rationalisations of the political interests of conflicting 
classes and groups ...  Behind economic alternatives lurk visions of society, models of 
culture, and thrusts for power” (Przeworski 1985: 206). 
 
Discipline is enforced within society and dissent restricted through the activation of 
power resources in the ideational sphere as well as through those inscribed in the 
structures of the state (see, for instance, van der Pijl 1997: 31).  Indeed, those structures 
themselves reflect the articulation of a particular political settlement to the underlying 
essence of state power.  This, in turn, tends to occur through the imposition of a dominant 
ideological mediation of ‘systemic imperatives’.  Thus, control of the authoritative ideas 
which orient society is functional to the enforcement of coercive interventions at the 
political level (Maier 1987: 16).  At the very least, it enables the legitimation of such 
discipline in the name of ‘common-sense’. 
 
It is in this way that New Labour has tended to use the dominant discourse of 
globalisation: as a legitimation device designed to head off opposition to its acceptance of 
its neo-liberal inheritance in the macroeconomic sphere.  The processes of globalisation 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Thatcherism here is conspicuous by its absence. 
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are almost certainly too underdeveloped for them to come complete with any actual neo-
liberal logic of no alternative.  Yet, so long as New Labour continues to appeal to the 
conventional wisdom of globalisation to successfully direct political debate in line with 
perceptions of ‘neo-liberal necessity’, such a logic could well continue to be experienced 
as real.  In this respect, globalisation serves not so much as the proximate cause of 
restructured state-society relations, but more as a complementary intervention aimed at 
facilitating their ‘policing’.  The Blair Government has used the idea that we live in a 
world which has already been globalised in order to ease the way for implementing 
policies that could in time lead to more global economic relations.  There are obvious 
distributional implications contained in decisions which allow business networks to 
develop along lines that do not coincide with national regulatory mechanisms (on which, 
see Maltby & Wilkinson 1998: 114-15).  That New Labour has had few problems 
defending such implications, despite a domestic political context generally understood to 
be antagonistic to further income polarisation (see Hutton 1997; Butler & Kavanagh 
1997; Hattersley 1998), owes much to its success in passing off globalisation merely as a 
‘fact-of-life’. 
 
To return the analysis to the major theme running through this chapter, it is clear that the 
impact of globalisation on British politics is much more complex than that of a simple 
determining economic structure (see Watson 2000c).  Indeed, understood that way, the 
concept of globalisation is largely incapable of performing significant analytical work.  
Rather, its importance lies in the political work which governments have been able to 
enlist it to do.  I reflect further in this theme in the remainder of the chapter. 
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‘Sound Money’ and the Technicalisation of Economic Policy Debate 
 
Whilst globalising tendencies are most often seen as structural constraints on state 
strategies, here I have been keen to develop a rather different line of argument.  Indeed, 
far from simply being constrained, I have suggested that the Labour government has been 
able to open up the political space to pursue an orthodox macroeconomic policy precisely 
because it has been successful in presenting such tendencies as constraints.  That space 
has remained open primarily as a result of the favourable reception that the party’s 
‘modernised’ macroeconomics has had amongst two constituencies.  As the 1997 general 
election clearly demonstrated, Middle-England has reacted with enthusiasm to New 
Labour’s fiscal prudence.  Moreover, the financial markets have expressed an almost total 
lack of concern about Middle-England’s changing political allegiance.  The momentum 
which the markets displayed in the pre-election period has continued unabated for the 
entire post-election period.  I now consider these two favourable ‘comments’ in turn. 
 
Perhaps the most notable theme of the literature on the 1997 election concerns the lack of 
political competition over the direction of future economic policy (see King et al 1998).  
Indeed, Labour’s new-found ‘electability’ appears to be closely linked to its ability to 
defuse such competition by treating economic policy merely as a matter of competence.  
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In relation to one of the most frequently asked questions of the campaign, ‘Who’s trusted 
most on the economy?’, virtually all the opinion poll data pointed to the Labour Party 
(Kellner 1997: 621).  Moreover, this was a distinctively ‘New’ Labour phenomenon.  
Whilst Labour held a narrow lead amongst all voters on the issue of perceived economic 
competence, amongst new Labour voters that lead was 4:1.  The party’s attempts to 
redefine the way in which it was seen by the electorate clearly resonated most 
spectacularly amongst its target constituencies of potential floating voters.  Here we see a 
party with a carefully constructed policy programme pitched directly at a pre-targeted 
social group whose support was deemed essential.  On the question of income tax, for 
instance, the party’s commitment to leave tax rates unchanged for the life of the 
parliament paid rich dividends in terms of the swing voters who changed the electoral 
geography of Britain so decisively (see Harrop 1997).  Labour’s overall lead on the 
question of ‘Which party do you trust most to make the right decisions about income 
tax?’ was a potentially election-winning 8%.  A potential victory was turned into an 
actual landslide by the fact that, amongst those who had voted Conservative in 1992 but 
five years later had not, that lead was almost three times as high (Kellner 1997: 621). 
 
Note, however, the type of questions which the opinion pollsters thought it important to 
ask about the economy.  They offer interesting insights into the way in which the main 
parties chose to treat economic policy as an election issue.  In previous elections, the 
economy had been identified as a crucial site of ideological competition.  Accordingly, 
the parties had struggled to impose a strategic vision to which society should be oriented.  
In 1997, by contrast, the economic status quo remained relatively unchallenged.  As New 
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Labour used the dominant discourse of globalisation to de-politicise its policy priorities, 
the economy was reduced solely to a site of technocratic struggle.  Thus, the only decision 
which the electorate was asked to make was which party could be trusted most to manage 
the economy in line with the existing socio-economic settlement.  Conservative failure of 
macroeconomic management was made a matter of technical competence rather than one 
of ideology (see Hay 1998).  The fact that Labour was successful in liberating itself from 
the ‘necessity’ of challenging Conservative neo-liberalism was heavily influenced by its 
prior success in identifying itself with the conventional wisdom of globalisation.  By the 
time of the 1997 election, New Labour had already popularised the assumption that 
globalising tendencies had rendered all resistance to the ‘sound money’ orthodoxy a non-
starter.  Set in such a context, the only potentially winning electoral strategy was to be 
seen endorsing a neo-liberal stance as enthusiastically as possible. 
 
In this respect, New Labour’s presentation of the strategic assessment of the context 
within which it exists bears close comparison to that predicted by the structural 
dependence thesis.  Of course, that the Blair Government acts as if the structural 
dependence thesis were true is not in any sense confirmation of such a thesis.  Yet, the 
very fact that it has behaved in a manner consistent with how it would have had to act 
were the thesis valid suggests the value of exploring its claims in a little more depth. 
 
Such claims are easily detailed (on which see, for instance Przeworski & Wallerstein 
1988; Block 1987; Lindblom 1988; Przeworski 1990; Swank 1992, 1998; Wickham-
Jones 1995, 1997; Hay 1997).  i) The state is assumed to be co-existent with capital: 
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capital is faced with a political environment which is dominated by states, and states are 
faced with an economic environment which is dominated by capital.  ii) Despite the 
superficial appearance of mutual dependence, in practice this relationship has become 
increasingly one-sided.  Capital is assumed to hold the upper hand to the extent that it is 
only through the successful reproduction of the capital accumulation process that the 
successful reproduction of the state can be ensured.  Thus, capital is able to dictate to the 
state in a way which the state is simply not at liberty to reciprocate.  iii) Moreover, 
globalisation is assumed to accentuate this disparity of power resources.  Once again, we 
are returned to a link between globalisation and a significant increase in feasible exit 
options for capital.  Adding assumptions of spatial mobility to those of structural 
dependence serve to shackle the political latitude of parties seeking state power still 
further.  Any indication that a potential party of government would be likely to sacrifice 
‘sound money’ policies to fund progressive redistribution is thought likely to be 
accompanied by rapid and destabilising capital flight.  iv) As such, even the suggestion 
that a social democratic party was on the verge of being elected in an era of globalisation 
and limitless exit options is deemed sufficient to generate significant capital outflows and 
subsequent economic crisis.  In turn, this ever-present threat of crisis is assumed to act as 
a guarantee that social democratic parties are unable to win elections unless they are 
willing to downgrade their social democratic aspirations. 
 
As we can see, the structural dependence thesis represents a further articulation of the 
perceived inevitability of neo-liberal economics.  Any government caught even thinking 
about a return to the ‘good old days’ of a golden Keynesian past is assumed to be lining 
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itself up for retribution at the hands of international financial investors (for the clearest 
statement from a New Labour advisor on this issue, see Balls 19983).  Activity within 
financial markets is thought immediately to re-sensitise governments to the need to adopt 
policies appropriate to the environment in which they exist (see IMF 1997).  Thus, the 
Chancellor has continually justified the government’s attempts to restrict its policies to 
those that are compatible with the idea of structural dependence by arguing that “the 
judgement of the markets ... [is] ... as swift as it is powerful” (cited in Shaw 1998: 5).  
Moreover, it is not only the government which appears to be operating in the manner 
suggested by the structural dependence thesis; the markets also seem to be conforming to 
such a model.  As such, the ‘judgement of the markets’ has typically been to reward New 
Labour for its ‘sensible’ management of the economy and, in particular, for its decision to 
liberate itself from the shackles of social democratic aspirations. 
 
This, then, has been presented as the second source of favourable comment that the 
Labour Party has received for its ‘modernised’ macroeconomics.  An obvious contrast is 
therefore in evidence between the reactions of the international financial markets to the 
possibility of Labour victories in the general elections of 1992 and 1997.  During the four 
weeks of the 1992 campaign, for instance, the headline FT-SE 100 index of leading 
shares recorded a points loss equivalent to 7% of the market’s total value.  Moreover, the 
most substantial losses in that period came in the immediate aftermath of opinion polls 
which showed a strong Labour lead (Heath, Jowell & Curtice 1994).  This reflected the 
                                                          
3 Although Balls does not mention by name the experience of the French Government’s ‘Keynesianism in 
One Country’ experiment in the early 1980s (on which, see Ross, Hoffmann & Malzacher 1987), it is far 
from difficult to identify in his argument the perceived need to avoid the ‘spectre of Mitterand’. 
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fact that those shares whose underlying values were considered most susceptible to a 
change of government experienced a percentage fall which ran well into double digits 
(Wickham-Jones 1995: 484).  By contrast, no similar cluster of ‘vulnerable’ shares 
emerged during the course of New Labour’s surge to victory five years later.  The FT-
SE’s upward trajectory was uninterrupted by the prospect of a Blair Government.  
Furthermore, since the change of government in 1997, the City has also demonstrated a 
singular lack of concern about the reality of co-habitation with a Labour-led Treasury.  
Safe in the knowledge that this Labour government is likely to do less than any of its 
predecessors to disrupt their investment plans, the subsequent ‘feel-good factor’ in the 
Square Mile has conspired to send London’s stock markets to new heights both during 
and after the election (Kavanagh 1997: 538; Sassoon 1998: 95). 
 
New Labour’s willingness to act as guarantor of financial market liquidity has been 
welcomed in the way the markets know best.  More capital has been pumped into the 
markets to keep them afloat with excess demand, and this has served to inflate existing 
financial prices.  Investors on the whole are acting in a manner entirely consistent with 
the broad range of market risks and returns having been shifted in the direction of a new, 
lower-risk, equilibrium.  Recent stock market increases have been so out of line with 
reports on company profitability (Financial Times, 05.06.99) that the very notion of 
underlying market ‘value’ has become increasingly virtual (on which point, see Watson 
2000a).  The stock market index and the market’s moving average tend to be aligned only 
in circumstances in which investors are fully sensitised to the prevailing risk structure 
within the market.  The index has been significantly higher than the moving average ever 
  290 
since the partial market correction of October 1997.  Indeed, it has spent much of that 
period in a more pronounced state of disalignment than at any time in the market’s history 
(The Economist 1998; Soros 1998).  This suggests that investors are currently discounting 
risk to a greater extent than ever before, allowing them safely to accept investment 
options which would seem entirely ‘irrational’ in a less bullish environment. 
 
Of course, such effects have not materialised merely as a quirk of fate.  Investors’ 
decisions are guided by their expectations of the environment in which they are situated.  
Much of the responsibility for the market’s post-election bullishness therefore lies in the 
Blair government’s success in demobilising potential opposition to the economic status 
quo.  It may well be that Labour continues to conflate the quite distinct logics of capital 
globalisation and financial liberalisation (this is evident, for instance, in Blair 1996b, 
1998; Brown 1996, 1998).  Yet, it is precisely because of this that, in attempting to 
formalise a range of policies appropriate to its globalisation rhetoric, it has provided 
further momentum to existing liberalising dynamics.  Moreover, it is to evidence of 
financial liberalisation that financial markets respond approvingly, not to evidence of 
globalisation.  The additional liquidity which liberalisation helps to sustain is almost 
always greeted by a fresh surge in market prices. 
 
It is the government’s guarantee of such liquidity which has ensured that the UK equities 
market has remained systematically ‘over-priced’ ever since New Labour took office.  
Indeed, the present disparity between the stock market index and the market’s moving 
average has begun to look less like a conjunctural feature of investors’ ‘irrational 
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exuberance’, and more like a structural feature which has become integral to the everyday 
operation of the market (see Watson 2000a).  This, at any rate, would appear to be the 
prevailing impression of those operating within the market itself.  Moreover, in a highly 
liberalised trading environment in which market outcomes are driven ever more by 
market expectations (Harmes 1998; Harvey 1999), this is what matters most.  Such 
expectations are currently being shaped by perceptions that the structure of the stock 
market has shifted in the direction of diminished risk sensitivities under the influence of 
the government’s conscious de-politicisation strategies.  Not only does the market’s 
continued bullishness represent its positive assessment of the government’s performance 
in regulating wider social relations of production along the lines of the prevailing 
economic orthodoxy.  In addition, the government has routinely appealed to the 
‘imperatives’ of maintaining the market’s current buoyancy as a feature of the state’s 
structural dependence on capital in an era of globalisation (see Blair 1998).  As such, the 
stock market has also emerged as an increasingly important institutional means of 
reproducing social regulation in the image of ‘neo-liberal necessity’. 
 
Once again, the causal impact of ideas about globalisation is palpable.  Remove the 
dominant discourse of globalisation, and the excesses of the current bull run are revealed 
for what they are: the expression of raw economic power founded on specific structures 
of exploitation and domination (see Martin 1999: 6-12).  Replace that discourse, 
however, and such structures are effectively stripped of their political content.  Set within 
the context of assumptions about globalisation and capital flight, the government’s 
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decision to foster further bullish tendencies can be reduced to the merely technical 
requirement of keeping capital on-shore in an era of increased exit options. 
 
Let me repeat that what is important here is not so much globalisation per se as ideas 
about globalisation.  In no sense is the prevailing ‘mood’ of the equity markets dependent 
on the dominant spatial flows of capital produced by globalising dynamics.  Bullish 
tendencies do not relate simply to the dominance of capital inflows, as assets are attracted 
from a range of other national equity markets.  Similarly, bearish tendencies do not relate 
simply to capital outflows, as other equity markets attract assets which are currently 
located within the domestic market.  Spatial mobility assumptions provide an inadequate 
conceptual framework for understanding equity trading to the extent that they suggest the 
existence of a zero-sum world.  In such a world, London’s gains are made at the expense 
of New York, Frankfurt, Paris, Tokyo and Hong Kong, and London’s losses result in 
gains elsewhere.  However, such assumptions do nothing to capture the actual patterns of 
trading in international equity markets.  The most noticeable pattern to have emerged in 
recent years is the degree to which the fortunes of individual markets now fluctuate in 
tandem.  As the events associated with the onset of the Asian financial crisis proved only 
too vividly, western equity markets now tend not only to go down together but to recover 
together as well (The Economist 1997b; New Statesman 1997).  Domestic investors 
increasingly act as if price movements elsewhere provide them with information which is 
relevant to the pricing of their own stocks (Frankel 1994: 15-16).  A good performance on 
one market has effectively become a condition for good performances on others.  As 
such, there is firm evidence for strong co-movements of equity prices.  However, this is 
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not at all the same as saying that here we have evidence for globalisation.  Such evidence 
would require for there to be strong co-movements of equity flows, consistent with 
enhanced exit options having prompted significant cross-border capital flight.  Yet, no 
such flows have so far been identified (Tesar & Werner 1994: 205-8). 
 
The concept of globalisation is therefore superfluous to explanations of the continuing 
bull market for British shares.  Much more important has been the Blair Government’s 
willingness to act in concert with other western governments to guarantee financial 
market liquidity.  Such guarantees have heightened expected returns at every level of risk, 
and have consequently provided extra incentives for holding investment portfolios 
dominated by equities.  It is the government’s commitment to ‘sound money’ orthodoxy 
which has ensured that the demand for equities has remained remarkably strong.  Indeed, 
its willingness to provide institutional arrangements to lock-in that orthodoxy has had a 
similar effect on underlying demand strength.  It is from the continuing reproduction of 
such strength that bullish tendencies emerge. 
 
To sum up, then, we are faced with a complex notion of causality here.  i) The 
government uses spatial mobility assumptions to argue that globalisation ‘necessitates’ 
policies which seal off potential exit options for those who have invested in equities.  ii) 
It chooses to present the separate logics of capital globalisation and financial 
liberalisation as conceptually indistinguishable.  iii) Although using the language of 
globalising imperatives, it has actually produced policies of further liberalisation.  iv) 
This has made equities a relatively ‘safe-haven’ investment option, as can be seen by the 
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market’s persistent bullishness.  v) The government has presented the continued rise in 
share prices as evidence that potential exit options have been successfully closed off.  
Finally, vi) This has been used to justify, not only the individual policies implemented, 
but also the more general argument that globalisation now ‘demands’ such policies.  The 
issue, then, seems to be the government’s technical competence to institutionalise policies 
appropriate to the wider economic context.  What is completely absent from such an 
account, however, is any appreciation that the record highs which London’s stock markets 
have experienced in recent years represent more than a favourable comment on the 
government’s perceived competence.  Rather, it is an indication of the markets’ 
satisfaction that New Labour has internalised its own political preferences, and that it 
now conceives of competence solely in terms of the adoption of ‘market-friendly’ 
policies. 
 
The government’s strategic appropriation of the dominant discourse of globalisation is 
therefore highly significant in the way that it is used to divert attention away from the 
reconstitution of the party’s sense of political priority.  If globalisation can be presented 
as a series of tendencies which ‘require’ a neo-liberal response, then the introduction of 
neo-liberal policies no longer becomes seen as a political intervention.  Rather, it is 
reduced to the realm of the merely technical.  In other words, the dominant discourse of 
globalisation allows the government to do a lot of relatively ‘unseen’ political work.  It 
focuses the analysis on the wider contextual factors which ‘necessitate’ that the 
government defends the market’s continued bullishness.  At the same time, it deflects the 
analysis away from the specific means which are adopted in order to approach such an 
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end.  As a consequence, the fact that the current bull run represents a clear political 
victory of the affluent tends to go relatively unobserved.  The government’s willingness 
to reproduce the currently favourable risk-return structure of the equity market has been 
fundamental to the attraction of additional capital to feed the bull run.  Yet, that structure 
is itself a reflection of the prior introduction of new forms of wage discipline to protect 
underlying profit levels (Gray 1998; Moseley 1999; Watson 2000a). 
 
Moreover, much the same line of argument can be pursued in relation to the 
government’s attempts to attract inward investors into Britain.  Again, the debate tends to 
be conducted with reference solely to the wider contextual factors which ‘require’ the 
government to play the inward investment game.  As such, little is said except that the 
government is responding to globalising pressures in exactly the same way as all other 
governments have had to respond to them.  Of course, this is also to privilege a debate 
about ends at the expense of one about means.  Consequently, the fact that the 
government has used inward investment dynamics in order to restructure labour market 
expectations in the direction of further wage discipline generally provokes little by way of 
critical comment.  This is an omission which I seek to correct in the following section. 
 
 
 
 
FDI and the State’s Structural Dependence on Capital 
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In previous chapters, I have discussed in some detail the ‘misinformation’ which 
dominates the public debate about globalisation in Britain.  Based on the most casual of 
empirical indicators, inward investment flows tend to be treated as an inevitable effect of 
globalisation (Bairoch 1996; Busch 1999).  In addition, they also tend to be constructed as 
an immense potential benefit to the overall functioning of the British economy.  The more 
inward investors take advantage of globalisation to re-locate in Britain, the greater the 
chance of their market-leading production techniques resulting in an improvement in the 
productivity of the domestic economy.  However, on further inspection, neither of these 
claims has turned out to be valid. 
 
Firstly, there is nothing essentially global about inward investment flows.  Inward 
investment may well conjure images of a borderless world.  Certainly, the popular 
depiction of globalisation more generally is as a process in which geography is simply 
dissolved by the perpetual motion of re-locating capitals.  Yet, if inward investment 
dynamics demonstrate anything about the world in which we live, then it is surely that 
geography continues to matter.  The very notion of flows suggests directionality (see Hay 
& Watson 1999a), whereby capital begins in one distinct geographical location and ends 
up in another.  In particular, capital is assumed to flow from contexts seen as less 
conducive to investment returns to those seen as more so.  Furthermore, a distinct pattern 
has emerged in terms of those countries which are seen as potentially profitable homes for 
inward investors.  What we have witnessed, then, is a spatial bunching of inward 
investment projects.  Inward investment is by no means experienced as equally as 
borderless world rhetoric implies. 
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Secondly, I have also shown that the image of inward investment as an unambiguous 
benefit to the domestic economy is almost certainly misplaced.  Such benefits are 
assumed to result from domestic firms learning to emulate the superior production 
techniques of their foreign rivals.  Yet, given that productivity levels for manufacturing 
transplants operating in Britain are no higher than they are for home-grown industries, it 
is difficult to see what impact such emulation would have.  On two accounts, then, the 
dominant discourse of globalisation makes statements about a world which turns out to be 
very different to the one in which we actually live. 
 
A range of plausible explanations could be advanced for such a finding.  Of course, this 
chapter has been written from the perspective that cognitive dissonance is not one of 
them.  I have argued that it is most unlikely that New Labour is anything other than fully 
aware that its globalisation rhetoric is less than a perfect match for the actual environment 
which it purports to describe.  I maintain that the Blair government has persisted with its 
rhetorical stance on globalisation, despite the widespread existence of evidence 
contradicting such a position, primarily for political reasons.  Thus, its decision to adopt 
the same attitude to inward investment as that it might have been compelled to adopt 
were it actually faced by globalisation is not necessarily confirmation that it accepts the 
economic logic of doing so.  Rather, it may only be confirmation of the potential political 
benefits it believes will flow from being seen to accept that logic.  In other words, I 
suggest that New Labour has been engaged in producing strategic ‘misinformation’ about 
inward investment.  The most important issue may not be to highlight what Labour 
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actually argues in relation to the economics of inward investment.  It could be that we 
should be focusing on how these superficial pronouncements about globalising 
imperatives simultaneously allow it to remain relatively silent on the fundamentally 
political dynamics at play here.  The government’s strategic ‘misinformation’ about 
inward investment may merely represent the tip of a much more interesting iceberg.  
Above the water line is what the government actually says about the British state’s 
structural dependence on footloose firms in an era of globalisation; below is what is left 
unsaid about the power relations which it is content to leave unchanged through its 
refusal to challenge the material base of such dependence. 
 
Such an argument is perhaps in need of rather more detailed explanation.  Any indication 
that foreign direct investment is on the increase enables the government to present 
‘evidence’ that we live in a world very much the same as that predicted by the spatial 
mobility hypothesis.  With foreign direct investment typically constructed as an inevitable 
effect of globalisation, the increasing penetration of the British economy by inward 
investors tends to be expressed as confirmation of globalising ‘realities’.  What is more, 
insofar as it is plausible to link globalisation to an objective economic structure of actual 
capital flows, then globalisation’s perceived logic of neo-liberal necessity can also be 
presented as an actual political structure constraining future possibilities.  Significantly, 
however, any evidence of the heightened incidence of inward investment activity allows 
the Blair Government to rationalise the case for an orthodox macroeconomic stance 
without at the same time having to justify the regressive distributional implications 
inherent in such a stance.  Important political work is therefore carried out without the 
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need to engage in explicitly political debate.  Flows of foreign direct investment have 
consequently become a powerful rhetorical device, allowing the government a means of 
reproducing an essentially de-politicised policy agenda on purely economic terms. 
 
However, there can be no doubt that the technical requirements of national 
competitiveness to which New Labour links the chase for inward investors is merely a 
mask for more fundamentally political arguments.  No construction of the competitive 
imperative can ever be politically-neutral.  At all times, such constructions are founded on 
highly politicised assumptions of the ‘ideal’ form of the capital relation.  The specific 
way in which the Blair Government has chosen to promote the competitive advantage of 
Britain has impacted on the capital relation most notably in terms of labour market policy.  
As I suggested in the previous chapter, competitive opportunities have been made 
available to capital on the basis of building comparative advantage on relative labour 
costs.  In one policy pronouncement after another in this area, the government has shown 
itself to be willing to subordinate domestic social policy to the international private 
property rights of inward investors.  This conspicuous privileging of international 
economic interests is made manifest in an unquestioning acceptance of the legitimacy of 
exit strategies.  In this instance, exit is equated with the right of footloose firms to 
demonstrate their refusal to pay the financial costs of funding a social state by moving 
overseas (see Calmfors & Driffill 1988; Scharpf 1991; Lane 1993; Moses 1995, 1998; 
Iversen 1996).  To the extent that an active social state is thought likely to diminish the 
flow of inward investment into its own territory, arguments for an active social state are 
now rarely heard in government circles.  Instead, attempts to defend the state’s revenue 
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base are being developed around restricting the scope of social provision.  It is in this 
primarily economic sense that we hear New Labour’s frequent exhortations of the “limits 
of government” (see Brown 1995).  Social policy has increasingly been recast throughout 
the 1990s as an extra-economic aid to national competitiveness (Jessop 1994a).  In this, 
as in so many other areas of socio-economic policy, the change of government in 1997 
has not triggered a significant departure from pre-existing norms (see Hay 1999).  The re-
commodification of social relations of production in Britain has continued, much of the 
time being directed by a dominant discourse of ‘more market, less state’. 
 
However, this is another occasion on which it is necessary to highlight the substantial 
mismatch between rhetoric and reality.  There is a certain irony that this slogan should 
trip most readily from the lips of the managers of multinational capital.  It has become 
second nature to hear them declare their ideological commitment to the social benefits 
which flow from organising economic activity around the competitive instincts of the 
market.  Yet, in practice, the ability of these same managers to be influential in shaping 
domestic political contexts results from them having turned their backs on competitive 
market structures.  The ‘raw power’ of multinational firms is a reflection of their 
tendency to organise themselves into production and distribution cartels (Petrella 1996: 
73-5).  Thus, they have created a series of oligopolistic structures which bypass the same 
competitive processes which they have been so keen to urge on others.  Footloose firms 
may well say that they require a competitive market for inputs into the production 
process, but the same standard is less rigorously policed in terms of the market for their 
outputs.  Increasingly, it is no longer companies who are competing through the quality of 
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their products, but workers and communities according to how cheaply they can make 
these products (Hildyard 1996: 125). 
 
Moreover, not only are multinationals increasingly inattentive in practice to their own 
calls for ‘more market’.  They are also placing an ever greater number of demands on 
national governments to provide them with an environment in which they are able to 
compete on their own terms (Watson 1997).  Despite their rhetorical claims to the 
contrary, then, the managers of multinational capital in general are not insisting on ‘less 
state’, only on a re-prioritising of state activities (on which point, see for instance Panitch 
1996).  Contemporary processes of restructuring within international financial markets 
are commonly assumed to have weakened the political control that national governments 
are able to exert over their domestic economies.  However, the ability of governments to 
control their populations remains fundamentally undiminished (Hirsch 1991; Gill 1992; 
Pellerin 1996; Rose 1996; Standing 1997), and this resource has been called upon to force 
down labour standards in the name of national competitiveness.  Not only, then, have 
successive British governments moved away from conventional economic definitions of 
‘competitiveness’ so as to source such concerns through the size of the direct subsidy they 
have been willing to offer potential inward investors.  In addition, ‘competitiveness’ has 
also come to be defined as the extent to which the government will be willing to 
undermine existing general wage levels as a means of promoting the domestic economy 
as a low-wage alternative to other western economies. 
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A highly significant restructuring of political norms therefore lies behind the specific way 
in which successive British governments have chosen to play the inward investment 
game.  There is nothing essentially neo-liberal about that game.  However, both the 
current Labour Government and its Conservative predecessors have sought to attract 
potentially footloose firms on the basis of a fundamentally neo-liberal conception of the 
competitive imperative.  This should be seen as part of a more general trend aimed at 
consolidating successive political victories of the affluent.  In particular, we can see the 
emergence of new forms of political mobilisation designed to secure the reproduction of 
the existing social structure of accumulation (see Watson 2000a).  It is those who are 
already relatively affluent who have been the focus of these mobilisation strategies. 
 
Within the context of political possibility circumscribed by Bretton Woods, middle-class 
consent for the status quo tended to be secured via a flow of material benefits originating 
in annual wage growth.  However, such benefits were non-exclusionary.  Under 
conditions of central wage bargaining, all workers enjoyed relatively similar gains.  This 
condition no longer holds.  Conscious attempts have been made to ensure that enhanced 
consumption possibilities are no longer reliant on wage increases.  The link between 
consumption and income is now rather less important at the margins than that between 
consumption and wealth.  This has led to a somewhat different process by which middle-
class support is secured for the prevailing macroeconomic regime.  It is still possible to 
observe a flow of material benefits to those within the consensual bloc, but this time it is 
one which originates in capital gains.  In itself, this has been sufficient to ensure a more 
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exclusionary character to the consensual bloc.  For, it is only those with access to capital 
in the first place who stand to benefit from an increase in the scope of likely capital gains. 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The second half of this chapter has focused on two effects of Labour’s determination to 
be seen enacting ‘sound money’ policies.  On the one hand, I have highlighted the 
government’s consolidation of the bullish tendencies which were already apparent in 
London’s equity markets.  On the other, I have highlighted not only its acceptance of the 
need to play the inward investment game, but also of the need to continue to do so in 
exactly the same way that it was already being played. 
 
I conclude that it is more than mere coincidence which has seen these two outcomes 
emerge at the same time.  Indeed, it is a mistake to treat them as two analytically 
separable outcomes.  The ability to present inflationary wage increases as a disincentive 
to inward investment has allowed the government to use exit threats as an anchor for the 
wage bargains in all sectors over which it has some control.  The direct effect of such 
discipline has been to hold down the general wage level.  The indirect effect has been to 
create inflationary expectations which have been conducive to  the continued appreciation 
of equity prices within London’s stock markets.  In turn, such buoyancy has sent positive 
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signals to inward investors in terms of potential shareholder value in Britain, and this has 
provided the government with ample legitimation for maintaining its current wage policy.  
Hence, the cycle of constrained pay increases and unconstrained share price increases 
begins again, with perceptions of the need to facilitate inward investment serving to 
deactivate opposition to its reproduction. 
 
Note, however, that it is unnecessary to appeal to globalisation in order to explain this 
cycle.  Globalisation is only important here in one sense.  The dominant discourse of 
globalisation has been appropriated to ensure that this redistribution of rewards from 
wage labourers to shareholders has taken place within a context of tendential de-
politicisation.  Of course, such a tendency is highly political in itself.  For, it is aimed at 
securing a flow of material benefits for a distinct social grouping which denies inclusive 
access. 
 
What is significant here is that this social grouping is already well-established in Britain.  
Furthermore, it also already enjoys effective control of the domestic political agenda, and 
has done for some time.  Indeed, the last twenty years of economic restructuring in Britain 
merely represent one effect of that developing control.  The acceleration of the 
restructuring dynamics in more recent times suggests that such control is now 
institutionally embedded.  When New Labour explicitly accepts the logic of recent 
economic changes (see Blair 1994, 1999), then, it is also affirming the right of the 
affluent to continue to dominate the demands which are placed on the policy process.  
The real significance of Labour’s use of the dominant discourse of globalisation to 
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consolidate pre-existing economic trends is that this has enabled it to consolidate pre-
existing political trends.  Given that the latter formed the basis of its strategy for fighting 
the 1997 election, I suggest that a direct link exists between Labour’s appropriation of the 
conventional wisdom of globalisation and its perceptions of the electoral constraints 
currently faced by all left-of-centre parties.  In the following chapter, I turn to examine 
such a link. 
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My aim in the previous three chapters has been to remove some of the conceptual 
ambiguities which continue to surround the notion of globalisation.  In particular, a stark 
contrast is apparent between the frequency with which globalisation is employed as an 
explanatory variable, and the similar frequency with which empirical evidence even for 
the existence of globalisation is found wanting.  On the basis of such findings, I have 
shifted the focus of the analysis away from the underlying assumption that the idea of 
globalisation can be called upon to perform significant analytical work.  I have suggested 
instead that there is much to be gained from analysing the idea of globalisation itself.  
Important political work has been performed, in Britain as elsewhere, through the 
strategic appropriation of the dominant discourse of globalisation.  In Britain, the task of 
defining both globalisation and its political implications has fallen almost exclusively to 
New Labour.  In this chapter, I explore the way in which the Labour Party has constructed 
such definitions specifically to serve its wider electoral ends. 
 
New Labour’s electoral strategy and its economic policy must be seen as mutually 
constituted.  However, the electoral strategy would appear to be dependent upon the 
economic policy in a way which just does not hold in reverse.  The sheer scale of the 
party’s success in the 1997 election (on which, see Norris 1997; Harrop 1998) was 
founded on its prior success in convincing its target middle-class constituencies of its 
suitability to manage its economic inheritance.  By contrast, its ability to maintain such a 
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reputation for ‘competence’ is unaffected by the size of its parliamentary majority.  This 
in itself may be sufficient to suggest that perceived electoral imperatives shaped 
perceived economic imperatives, and not the other way around.  At the very least, this 
chapter will be grounded in the assumption that Labour has engaged so actively with the 
dominant discourse of globalisation only because of its specific understanding of the 
electoral environment in which it was situated. 
 
 
 
 
The ‘Public’ and ‘Private’ Faces of New Labour’s Neo-Liberal Conversion 
 
New Labour has been fundamental to the way in which ideas about globalisation have 
permeated popular political debates in Britain.  It would be an exaggeration to say that, 
without the Labour Party’s lead, globalisation would not be an issue at all in Britain.  
That said, however, such a lead has been significant in linking global economic trends 
quite so closely to a political logic of neo-liberal necessity.  It has been unusual to hear 
Conservative politicians use the idea of globalisation in this manner.  They tend instead to 
reduce commitments to economic neo-liberalism merely to a statement of ideology.  It 
has typically been left to Labour’s leaders to enlist the conventional wisdom of 
globalisation for political purposes. 
 
  309 
That, at any rate, has tended to be the case when the party’s leaders have discussed its 
increasing acceptance of neo-liberal economics in public.  The ‘public face’ of New 
Labour has narrated the structural constraints of the prevailing political environment as 
being primarily external in origin and economic in nature.  Globalising imperatives have 
been appealed to whenever the party leaders have tried to convince anyone other than 
Labour Party members that ‘New Labour’ was more than mere electoral expedience.  The 
idea that globalisation allows no opt-outs has been used to demonstrate a substantive 
commitment to the fiscal and monetary policy priorities of a strictly orthodox 
macroeconomics.  In this way, it has helped to overcome concerns that pre-election 
pledges to leave the existing economic settlement intact would not last long into the post-
election period.  The dominant discourse of globalisation has therefore been used not 
merely to placate the ‘fears of the markets’.  Behind these abstract façades of ‘markets’ 
lie real people (see Watson 2000a).  More importantly for its electoral strategy, New 
Labour’s ability to present itself as a party which was sensitive to the ‘demands’ of 
globalisation enabled it to placate the fears of those elements of the middle-classes who 
have their savings invested on the financial markets.  In using globalisation rhetoric to 
force the image that they were ‘on message’ with the markets, Labour’s leaders have also 
been able to show Britain’s middle-classes that they would speak up directly for their 
interests. 
 
It is in this latter respect that New Labour was able to derive the most obvious political 
benefits from having “banished the ‘fear factor’” (on which, see Kellner 1997: 622).  To 
put it somewhat crudely, financial markets do not vote in general elections, whereas the 
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middle-classes do.  It is often said that financial markets do not like governments who fail 
to share their enthusiasm for fiscal austerity, and also that globalisation has furthered their 
ability to register that displeasure amidst a flurry of disinvestment.  For New Labour, 
however, a rather different issue was the most pressing concern.  As David Butler and 
Dennis Kavanagh suggest, the general election defeat in 1992 had convinced Labour’s 
leaders that the party had no choice but to “accommodate a more ... economically 
conservative electorate” (Butler & Kavanagh 1997: 48; for a dissenting view, see Norris 
1993).  Assuming that its target constituencies would vote for nothing other than the tax 
and spend status quo, the party’s strategy for fighting the 1997 election consequently 
revolved around accepting such demands.  Financial markets may well be thought to 
object to an active fiscal policy by withholding their investments.  However, the Labour 
Party’s main concern about countenancing such a stance lay in its assumptions that 
Britain’s middle-classes were likely to display similar objections by withholding their 
votes. 
 
Once again, we appear to have an instance in which globalisation is superfluous to 
political outcomes which are so often attributed to it.  Certainly, it is noticeable that 
globalisation is almost entirely missing from the party’s own explanation of its neo-
liberal conversion when it is its ‘private face’ which is on view.  When Labour’s leaders 
have sought the assent of its membership to quicken the reform of the party’s policy 
commitments, perceived electoral imperatives have tended to be the justification.  Tony 
Blair’s first speech as leader of a post-Clause IV Labour Party in 1995 is illustrative in 
this respect (see Seyd 1997).  Speaking directly about the task of leading the party in the 
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forthcoming election, he told his audience that he was not interested in leading a party of 
opposition: “This is a party of government or it is nothing”.  “Principle without power is 
futile,” he argued, as a means of sensitising the party membership to the possibility that 
he would do whatever it took to make Labour electable once more (see Blair 1995a).  
From that time onwards, the ‘private face’ of New Labour has rationalised almost all 
revisions to party policy in terms of the need to re-connect with those voters who were 
politically mobilised during the Thatcher years to aspire to be upwardly mobile.  When 
called upon by party members to defend its increasing acceptance of neo-liberal 
orthodoxy, New Labour’s reasoning has typically made little reference to global 
economic trends.  The ideas which appear to have done most to energise the leadership’s 
‘modernised’ macroeconomics has been that Labour had ceased to be “the party of the 
aspirational classes” (Streeter 1996: 13).  That is, the ‘private face’ of New Labour has 
assumed that the structural constraints of the existing political environment are primarily 
internal in origin and electoral in nature. 
 
Thus, New Labour would appear to present two contrasting accounts of its own neo-
liberal conversion, depending on its likely audience.  In many ways, this can be seen to 
mirror the main division in the existing academic literature on the Labour Party’s 
‘modernisation’ process.  This literature tends to be split into overly economistic and 
overly politicist explanations of change.  On the one hand, we see the ‘public face’ of 
New Labour promote globalisation as the progenitor of change.  Politics is thus reduced 
to a state in which it is merely functional to the reproduction of a governing economic 
essence.  Globalising tendencies are argued to come complete with an attendant blueprint 
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for future political action.  On the other hand, we see the ‘private face’ of New Labour 
highlight the political as cause rather than effect.  Here, the emphasis is on perceived 
electoral imperatives as the essential prerequisite of change. 
 
In what follows, I attempt to construct an analytical position which begins to move 
beyond a stylised opposition between ‘politics’ and ‘economics’.  I do this by focusing on 
the idea of globalisation rather than on globalisation per se.  Globalisation itself may well 
be superfluous to explanations of Labour’s neo-liberal conversion, as the ‘private face’ of 
New Labour suggests.  However, the same cannot be said of the dominant discourse of 
globalisation.  New Labour has presented that discourse as ‘conclusive proof’ that no 
government now has the ability to direct capital.  The force of the party’s commitment to 
that conventional wisdom does not, of course, necessarily render that convention ‘true’.  
Indeed, I have argued against such a conclusion in much of the preceding chapters.  In 
this way, I have attempted to challenge the assumption that the Labour Party is faced by a 
series of objective economic constraints.  I have suggested that Labour has engaged 
actively with the constraints that a truly global circuit of capital would be likely to impose 
primarily for electoral reasons.  However, this is not necesssarily to claim that the Labour 
Party is faced by a series of objective political constraints either.  There should be no rush 
to replace overly-structuralist assumptions about the prevailing economic environment 
with overly-structuralist assumptions about the prevailing political environment. 
 
This perhaps requires further explanation.  There can be no doubt that Labour’s chosen 
construction of globalisation is to emphasise the extent to which it acts as an economic 
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straitjacket for its political aspirations.  I am also in little doubt that such a construction 
serves primarily as a means of arguing credibly that middle-class interests will continue 
to be articulated to domestic economic policy, even under a Labour government.  Yet, 
there is no sense in which New Labour has been structurally bound to follow such a 
strategy by some underlying political logic.  There would appear to be at least two distinct 
trajectories which the party could have adopted in terms of its strategy for fighting the 
1997 election.  On the one hand, it could have attempted to deconstruct the liberal 
ideology which dominates the context through which ‘normal politics’ is understood in 
Britain.  It is this ideology which has effectively marginalised arguments for progressive 
redistribution, and which therefore serves to maintain middle-class control of the 
domestic political agenda. 
 
Of course, Labour took a deliberate decision not to challenge that control.  As such, there 
was no attempt to instigate a successful war of position within society.  Any talk of 
winning ‘hearts and minds’ was only in terms of convincing the electorate that Labour 
was capable of managing the existing economic settlement.  There is certainly little 
indication that it was trying to win over the electorate by mobilising it politically to a 
counter-hegemonic project.  There has been no qualitatively new political agenda for 
managing the British economy since the 1997 election, mainly because the Labour Party 
offered no prospect of such an agenda at that election.  As Richard Rose states quite 
bluntly, a strategic decision was taken to make a virtue out of “refusing to fight 
Thatcherism” (Rose 1997: 751).  Such a claim is more difficult to sustain in some spheres 
than in others (on which, see Barnett 1997; Lister 1997; Norris 1998; Prabhakar 1998; 
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Evans 1999).  Yet, its unwillingness to be seen attempting to undo the political economy 
of Thatcherism has been particularly stark.  It was through a distinctive political economy 
project that the Thatcher governments of the 1980s first presented themselves as the 
champion of the middle-classes.  Moreover, the fact that New Labour has subsequently 
striven to re-position itself as the guardian of that political economy represents a clear 
attempt to be seen defending the middle-class gains that Thatcherism made possible. 
 
A significant element of choice is in evidence here.  The Labour Party obviously had no 
choice in the 1980s about being faced by Conservative Governments who were 
determined to restructure the capital relation in line with the interests of its middle-class 
constituencies.  Yet, it has had a choice about whether to respond to that restructuring by 
accepting or challenging it.  As a consequence, it is necessary to reject assumptions that 
the Labour Party’s conversion to neo-liberal economics has been determined by a series 
of objective constraints existing within the domestic political environment.  Such 
constraints are constructed in the same way as those relating to the external economic 
environment.  I have argued in previous chapters that the explanation of neo-liberal 
convergence between the main parties revolves less around global economic trends than it 
does dominant ideas about globalisation.  I would now like to rehearse a similar argument 
in this chapter.  It is not so much actual middle-class intransigence which has made the 
Labour Party so wary of challenging the legacy of Thatcherite economics.  Rather, it is 
the dominant political discourse of ‘taxpayer revolt’ that casts such a shadow over the 
prospects for progressive redistribution (see Norris 1993). 
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It is perhaps important that the comparison between the party’s construction of the 
constraints it faces which are external in origin and economic in nature, and those which 
are domestic in origin and electoral in nature, is not pushed too far.  Certainly, there 
would appear to be one big difference between them.  I concluded the previous chapter by 
suggesting that the available evidence pointed to Labour being fully aware that its 
globalisation rhetoric routinely overstated a far from global reality.  By contrast, there is a 
distinct lack of evidence for applying a similar argument to its perceptions of domestic 
electoral constraints.  When New Labour has spoken of its inability to re-politicise the 
fiscal agenda, its concerns for taxpayer revolt really do seem to be genuine.  In the minds 
of Labour’s leaders at least, there would appear to be a great degree of symmetry between 
rhetoric and reality in this instance.  Put simply, New Labour argues that a redistributive 
tax agenda would harm its electoral prospects precisely because it believes this to be the 
case. 
 
 
 
 
Taxpayer Revolt and Electoral Crisis 
 
The overall aim of Labour’s post-1987 ‘modernisation’ is perhaps best captured by the 
party’s own notion of ‘reconnection’ (see Smith 1992; Gamble 1992).  In strict electoral 
terms, reconnecting with society has meant a concerted attempt to re-embed the party 
within an electorally viable coalition of social forces.  ‘Modernisation’, then, is 
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inextricably linked to the party’s perceptions of electoral crisis (Coates 1996; Panitch & 
Leys 1997; Sassoon 1998). 
 
However, if the extent of the party’s electoral crisis became increasingly obvious from 
1979 onwards because of four successive general election defeats, the party’s diagnosis of 
the nature of that crisis has been less clear-cut.  The struggle for the context in which the 
crisis was to be understood split the party in the early 1980s.  Moreover, the ensuing 
divisions remain to this day.  Indeed, the current leadership has actively courted 
awareness of such a split, using it to promote comparisons between Old and New Labour 
which have been distinctly self-serving.  For those within the party resistant both to the 
pace of ‘modernisation’ and to the leadership continually emphasising its ‘inevitability’, 
the key to electoral rejuvenation has always been in the ability to better mobilise Labour’s 
natural voting base to a traditional working-class programme (on which point, see Shaw 
1994: 200-2).  For those determined to drive the ‘modernisation’ process to its logical 
conclusion, such reasoning was seen more as the cause of the party’s electoral problems 
than their solution.  Looking back at the post-1987 Labour Party, Colin Hughes and 
Patrick Wintour write of the “forbidding intensity of [the modernisers’] purpose and their 
contempt for those party members who did not share [the same] priorities” (Hughes & 
Wintour 1990: 203).  The element of the ‘modernisation’ project which prompted most of 
that intensity - and, indeed, most of the contempt which was aimed at dissenters - was the 
attempted mobilisation of brand new constituencies to the party’s colours.  If that 
required liberating the party from its own political history in the search for power, then 
(for the modernisers at least) so be it. 
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As David Butler and Dennis Kavanagh suggest, the 1992 general election proved to be a 
watershed in the course of the ‘modernisation’ process (Butler & Kavanagh 1997: 46).  
Given the wider political and economic contexts within which the election was fought, 
most of the party leadership considered it ‘unlosable’ (Heffernan & Marqusee 1992).  If 
the history of post-war British politics tells us just one thing, it is that incumbent 
governments find it more difficult to win elections when either political or economic 
conditions turn against them.  When both are unfavourable at the same time, expectations 
of a change in government run especially high.  However, the Major Government 
inflicted the Labour Party’s fourth successive defeat in 1992 with a far from popular 
leadership and at the bottom of a protracted recession.  The modernisers’ reaction to that 
defeat was to adopt a position which served to justify the trajectory upon which it had 
already set the party.  Buoyed by a series of leading articles in the popular press which 
were arguing a similar line, the modernisers concluded that the party was in danger of 
rendering itself structurally unelectable were it to continue to appeal solely to its 
traditional voters (King 1993). 
 
The argument was simplicity itself.  The party’s core voting block was assumed to have 
shrunk so significantly because of wider social trends that future electoral arithmetic was 
always likely to work against it unless a broader voting base was established (see 
Margetts & Smyth 1994; Nairn 1994).  Two tendencies need to be emphasised in this 
respect.  Firstly, Thatcherism was assumed to have accelerated a pre-existing tendency 
towards social mobility.  Put in somewhat crude terms, the number of working-class 
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people with genuine working-class concerns was perceived to be getting smaller.  As 
such, the future for any party espousing a distinctly working-class agenda appeared rather 
bleak (Denver 1998).  Thus, incremental yet cumulative changes in the social structure 
were seen to have marginalised Labour from the electoral mainstream (Kellner 1997; 
Norris 1997).  Secondly, Thatcherism was also assumed to have impacted - and this time 
more significantly - on aspirations to social mobility.  Therefore, not only has Labour 
been disadvantaged by a declining working-class base, it has been doubly disadvantaged 
by the fact that an increasing number of the remaining working-classes have come to feel 
disinclined to vote for an explicitly working-class agenda. 
 
It has become a psephological common-place to argue that, across the board, class-based 
loyalties now play a diminished role in voter decision-making (see Sanders 1998).  In 
practice, however, this ostensibly general trend has effected distinctly one-way outcomes.  
The middle-classes have not shown themselves to be any less inclined to vote for parties 
seeking to defend middle-class interests.  It is only the working-classes who seem to be in 
the process of dissolving traditional class alignments.  This is certainly the assumption to 
which the Labour Party would appear to be operating.  As a consequence, it has chosen to 
re-define its electoral appeal, focusing less attention on trying to mobilise the working-
classes and more on trying to mobilise the aspiring middle-classes. 
 
The advent of New Labour itself is perhaps the single biggest example of the way in 
which this assumption has come to dominate party thinking.  Remove the idea that the 
outcome of British elections is now decided by the votes of those aspiring to social 
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mobility (on which idea, see Hall 1992), and perceptions of the electoral imperatives on 
which New Labour was founded become increasingly difficult to sustain. 
 
Assumptions of the strategic significance of Britain’s ‘contented majority’ have had a 
particular impact upon the party’s fiscal policy priorities.  Its tax plans were the first to be 
recast so that they posed no sense of threat to the living standards enjoyed by such 
constituencies (Sanders 1996).  The party’s belief that it could ‘get away with’ making the 
middle-classes contribute more of their income to finance state expenditures accordingly 
became a major casualty of perceived changes to the social structure of its own support 
(cf Norris 1993).  The ‘voice of Basildon’ at the 1992 election was assumed to be the 
authoritative voice of the voters the party had to win if it was ever to form a government.  
Labour’s leaders thus set themselves the task, quite literally, of reducing the ‘price’ of not 
voting Conservative.  In 1992, the party was accused of having lacked a clear message to 
match the Conservatives’ simply stated preference for getting the tax system off voters’ 
backs (Lipsey 1992).  Five years later, it had closed this gap by moving decisively 
towards the Conservatives’ political terrain.  The success of such a strategy is plain to see.  
By abandoning commitments to more progressive forms of taxation, the party not only 
changed the relative ‘price’ of voting Labour.  It also brought many more people into that 
particular market as it did so. 
 
Of course, by accepting that no political space now exists for re-politicising the fiscal 
agenda, the Labour Party has given up more than merely one means of institutionalising 
progressive redistribution.  It would appear to have given up on the ends of redistribution 
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as well (Coates 1996; Shaw 1996).  Traditional left mobilisation, aiming to use the 
personal tax system to drive collective social advance, appears very much as yesterday’s 
issue when set within the context of contemporary British politics.  Certainly, the only 
occasions on which Labour has mentioned tax-based redistribution since the 1992 
election has been to assure the middle-classes that it had no desire to revive the class 
antagonisms of the past through a ‘punitive’ economic policy.  Indeed, the ‘classlessness’ 
which has been the hallmark of the party’s economic stance following the advent of New 
Labour has been struck on distinctively ‘middle-class’ terms.  At the very least, its 
programme has been tailored to those who understand their interests as being served by 
policy commitments couched in terms of a middle-class ‘classlessness’. 
 
 
 
 
New Labour as a Party of Middle-Class Common-Sense 
 
The manner in which the Blair Government approached the 1997 election merely 
affirmed the existing social hierarchy in Britain.  As Roy Hattersley concludes, “the 
sceptred isle [is] firmly under the control of the suburban middle-classes” (Hattersley 
1998: 385).  Although New Labour offered the promise of improved welfare, its 
manifesto commitments indicated that this was to be sourced at lower cost.  Similarly, its 
calls for an increasingly compassionate society mandated no-one to pay for its creation.  
As Leo Panitch and Colin Leys suggest, the vision of ‘national renewal’ which the Labour 
  321 
Party presented to the electorate in 1997 “could not help giving the impression of 
insubstantiality” (on which point, see Hay & Watson 1998: 34-40).  As they explain, “it is 
difficult to appear weighty and forceful if what you propose is essentially to do better 
with less” (Panitch & Leys 1997: 259).  This observation is well made.  However, it could 
also be slightly to miss the point.  The Labour Party’s concern to be seen to be offering 
the prospect of doing ‘better’ may well have been of only secondary importance.  It is 
possible that its primary aim was precisely to be seen making do with less.  For, this 
provided a means of presenting conclusive evidence that the party was now ‘on message’ 
with its perceptions of the tax demands of its target constituencies. 
 
Of course, such a conclusion represents a rather different interpretation of the Labour 
Party’s actions as compared with that of the party itself.  I am suggesting that Labour’s 
leaders now accept that the particular interests of the middle-classes should be articulated 
to the general interest of society as a whole.  Hence, I concentrate on the distinctive 
normative position which Labour has adopted.  By contrast, the party prefers to suggest 
that it has merely accepted the ‘common-sense’ demands of the environment in which it 
finds itself.  As such, it is technical questions which are being emphasised.  For the 
current leadership, the very essence of New Labour has been to liberate the policy-making 
process from the ideological battles which have dominated twentieth century politics, but 
which the Prime Minister has declared “irrelevant” to contemporary events (Blair 1997a).  
The key to understanding the party’s policy programme is to be found, according to 
offical party line at least, in the search for objectives which “all ‘right-minded people’ 
support” (Hattersley 1998: 384).  Arguments constructed through the perspective of 
  322 
‘class’ have therefore been rejected, their overt politicisation being viewed as “nothing 
but obstacles to good thinking” (Blair 1997a).  In the party’s own terms, then, New 
Labour cannot be seen as a middle-class party, because it privileges issues of technical 
competence over any form of group identification.  Tony Blair’s blatant disregard for 
“ideological blueprints”, and his associated commitment to “doing ... what works”, is 
emblematic in this respect (Blair 1996b, 1999).  New Labour therefore constructs itself 
not so much as a party of the middle-classes as a party of ‘common-sense’. 
 
Adopting a Gramscian perspective, however, these two descriptions need not be mutually 
exclusive.  The essence of ‘common-sense’ for Gramsci was a situation in which a 
specific interest was articulated to the ‘national-popular interest’ in the general absence of 
political mobilisation in favour of alternative visions of society (Gramsci 1971: 130-3; 
Poulantzas 1978; Carnoy 1984).  ‘Common-sense’ therefore relates to much more than 
merely technical concerns.  To the extent that it signifies the parameters of future political 
possibilities, ‘common-sense’ is itself a highly political construct.  Moreover, it is 
necessary to emphasise that it is merely a construct.  As such, a given set of 
circumstances is capable of sustaining a whole range of possible ‘common-senses’.  
Which of the competing ‘common-senses’ will prevail at any given moment is, of course, 
dependent on the dominant political dynamics of that time.  For electoral reasons, New 
Labour has increasingly ruled itself out from leading the popular mobilisation of new 
political dynamics in Britain.  As such, it has shown no desire either to wrest control of 
the policy agenda from the country’s middle-classes or even to question the ‘common-
sense’ on which that control is founded.  Insofar as Labour is a party of ‘common-sense’, 
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then, it is undoubtedly a party of middle-class ‘common-sense’.  The only sense in which 
its leaders appear to have dissolved the category of ‘class’ within British politics is 
through rendering middle-class values so unambiguously as the values to which the 
whole of society should be aspiring (Blair, Interview with BBC News, 03.09.99).  New 
Labour is a living embodiment of the fact that, to be considered classless within the terms 
of contemporary British political culture, it is necessary to espouse an actual middle-class 
agenda. 
 
That such an agenda is increasingly uncontested by the parliamentary left in Britain owes 
much to the political economy of globalisation.  Ever since the collapse of the Thatcher 
Government’s Medium-Term Financial Strategy, globalising dynamics have replaced 
monetary targeting as the means through which a strictly orthodox macroeconomic policy 
has been insulated from potential political rearticulation (Bonefeld & Burnham 1996).  
Just as the Thatcher Governments were more interested in the social and political 
functions which monetarism could perform than the economic purity of monetarism per 
se (for interpretations of this claim from right and left respectively, see Bulpitt 1986, 
McDowell 1991), so it is with New Labour and its strategic appropriation of the dominant 
discourse of globalisation.  New Labour has used its relatively free hand in defining what 
globalisation is to mean in Britain in order to increase its chances of re-embedding itself 
within the middle-class voting block it now sees as hegemonic.  This it has achieved 
through manufacturing consent for the sheer ‘unquestionability’ of the neo-liberal 
ideology which serves the material interests of the dominant middle-class voting block.  
The dominant discourse of globalisation has been functional to such an end insofar as it 
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asserts that in present circumstances there are, in any case, no viable alternatives.  
Continually repeating the main claims of the globalisation hypothesis has enabled the 
party to present its conversion to a middle-class agenda in a ‘taken-for-granted’ manner.  
The ‘common-sense’ character of its appeal to Britain’s middle-classes has in turn 
allowed that appeal to be treated as credible, and such credibility has subsequently paid 
dividends in terms of potential electability. 
 
However, it is important to note the way in which the ends of electoral rejuvenation have 
been used to justify the means of eliminating strategic visions of society which fail to 
conform to pre-existing political norms.  Globalisation rhetoric has been appropriated by 
the Labour Party to disempower potential resistance to such conformity.  Beyond that, the 
image of globalisation as a causal phenomenon is much more difficult to sustain.  The 
important dynamics at work here would appear to be primarily political.  For instance, it 
is unlikely that the electoral pay-offs to using the conventional wisdom of globalisation 
would have been as spectacular as they were had a successful war of position against 
egalitarian ideals not been fought before-hand within the party.  It is necessary to 
remember that the Labour Party was already moving to meet an electorate whose centre-
of-gravity it considered to be to its right before it began to engage actively with 
globalisation’s dominant discourse of ‘neo-liberal necessity’.  Indeed, it was only when 
set within the context of such a move that this discourse was able to resonate quite so 
deeply with its new target constituents amongst the middle-classes.  Remove from the 
equation the Labour Party’s rightward drift from the time of the Policy Review onwards, 
and two conclusions immediately present themselves.  Firstly, it is far from certain that 
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the party would have been in a position to approach the middle-classes with the sort of 
commitments which formed the basis of its 1997 manifesto.  Secondly, even if this had 
not proved to be the case, it is most unclear that the middle-classes would have found 
such commitments believable.  Moreover, no amount of globalisation rhetoric would 
have been sufficient to bridge this ‘credibility’ gap had the Labour Party not already 
begun to accept the political demands which globalisation is argued merely to confirm. 
 
As such, it is clear in this instance that New Labour’s globalisation rhetoric serves as a 
post hoc rationalisation of a political project of change upon which the party was already 
embarked (Watson 1999b).  The current leadership’s desire to be seen distancing itself 
from much of the party’s past represents acceptance of a future constructed by others (see 
Heffernan 1996).  When Labour talks of the imperatives of ‘competence’, it is necessary 
to ask: ‘competence on whose terms?’.  Equally, when it talks of the imperatives of 
‘credibility’, it is necessary to ask: ‘credibility on whose terms?’.  Unquestionably, the 
answer is not its own, nor yet that of its traditional voting base.  As Colin Hay suggests, 
Labour’s modernisation has been driven almost exclusively by electoral considerations, 
and hence a desire to end the “one-party political settlement” prevailing in Britain since 
the election of the first Thatcher Government in 1979.  Yet, its strategy for modernisation 
has seen the party “accommodate itself to the content of that settlement ... committing 
itself to operating within the confines of a ‘one-vision polity’” (Hay 1997b: 4). 
 
Even the fact that it has chosen to use the language of ‘competence’ and ‘credibility’ in 
the way it has is indicative of such a tendency.  For, New Labour has engaged only 
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minimally with trying to rearticulate the dominant meanings which are attached to such 
language within public discourse in Britain.  As such, the strategic vision of ‘competence’ 
and ‘credibility’ to which Labour Party economic policy is now oriented remains 
fundamentally intact from the days of Thatcherite government.  It is ‘credibility’ to 
manage the economy on agreed principles of neo-liberal necessity which New Labour 
seeks, and ‘competence’ in the eyes of the financial market guardians of middle-class 
interests which it espouses. 
 
Whilst the extent of the reach of Thatcherite values into British society remains much 
debated (see, for instance, Crewe 1988), their effect on the dominant political vocabulary 
of the day should be less in doubt.  The distinctive success of Thatcherism lies less in its 
ability to reshape British political institutions (see Riddell 1983; Marsh & Rhodes 1992; 
Kerr & Marsh 1999), than in its ability to reshape the language which was used to 
constitute the understanding of ‘normal politics’ in Britain (see Hall 1979; Hall & Jessop 
1985; Leys 1990).  Under the influence of New Labour, this language continues to set the 
discursive parameters within which systemic ‘common-sense’ is currently articulated in 
British politics.  If key floating voters can be thought to possess anything which 
resembles a ‘collective will’, then it is now assumed that this can only be tapped into by 
using the terms popularised by the New Right in the 1980s.  This goes some way to 
explaining the continued ascendancy of discourses of ‘self-help’, ‘individual morality’, 
‘aspirations’, ‘social mobility’, ‘competitiveness’ and ‘market necessities’. 
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As Stuart Hall suggests, ‘Old’ Labour appeared anachronistic in relation to the rest of 
contemporary British politics primarily to the extent that it refused to engage anything but 
critically with such language (Hall 1992).  Even after the completion of its post-1987 
Policy Review, opinion poll data indicated that the party’s continuing unease with talking 
the language of ‘competitiveness’ and ‘market necessities’ was understood by the 
electorate to be a scepticism about socio-economic change more generally (Lipsey 1992; 
Kenny & Smith 1997; Kellner 1997).  Yet, it was precisely these dynamics of change 
which the Conservative Governments of the 1980s and 1990s had successfully linked to 
the prospect of social mobility (Leadbetter 1987).  It appears that very few people actually 
believed John Major’s argument that a vote for the Conservatives in the 1992 election 
necessarily meant that economic recovery would begin the next day (Heath, Jowell & 
Curtice 1994: 276).  Equally, however, the broader message about harnessing the wider 
dynamics of change to lead not only to improved economic performance, but also the 
fulfillment of aspirations to social mobility on the back of such improvements, struck a 
sufficiently responsive chord to ensure a further defeat for ‘Old’ Labour (Hall 1992; cf 
Norris 1993). 
 
In response to that defeat, Labour’s modernisers began to search for a set of ideas which 
they believed would enable them to be taken seriously when they spoke of the 
‘competitive imperative’ and the ‘demands of the market environment’.  Such a search 
centred on the dominant discourse of globalisation.  The use of globalisation rhetoric has 
allowed the party to highlight perceptions of a brand new phase of capitalist development, 
the like of which has never been seen before (see Watson 2000c).  Moreover, as this logic 
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has diffused and penetrated political structures, it is further assumed to have swept away 
the sedimented institutions and dominant norms of a now bygone era.  Even the familiar 
addition of the prefix ‘New’ to the party’s name is testament to such an assumption (on 
which point, see Hay & Watson 1998). 
 
The subsequent suggestion that New Labour is dedicated to working “with the grain of 
global change” (Blair 1996b) has been used not only to force the distinction between 
‘Old’ and ‘New’, but also to force the party’s new-found appeal to the middle-classes.  
New Labour has consciously attempted to remove the last lingering doubts that it may be 
suspicious of the social benefits of economic change by demonstrating that it is ‘on 
message’ with the most exaggerated period of economic change yet witnessed.  A 
complex process of mutual articulation between ‘globalising realities’, ‘competitiveness 
concerns’, ‘qualitative novelty’, ‘individual aspirations’ and ‘social mobility’ is therefore 
in evidence.  In the following section, I seek to shed more light on such an articulation by 
focusing explicitly on the party’s changing understanding of the competitive imperative. 
 
 
 
 
New Labour’s Discursive Construction of the Competitive Imperative 
 
New Labour has tended to link issues of domestic competitiveness to the fact that all 
national economies now exist within a single global system of market forces.  We are told 
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that the ‘stateless’ character of liquid assets flowing through the international financial 
markets has effectively uprooted the domestic capital relation, displacing it to a higher 
spatial scale than the merely national.  It is governments’ inability to disrupt the 
boundless nature of contemporary financial flows which has consequently locked all 
states into a head-to-head struggle for scarce economic resources.  Even modest 
uncertainty within the markets that a government is fully in tune with the demands of the 
competitive imperative is considered sufficient to trigger destabilising disinvestment.  
Moreover, all governments are now assumed to be fully sensitised to the speed with 
which the financial markets can punish policy ‘mistakes’.  That knowledge is all that has 
been required to ensure that globalising realities have become a disciplinary anchor for 
government economic policy. 
 
In this, as with so many other aspects of New Labour’s use of globalisation rhetoric, there 
is much of which to be sceptical.  Firstly, it is necessary to question the economic logic of 
the link between the dominant discourses of globalisation and the competitive imperative.  
Such discourses are so obviously self-referencing.  Should we choose to relax any of the 
assumptions on which one is based, then the conclusions of the other are immediately 
stripped of their grounding.  On the one hand, concerns for a distinctively neo-liberal 
conception of the competitive imperative are based on a globalisation hypothesis which is 
simply assumed rather than proved.  On the other hand, the ‘necessity’ of a distinctively 
neo-liberal globalisation process are founded on concerns that the world has become 
more competitive.  Likewise, these concerns are simply assumed rather than proved.  
Question: How do we know that the economy requires a neo-liberal competitive 
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imperative?  Answer: Because it has been globalised.  Question: How do we know that it 
has been globalised?  Answer: Because it requires a neo-liberal competitive imperative.  
Even though it is the ease with which self-referential discourses can be rendered 
comprehensible which enables them to be reduced to the status of ‘common-sense’, this 
should not lead us to overlook the fact that the two discourses in question here are so 
evidently self-referencing. 
 
Secondly, and perhaps even more crucially, it is necessary to insist that historical events 
be placed in their correct temporal sequence.  An important chronological contradiction is 
involved in following New Labour’s assertion that its concerns for the competitive 
imperative result simply from the ‘realities’ of the new global era.  Given the date at 
which Labour first conceded the need to satisfy competitiveness concerns and the date at 
which it first pointed to the conditioning effects of globalisation, this is to have perceived 
cause occurring after observed effect.  It would be difficult to deny that the idea of 
globalisation has been used as a powerful rhetorical device, ensuring the resonance of 
Labour’s competitiveness discourse within public debate in Britain.  Yet, globalisation 
itself acts as little more than confirmation that the party had been right all along in terms 
of the prior introduction of a more competitive edge to its economic policy.  At most, 
then, globalisation has been instrumental in deepening the degree to which already 
dominant trends have been normalised as an increasingly ‘unquestionable’ aspect of the 
party’s political programme. 
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Causal inferences cannot be drawn simply from the emergence of a global competitive 
imperative per se.  Rather, we should be looking at the way in which the Labour Party has 
used the idea of such an imperative to effect wider political change.  To explain this 
further, discourses of competitiveness are in no sense politically-neutral.  The 
institutional ‘needs’ of capital can be satisfied in a number of different ways; each distinct 
model of capitalism serving different political ends.  For instance, given active political 
mobilisation to such a vision of society, it is possible to construct competitive advantage 
through the social embeddedness of economic institutions and the de-commodification of 
labour (on which, see Boyer & Drache 1996).  By the same token, in the absence of 
political parties willing to lead such mobilisation, competitive advantage tends to be 
constructed through attempts to disembed the capital relation from socially-oriented 
economic institutions (Coates 2000).  The result in this instance is typically that labour is 
re-commodified as it is forced onto open markets which are unprotected by social 
legislation (see Ross 1995: 58). 
 
This latter trajectory presents the better guide to the competitiveness strategy adopted by 
New Labour.  In this, there is a close correspondence between the Blair Government’s 
strategic intent, and that of the governments it succeeded.  The state continues to be 
inserted into the capital relation to ensure that new forms of work discipline provide the 
basis of the government’s response to the competitive imperative (Gray 1998).  As its 
workfare policies amply demonstrate, the Labour Party now has a supply-side regime 
every bit as dedicated to enhancing national competitiveness through disciplinary neo-
liberalism as the Thatcher Governments of the 1980s. 
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Globalisation may well have been the rhetorical justification for such a stance.  But 
globalisation is not needed to explain the active courting of a distinctively neo-liberal 
competitiveness strategy.  It is necessary to refer only to the way in which labour market 
restructuring has been used to emphasise those discourses of ‘self-help’ and ‘social 
mobility’ to which the aspirational classes are assumed to be so particularly attached.  I 
develop an analysis of this nature in the remainder of this section. 
 
It has become increasingly common for competitiveness concerns to be sourced directly 
through the terms on which the capital relation is experienced.  It is the experience of 
workers, specifically those in low-paid employment producing goods with a high degree 
of substitutability on world markets, which is deemed to be important.  The dominant 
trajectory of economic policy in Britain throughout the last twenty years has been aimed 
at making the domestic economy a world leader in this respect.  The fact that the Blair 
Government has done little to distance itself from its policy inheritance in this area (see 
Anderson 1992: 346) is indicative of the effect which the Thatcher Governments had on 
restructuring the whole idea of economic efficiency within public discourse in Britain 
(Gamble 1996: 26). 
 
For most of the post-war period, the regulatory arms of the state had been used to 
facilitate, even force, the continued rationalisation of the private sector as a means of 
fostering growth dynamics within the British economy (on which point, see Coates 
1999a).  However, the Conservative opposition successfully constructed a sense of 
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enveloping national crisis in the late 1970s in order to disarticulate the perceived political 
rationality of such forms of economic management (Hay 1996).  That crisis was assumed 
to have its roots in the increasing difficulty which governments of both left and right were 
experiencing in their attempts to impose any form of sustainable growth trajectory onto 
the domestic economy.  Where once the state had been believed to be functional to 
national competitiveness, now it came to be viewed as an impediment to it.  Moreover, 
the negative impact of an over-active state was assumed to reach beyond the economy 
and into society more generally.  Governments which tried to manage the economy 
consequently became constructed, not only as a brake on the ability of the economy to 
grow, but also as a brake on the ability of individuals to fulfil their personal aspirations by 
successfully riding the coat-tails of such growth. 
 
According to New Labour, a fundamental element of ‘Old’ Labour’s electoral crisis was 
that it became unable to liberate itself from such a construction within popular political 
debate.  Whenever ‘Old’ Labour presented itself to the electorate as a potential party of 
government, it was assumed that it did so on terms that the electorate associated with a 
past to which it did not want to return.  In this respect, the 1987 election was perhaps the 
most crucial of Labour’s four successive defeats.  For, it was this election, played out 
against the backdrop of the Lawson boom, which allowed Labour’s modernisers to 
highlight perceptions that the electorate doubted whether Labour truly understood what 
was required to insert the British economy into an international environment which was 
already believed to be highly competitive.  Taking the modernisers’ line, Charles 
Leadbetter argued in an influential Fabian pamphlet of the time that: “Neither occasional 
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press conferences nor glossy policy documents were going to establish an association 
between Labour and economic dynamism” (Leadbetter 1987: 5).  As a consequence of 
this missing link, the Conservative Government of the day held the largest lead ever 
recorded in response to the question of which party was considered best able ‘to make 
Britain more prosperous’.  Indeed, a majority of voters expressed concern that a potential 
Labour government would ‘undo most of the good things that have been done over the 
last few years’ in terms of securing the material base of that increased prosperity (Lipsey, 
Shaw & Willman 1989: 20-1).  Such was the extent to which ‘Old’ Labour was accused 
of failing not just personal economic aspirations, but the aspirations of the country as a 
whole. 
 
In particular, the fear seemed to be that a Labour government would erode the 
foundations of the economic growth which Thatcherite restructuring had delivered 
because of its refusal to privilege macroeconomic over social policy (Leadbetter 1987: 5; 
cf Hay & Watson 1999a).  The Conservative Government was able to make Labour’s 
policy priorities resonate strongly in populist terms - but this was in a way which was 
wholly detrimental to Labour’s chances of forming the next government, whilst being 
favourable to its own.  Whereas the Conservative Party repeatedly linked future economic 
growth to the ability to satisfy middle-class aspirations of increased personal wealth, it 
also suggested that Labour’s leaders were only interested in future economic growth so 
that they might be able to satisfy their own aspirations to equalise wealth within society. 
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It is this perception, and in particular the effects it was presumed to be having on 
Labour’s electoral fortunes, which explains not only Labour’s appeal to the competitive 
imperative but also the precise way in which that appeal has been presented.  New 
Labour’s insistence that all competitiveness strategies must have their roots in labour 
market flexibility (see, for instance, Brown 1995; Labour Party 1996; Cook 1997; Blair 
1997b) owes much to its perception of the need to be seen subordinating social to 
economic policy concerns.  Somewhat paradoxically perhaps, exposing domestic labour 
to the rigours of a largely unregulated international market is assumed to bring electoral 
rewards.  For, it also serves to break the link in the minds of the party’s target middle-
class constituencies between Labour and its former egalitarian instincts.  With that link 
broken, New Labour has been able to talk the language of ‘individual aspirations’ and 
‘personal wealth’ to Britain’s middle-classes.  Moreover, as the result of the 1997 
election shows only too well, Britain’s middle-classes now tend to believe that Labour’s 
leaders are genuine when they do so. 
 
To conclude, the ‘public face’ of the Blair Government may well continue to appeal to 
globalising ‘necessities’ in circumstances in which it faces challenges from its left over its 
strategies for increasing labour market flexibility.  However, this notion of causality is 
difficult to sustain.  Again, it is the dominant discourse of globalisation, rather than 
globalisation per se, which has the greater impact here.  Even then, that impact is 
somewhat superficial to the way in which the Labour Party has aligned itself to 
competitiveness concerns.  Globalisation rhetoric, and in particular Labour’s use of such 
rhetoric to insist on being seen to be working with the grain of globalising tendencies, has 
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allowed the party to convey precisely the image of economic dynamism which it 
presumed had previously been missing.  As Dennis Kavanagh is surely correct to note, 
Blair personally has been “almost obsessive in speeches, interviews and soundbites in his 
use of the words ‘new’ and ‘change’” (Kavanagh 1997: 537).  New Labour has chosen to 
understand ‘Old’ Labour’s inability to win elections through the perspective of 
widespread perceptions that the party had become so suspicious of novelty that its first 
instinct was to resist any form of change.  Two decades in the electoral wilderness 
convinced the party’s modernisers that such an instinct had now led it to resist change 
which key elements of the electorate were more than willing to embrace.  The party’s 
active engagement with globalisation rhetoric, which really took off amidst a flurry of 
keynote speeches by Tony Blair and Gordon Brown in the spring and summer of 1995 
(Hay & Watson 1998), has served to dispel such perceptions once and for all.  
Accordingly, there is much of a profoundly political nature which lies behind the Labour 
Party’s acceptance of a fundamentally neo-liberal competitive imperative.  This can only 
be masked by the appeal to the simple causal determinism which is to be found in the 
conventional wisdom. 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
  337 
I have suggested that the Labour Party’s current macroeconomic stance has emerged as a 
result of the mutual articulation of ‘globalising necessities’, ‘competitive imperatives’, 
‘the limits of government’, ‘middle-class aspirations’, ‘social mobility’, ‘default neo-
liberalism’ and ‘electoral constraints’.  No straightforward line of causation operates 
between them. 
 
My conclusions consequently stand in contrast to much of the existing academic literature 
in this area.  There, the debate on New Labour tends to split into one of two types of 
argument.  Recent changes in the party’s policy priorities are linked either to the 
international economic environment in which Labour’s leaders find themselves, or to the 
domestic political environment in which they are situated.  I have attempted to break 
down this division between international and domestic restructuring.  In particular, I have 
highlighted the way in which ideas about restructuring at the international economic level 
have been used to legitimate prior restructuring at the domestic political level.  New 
Labour’s globalisation rhetoric has found such a significant degree of resonance within 
popular political debates in Britain precisely because it has been used to confirm the 
continued reproduction of a pre-existing domestic political settlement. 
 
As such, I have also attempted to transcend a frequently articulated divide between the 
dominant discourses of ‘neo-liberal necessity’ and ‘middle-class common-sense’.  Whilst 
it is restructuring at the international economic level which is most commonly viewed 
through a perspective of ‘neo-liberal necessity’, it would be a mistake to exclude from 
such a perspective the way in which that rhetoric has served to legitimate restructuring at 
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the domestic political level.  Equally, whilst it is restructuring at the domestic political 
level which is most commonly viewed through the perspective of ‘middle-class common-
sense’, it would also be a mistake to exclude from such a perspective the way in which 
that rhetoric has served to reproduce restructuring at the international economic level.  It 
is therefore clear that the dual discourses of ‘neo-liberal necessity’ and ‘middle-class 
common-sense’ do not relate to two autonomous aspects of social reality.  There is no 
sense in which a plausible narrative of contemporary social change can be sustained when 
set within the context of an imagined split between one sphere called ‘the economic’ and 
another called ‘the political’.  Neither can such a task be fulfilled when set within the 
context of an imagined split between one sphere called ‘the international’ and another 
called ‘the domestic’.  At all times, we must simultaneously acknowledge the 
international economic conditions of domestic political dynamics and also the domestic 
political conditions of international economic dynamics (Hay & Marsh 1999: 14).  
Globalising tendencies are currently being generated in Britain through the complex and 
dialectical articulation of the domestic and the international, and of the political and the 
economic (Hay & Watson 1998: 16-26).  Such a conclusion must be applied to both the 
material and the discursive construction of globalising tendencies.  Quite clearly, the 
ability to create parsimonious models of social change are complicated still further when 
it is recognised that the material and the discursive realms are also dialectically related 
(Watson 1999b, 2000b; Marsh 1999). 
  
 
 
 
CONCLUSION: 
 
IDENTIFYING THE ACADEMIC 
AND THE POLITICAL SPACE FOR EXTENDING 
THE STUDY OF ‘GLOBALISING OUTCOMES’ 
 
 
  340 
 
 
 
Against Globalisation as Grand Narrative 
 
It is the nature of all academic work that it is necessarily limited; that it leaves unresolved 
as many issues as it answers.  This comment is particularly pertinent given the subject 
matter of this thesis.  For, in many areas of both academic and public policy debate, the 
image of globalisation is enlisted to play a grand narrative role.  Globalising tendencies 
have increasingly been appealed to as a default explanatory phenomenon.  Moreover, it 
has also come to be used as a description of, as well as an explanation for, almost every 
element of socio-economic change that we would currently appear to be experiencing.  
The possibility that those experiences may be more precisely linked to other causal 
factors is largely overlooked in the rush to attribute all aspects of contemporary socio-
economic change to exogenous economic forces. 
 
It is that image, of globalisation as grand narrative, that I have attempted to move beyond 
in this thesis.  A rather startling hole still exists within the academic literature for analyses 
of this nature.  Furthermore, guilty as much of the academic literature is of making under-
specified generalisations about the dynamics of the globalisation process, the public 
policy-making debate tends to be based on ever cruder accounts of international economic 
change.  Thus, both a significant academic space and a significant political space exists 
for re-thinking both the causes and the consequences of globalisation. 
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In order to address such concerns, this conclusion proceeds (albeit briefly) in three stages.  
Firstly, I assess the hole within the existing academic literature that I am attempting to fill 
with this thesis.  I do this by reviewing those aspects of the thesis which I consider to be 
its major original contributions to the literature.  Secondly, I assess the holes which still 
remain within the thesis itself.  There are clear sins of omission in the preceding chapters, 
and I attempt to address these by suggesting new directions in which this analysis could 
be taken in the future.  Thirdly, the thesis concludes in exactly the same manner as it 
started, by arguing that there is an awful lot at stake politically in the construction of 
knowledge about globalisation.  I review the new political spaces which are opened up if 
we choose to operate with my revised reading of the globalisation debate. 
 
 
 
 
Contributions to the Literature 
 
My main aim has been to try to transcend economistic explanations of the constraints of 
the contemporary public policy-making environment.  This is the explanation which 
continues to dominate both public discouse and, although admittedly to a lesser extent, 
the existing political economy literature on international economic restructuring.  
However, I suggest that such a view can only be sustained on the basis of underlying 
conceptual assumptions which are themselves unsustainable. 
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Perhaps most obviously in this respect, globalisation tends to be constructed as a purely 
exogenous process.  The very word ‘globalisation’ implies a spatial scale which exists at 
one stage removed from domestic political dynamics.  As such, it is usual for domestic 
political actors to be conspicuous by their absence from most accounts of the 
globalisation process.  This is an argument which I seek to expose to direct challenge by 
identifying the domestic political conditions of international economic reform. 
 
I have suggested that it makes sense to identify such conditions, because it is through 
domestic politics that institutional bargains are struck which make possible the social 
reproduction of consent to market outcomes.  This has been true of the way in which 
market outcomes have been sustained in the past at both the national and the international 
level.  Moreover, even though the empirical data reviewed in Chapter One implies that 
we are still far from experiencing a world of truly global market outcomes, if we are ever 
to experience such a world, then the same basic condition will surely apply.  If domestic 
political actors do not work to secure consent for the social reproduction of market 
outcomes, or at the very least do not secure some sort of substitute for such consent, then 
the process of market formation immediately becomes more problematic.  In other words, 
no degree of assertion of the ‘inevitability’ of globalisation - however powerfully argued 
and however passionately believed - would ever appear to be sufficient to enforce 
globalising outcomes, so long as the mechanism for securing social consent for such 
outcomes was absent. 
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Or would it?  Given the rather different notion of causality I have used in this thesis to 
explain the experience of globalising outcomes, I am not so sure.  Indeed, I have argued 
that ideas about globalisation can have an independent causal impact on the production of 
globalising outcomes, over and above that which can be attributed simply to the material 
effects of recent international economic restructuring.  At the very least, then, it would 
seem that I have to leave open the theoretical possibility that the constant repetition of 
arguments about the ‘inevitability’ of globalisation can be used to displace the need for 
active consent to globalising outcomes in the absence of popular political mobilisation to 
resist such outcomes.  Clearly, however, that is an empirical question which cannot be 
answered on the basis of a limited number of case studies, let alone the single case which 
has been presented in this thesis. 
 
That said, an analysis of the British experience of globalising outcomes has offered a 
number of important insights into why the globalisation process cannot be reduced to 
simple determinations located in the sphere of exogenous economic forces.  
Contemporary British politics is noticeable for the absence of a mainstream party willing 
to lead resistance to the ‘inevitability’ of the political straitjacket which globalisation is so 
often said to enforce.  In an important sense, then, this also means that the need for active 
consent to the experience of global market outcomes is also absent.  For, there would 
seem to be no viable channels of popular representation capable of directing a withdrawal 
of consent from the existing regime into an alternative political project of change.  
Indeed, in the hands of the Blair Government, it is the constant invocation of a globalising 
political logic of no alternative which has been used to police the parameters of popular 
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political mobilisation such that a withdrawal of consent from the existing macroeconomic 
settlement is unlikely to lead to the institutionalisation of alternatives.  Thus, in present 
circumstances, the continued reproduction of the macroeconomic status quo in Britain 
depends as much on the use of the idea of globalisation to ensure political resignation that 
no viable alternatives exist as it does on active mobilisation to the status quo. 
 
This is significant, because it suggests that the prior reconstitution of the material 
structures of the international economy need not have taken place in a manner consistent 
with the globalisation hypothesis for us to experience outcomes consistent with that 
hypothesis.  Instead, the fact that a government may believe that the world has been 
restructured in this way could be a sufficient condition for us to experience such 
outcomes.  Moreover, if this suggests that government actions in producing globalising 
outcomes are essentially unwitting, there is another explanation of this trend which 
suggests the exact opposite.  For a range of possible reasons located in the sphere of 
domestic politics, it is possible that governments strategically enlist the image of 
globalisation specifically to close off the space for popular political mobilisation against 
the prevailing macroeconomic settlement.  Empirical research is clearly needed to decide 
which of these two scenarios more closely fits the globalisation experience in any given 
national context.1  Either way, however, it demonstrates that the dominant discursive 
construction of globalisation within that national context can have an independent causal 
effect on the domestic political agenda. 
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This is certainly what my analysis of the Blair Government’s use of the idea of 
globalisation - and, in particular, its use of the idea of a globalising logic of political 
necessity - would suggest.  Although it has not been my intention to write a thesis about 
New Labour per se, and my arguments about the Blair Government serve as no more than 
illustrations of wider theoretical concerns relating to globalisation, it is clear that my 
conclusions stand in marked contrast to those of much of the literature in this area.  It has 
been usual for that literature to concentrate on the way in which the Labour Party has 
sensitised itself to policy-making constraints imposed exogenously by international 
economic forces.  By contrast, I have focused on the way in which New Labour has 
enlisted the image of international economic forces specifically as a constraint on its 
policy-making aspirations.  This image has subsequently been appealed to in order to 
render redundant forms of popular political mobilisation resistant to the status quo of 
British politics. 
 
This has been particularly important to New Labour, given the party’s history of leading 
resistance to the type of macroeconomic regime which currently constitutes the status quo 
in Britain.  Indeed, the party’s present leaders would seem to have identified a clear 
contradiction between that history on the one hand, and what it had become required to 
do to secure its own electoral rejuvenation on the other.  The party has come to perceive 
the ‘impossibility’ of leading Britain’s electorally-ascendant classes to resist the 
macroeconomic status quo.  In such circumstances, the strategic appropriation of 
globalising rhetoric has paid rich dividends.  On the assumption that globalisation rules 
                                                                                                                                                                             
1 Of course, it may prove difficult to differentiate precisely between these two causal tendencies purely at 
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out all macroeconomic alternatives, the appeal to a political logic of no alternative has 
successfully immunised New Labour from even having to ask Britain’s electorally-
ascendant classes whether they would be prepared to be led away from the prevailing 
status quo. 
 
Of course, it would be wrong to extrapolate from this single case to suggest that these 
conclusions represent a more general ‘state of the world’.  Clearly, different governments 
will attempt to drive their domestic political agendas through the construction of a logic 
of ‘globalising imperatives’ for a range of different reasons.  Equally clearly, the nature of 
those ‘imperatives’ is likely to differ from case to case, depending on the dominant form 
of political mobilisation existing within the country under review.  The need for a more 
explicitly comparative perspective than that presented here would therefore seem to be 
compelling. 
 
 
 
 
Avenues of Future Research 
 
The most obvious direction that my work could take in the future would be to place more 
empirical flesh on the bones of the theoretical framework which has been outlined here.  
My aim has been to assert the need to study the domestic political conditions of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the empirical level. 
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international economic reform.  I have argued that reform dynamics are in no sense the 
manifestation of a generic logic or a single tendency.  In this respect, it should be clear 
that it is not even necessary to make the assumption that ‘globalisation’ is a global 
phenomenon.  Rather, both globalising tendencies and the political ‘necessities’ they are 
assumed to summon are produced politically, through the concrete process of historical 
struggle.  Such a process continues to be dominated by attempted mobilisation in and 
through domestic political structures.  Given the differentiated nature of that struggle as it 
crystallises in different countries, it is more plausible to talk not of a singular logic of 
globalisation, but of very many different logics.  As a result, it is to be expected that these 
different globalising tendencies will reveal themselves in different globalised outcomes.  
The focus of future empirical research in this area should therefore be the historical 
specificities both of the way in which globalised outcomes are produced, and also of the 
way in which such outcomes are experienced. 
 
Two conclusions appear most prominently from the preceding analysis.  Firstly, I have 
argued that it is not necessary to experience globalisation per se in order to experience 
outcomes consistent with the globalisation hypothesis.  Secondly, I have argued that such 
experiences are likely to be the product of nationally-distinct processes of causation.  As 
such, causal influences which can be identified in one particular setting cannot 
automatically be argued to apply in others.  Sustained empirical comparisons are therefore 
required to reveal the extent to which any single causal influence should be viewed in 
specific or general terms. 
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Such comparisons could reasonably be expected to shed more light on the substantive 
features of the constitutive role which the discursive construction of globalisation has on 
its material construction, and also of the causal role which ideas about globalisation have 
in the production of globalising outcomes.  It has been suggested at quite a high level of 
theoretical abstraction that these relationships will hold at all times.  Yet, in practice, their 
particular manifestation is likely to vary from case to case. 
 
It is usual for spatial comparisons to be introduced into empirical research in order to try 
to pick up on cross-case variance (on which point, see Rose 1991).  However, whilst this 
would also seem to be the most obvious means of extending the study from its present 
focus, it is not the only means.  In general, there is utility in comparing across time as 
well as across space (Mackie & Marsh 1995).  Clearly, given the extremely contemporary 
nature of the globalising moment, at present it is simply not feasible to undertake 
sustained temporal comparisons of different forms of the globalisation experience in 
Britain.  That said, there is ample reason to believe that such a comparison may not only 
be feasible some time in the near future, but also highly instructive. 
 
Moreover, it is not only potential swings of electoral fortune which could make such a 
comparison fruitful.  For example, the most interesting aspect of Gordon Brown’s most 
recent Budget was the extent to which New Labour would no longer appear to find it 
necessary to appeal to the conditioning effects of globalisation in order to rationalise the 
production of outcomes consistent with the globalisation hypothesis.  From the party’s 
‘discovery’ of globalising tendencies some time around 1994, through the general 
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election of 1997 and right up to the week before the 1999 Budget, the image of an 
objective structure of global capital flows appeared ever-present.  By contrast, the Blair 
Government’s third Budget - which was widely publicised in the media as being “the 
defining moment” of New Labour (see The Mirror, 10.03.99: 8) - was justified purely on 
its own terms.  All references to a governing global economic essence had been erased. 
 
Of course, it remains to be seen whether this continues to be the case.  However, 
irrespective of what the future holds, the third New Labour budget offers two valuable 
insights into the need for future research in this area.  Firstly, it shows that it is more than 
feasible for governments to re-negotiate their understanding of precisely what globalising 
pressures imply.  Secondly, it also shows that governments do negotiate their own 
understanding of those pressures in the first place. 
 
Moreover, it is not only the changing features of the domestic political environment 
which may have an influence on the way in which New Labour chooses to construct 
globalisation in future time periods.  In addition, there are also likely to be new 
constraints emerging from the international economic environment which will have more 
of an effect on its understanding of systemic imperatives than they do at this moment.  
Perhaps most significantly, New Labour’s construction of globalisation has emerged from 
a political context in which discussions of the formal processes of European monetary 
union have been almost entirely absent.  Yet, from the signals which have recently 
emerged from both the Prime Minister’s Office and the Treasury, it is possible that this 
situation will not hold much longer.  There has still been no definitive statement about 
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whether the government is preparing to head the campaign for taking Britain into the 
Eurozone some time after the next election, but there is every indication that discussions 
about EMU are likely to feature more prominently in public discourse in the future than 
they have in the past.  In such circumstances, all appeals to the notion of economic 
‘necessity’ will have to take account not only of globalisation, but of the processes of 
European monetary union as well. 
 
The restructuring of the economy in Europe is a multi-dimensional process which extends 
beyond globalising norms to integrationist tendencies.  As such, a study of the current 
restructuring of any single European economy would preferably include, not only an 
appreciation of each aspect of this multi-dimensional process, but also an appreciation of 
the interactions between them.  At present, however, it would be reasonable to suggest 
that the existing literature on socio-economic change within western Europe tends to be 
boxed off into separate analyses of the individual tendencies which are driving that 
change.  There are only a limited number of studies which do not treat globalisation and 
European integration as isolated aspects of the current historical moment.  Of these, the 
number which focus specifically on the interaction between the two is even smaller. 
 
However, there are good reasons for extending the scope of this thesis in order to take 
account of that interaction.  For instance, it would seem to make sense to ask about the 
extent to which European integration might be seen as attenuating, exacerbating or even 
initiating tendencies towards the reconstitution of economic ‘common-sense’ throughout 
contemporary Europe.  Perhaps most significantly, further attention needs to be paid to 
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the extent to which the Maastricht convergence criteria in particular might be seen as the 
proximate cause of many of the effects more frequently attributed to globalisation (see, 
for example, Watson 1998b).  Even the most cursory glance at the dominant discourses of 
‘economic necessity’ currently in operation in Europe would suggest that very different 
appeals are being made to the processes of European integration and globalisation in 
justifying redrawing the parameters within which the capital relation is currently 
experienced (see Hay, Watson & Wincott 1999).  Once again, it is necessary to caution 
against the analysis presented here being read as a general theory of globalisation.  As 
Peter Taylor-Gooby argues, for instance, of the four G7 economies in Europe, only 
France shares with Britain the greater emphasis which is given to restructuring concerns 
linked directly to a set of ideas about globalisation.  In Germany and Italy, by contrast, the 
Maastricht convergence criteria have tended to dominate the public discourse articulating 
changing understandings of economic ‘necessity’ (Taylor-Gooby 1996). 
 
The introduction of a far-reaching comparative perspective into the analysis - not only in 
terms of who is studied but also in terms of what is studied - may well serve to further 
blur the causal influences which have traditionally been attributed to globalisation.  For, it 
is clear that the appeal to globalisation is by no means a global appeal.  This is not to say 
that public discourse operates anywhere without reference to conditioning effects existing 
within the external economic environment.  Yet, such effects, which until recently have 
been perfunctorily described as ‘globalising imperatives’ by New Labour in Britain, are 
just as likely to be understood elsewhere in Europe as an outcome of the process of 
monetary integration.  Moreover, with the likely introduction of the Stability Pact, which 
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will police the parameters of autonomous fiscal policy even more rigorously than did the 
Maastricht convergence criteria, it would appear reasonable to expect that the rhetorical 
link between conditioning effects in the external economic environment and European 
integration will become even stronger in the future. 
 
 
 
 
New Academic Spaces and New Political Spaces in the Study of ‘Globalising Outcomes’ 
 
As the complex institutional bargains which form the basis of European monetary union 
demonstrate, the restructuring of the international economy is clearly politically-driven.  
This is an issue which is all-too-frequently overlooked amidst talk of global ‘invisible 
hands’.  Moreover, such talk is not only academically restrictive, it is also politically 
debilitating. 
 
Indeed, the dominant neo-liberal discourse of globalisation may have captured the 
imagination of public policy-makers in Britain precisely because it is politically 
debilitating.  The mere assumption of globalisation has been used to circumscribe the 
parameters of what is now considered to be politically possible.  Moreover, by appealing 
to the pressures of a global ‘invisible hand’, it has done so in a way which forces the 
impression that public policy constraints are being imposed at a spatial scale which the 
dynamics of domestic politics can do nothing to influence.  In other words, the dominant 
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discourse of globalisation has been appropriated in order to de-politicise the experience of 
the macroeconomic status quo.  According to ‘invisible hand’ assumptions, resistance is 
futile. 
 
My intention in attempting to deconstruct the dominant discourse of globalisation is to 
help shape a political space in which resistance is seen as anything other than futile.  If 
the dominant discourse should be seen as a means of de-politicising the experience of 
international economic reform, the attempt to deconstruct it should be seen as a means of 
re-politicising that experience.  To the extent that it represents a call to arms, it is about 
re-establishing a context in which we can once again think that the world could be 
different from how it is presented now (on which point, see also Hay & Marsh 1999: 19). 
 
The essence of all political resistance is that it is first necessary to identify clearly and 
unambiguously exactly what it is that is being resisted.  In the case of globalisation, 
however, that process of identification is far from straightforward.  The implication of the 
preceding chapters is that strategies of resistance need not necessarily be aimed at 
globalisation per se; or not, anyway, at a material structure of global markets.  The 
empirical data reviewed in the opening chapter, for instance, would certainly suggest that 
such a structure is by no means complete, there are no truly global demand and supply 
dynamics which would imply the existence of truly global markets.  Our search must 
therefore go on for the most relevant site of resistance to contemporary international 
economic restructuring.  If the conclusions of this thesis are in any sense valid, that search 
should probably concentrate on the widely-held idea that governments now have no 
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choice but to act in a manner consistent with the existence of a material structure of 
globalisation, and hence in a manner which itself threatens to bring such a structure into 
existence. 
 
When we talk of resistance to globalisation, then, we may not really be talking at all about 
resistance to globalisation per se.  What we may really be talking about is resistance to 
the conclusion that globalisation encapsulates a pure economic logic which involves the 
systematic eradication of political choice.  The very word globalisation implies a process 
of reorganisation which has taken place ‘after’ something (Amoore et al 1997: 182).  
Within the terms of the dominant discourse, that ‘something’ has tended to be constructed 
as an economic experience whose precise nature was mediated politically.  Social agency 
in the form of the state, social movements and organised labour are all basic to forms of 
politics which previously have been mobilised in order to mediate our experience of the 
capital relation.  Yet, it is precisely these political practices which the globalisation 
hypothesis seeks to deny.  Political choice is typically presented within that hypothesis as 
the ability to opt-in or to opt-out.  However, globalising dynamics are assumed to remove 
the social space that we may once have enjoyed to exercise the opt-out option.  Hence, we 
tend to be presented with a world which we must accept for what it is, and learn to re-
negotiate our own priorities accordingly.  Even if this means that we are being asked to 
give up the right to struggle politically over the way in which our world is shaped for us 
to experience, then so be it. 
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Resistance to globalisation, then, would seem to be all about reclaiming the legitimacy of 
political interventions into the economy and, even more fundamentally, the right to be 
political.  The very first thing that resistance would have to encompass is reasserting the 
political right to resist.  For, that also becomes the right to choose to imagine, affirm and 
realise alternative modes of human development.  It is only through reclaiming the 
legitimacy of political struggle that it would seem to be possible to hold open for 
ourselves the opportunity of building a world which is qualitatively different from the one 
in which we live today. 
 
The political intent which underwrites the attempt to deconstruct the dominant discourse 
of globalisation lies in the desire to hold open such possibilities.  The alternative 
conceptualisation of globalisation which I have advanced in this thesis consequently 
speaks to more than merely academic concerns. 
 
Clearly, any discourse of resistance is an artefact of prior discourses of emancipation and 
empowerment.  By opening up an academic space in which it is possible to challenge the 
dominant discourse of globalisation, I also hope that it has become possible to open up 
the political space to challenge globalisation’s perceived logic of no alternative.  Not only 
would this entail liberating political choice in relation to the world in which we currently 
live.  It would also allow us to hand down to generations yet unborn the ability to make 
definitive political choices about the world in which they are destined to live. 
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Postscript 
 
Let me finish with a quote from T.S. Eliot, in which Eliot outlines the significance of 
history.  “Someone said,” he wrote, “‘The dead writers are remote from us because we 
know more than they did.’  Precisely, and they are that which we know” (cited in Blaug 
1978: vi).  Today’s present is, of course, tomorrow’s history, which allows us to use 
Eliot’s observation to gain an insight into the importance of our actions today.  If future 
generations are to be given the right to know a world which they are active participants in 
shaping, then we would seem to have a responsibility in the present to explore new forms 
of knowledge about globalisation which preserve the ability to resist perceptions of its 
political logic of no alternative.  The stakes of a revised and reinvigorated globalisation 
debate are therefore extremely high; let that debate begin. 
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